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
ON THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE:

AN EXPOSITION OF

"THE DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY."

ON

THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE:

AN EXPOSITION OF

" ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,

OR THE DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY,

BY JOHN HORNE TOOKE."

BY CHARLES RICHARDSON, LL.D.

AUTHOR OF A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

" What an epoch in many a student's intellectual life has been his first acquaintance with ' The Diversions of Purley.' "—TRENCH, on *The Study of Words.*
" Nor did any one ever take up ' The Diversions of Purley' and lay it down, till some other avocation tore it from his hands." —LORD BROUGHAM, *Statesmen of George III.*

CONTENTS.

PREFACE.

I HAVE thought it would be a fitting, and might prove a useful, employment of these last days of my life, if I were to prepare for publication some papers which have for many years been lying by me;—having for their object, An Exposition of the Grand Doctrines of " The Diversions of Purley,"—by a plain, concise statement of those doctrines, accompanied by such notes and commentaries as to me seemed requisite and proper for the purpose. The greater portion of these papers was written before the commencement of that happy cessation from war, and those horrors of war, into which a ruthless and most faithless despot has at this moment plunged us. Others have been written at different and less distant intervals. Yet all will lay claim to the weight that may be thought due to long and deliberate conviction, with the additional advantage of a careful revisal.

That the work itself—to use the Author's own emphatic expression on a different occasion—" will live for ever,"[*] there can be no doubt; and it is, and has long been, my ambition to spread the

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[*] On Erskine's Speech in Defence of Hardy. See Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors, vol. vi. p. 477, note.

knowledge of such its unquestionable title to im-
mortality.

It is unfortunately too true that the Author, by
his vigorous attacks on all parties, and his bitter
personalities against individual members of those
parties, whether Whigs or Tories, or supposed fa-
vourites of the Court, brought upon himself (and
it is not a matter of surprise that such should be
the consequence) the severe punishment which the
spirit of retaliation is never slow to inflict.

Much, undoubtedly, may be alleged in his ex-
cuse, and Lord Brougham generously steps in,
not, I think, as the partial advocate, but as a fair
and enlightened judge.*   The sum of his Lord-
ship's apology is, that Horne Tooke had been com-
pelled to pay a heavy fine, and suffer an imprison-
ment of twelve months; and those twelve months
destined to be among the most active of his life, for
having written, and set his name to, a just and,
as it would nowadays be considered, a mild de-
nunciation of an attack by the king's troops on our
American brethren.†   For his peaceful exertions to
obtain Parliamentary Reform and good govern-
ment for the country, he had, under many aggra-
vating circumstances, when bent down with griev-
ous infirmities, been hurried away in the night,
subjected to an inquisitorial examination before a
secret council; again flung into prison, and only
released, after months of confinement, and after
having his life put in jeopardy by a trial for high

* See Statesmen in the Time of George III.—Mr. Horne Tooke.
† At Lexington, in Massachusetts, on the 19th April, 1775.

treason. " These," his Lordship feelingly observes, " are sufferings, which fair weather politicians know nothing of."*

It is to be regretted that the passions thus excited in the hotbed of politics, should be carried into the retreats of literary life; though here again it may be urged in mitigation, that something political was mingled with the literary character of those with whom he came principally in contact: Harris, who was a Lord of the Treasury, and Dr. Johnson, who enjoyed a pension, and had written three pamphlets in defence of the measures of the Government.

As far as the former, with Lord Monboddo, and Doctors Oswald, Reid, and Beattie are concerned, he pleads, in his own defence of his asperity, the manner in which they treat the " vulgar, unlearned, and atheistical Mr. Locke " (for such are the imputations they cast upon that benefactor of his country); on Locke, " whom (as Ben Jonson says of Shakespeare) I reverence on this side of Idolatry."

It was during the first imprisonment that he wrote his Letter to Mr. Dunning, afterwards Lord Ashburton† (who was not, Lord Chatham

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* Another circumstance vitally affecting Tooke's prospects in life, must not be omitted. The refusal of the Benchers of the Inner Temple to admit him to the Bar, after quitting the *Order* of Clergy. This Lord Brougham ascribes to " the indelible nature of English Orders; " but the sufferer himself to political persecution. The question seems likely to be revived.

† Dunning married a sister of Sir Francis Baring, in whose son, Alexander, the extinct title was revived.

affirmed, a lawyer, but law itself); in which he
appeared for the first time before the public as a
philosophical grammarian, and in which is to be
found all that he had ever afterwards to say *on the
conjunctions.*

The Author tells us that at the time of writing
the letter,* he was in the King's Bench Prison,
" the miserable victim of two prepositions and
a conjunction." The expression has often been
quoted, and deserves to be explained.

The information filed against him, charged that
he, John Horne, did write and publish, &c., a cer-
tain false, wicked and seditious libel *of and concern-
ing* his Majesty's Government, and the employ-
ment of his troops, according to the tenor, &c. On
the trial a verdict of Guilty was returned; and a
question was raised by Horne—first on motion in
arrest of Judgment, and afterwards on Writ of
Error in the House of Lords; whether the writing
contained in the information, was, in point of law,
sufficiently charged to be a libel *upon* his Majesty's
Government. And it was in both Courts decided
in favour of the Crown. In the meantime the pe-
riod of imprisonment had expired, to which the
miserable victim of the two prepositions and con-
junction, " of and concerning," had been con-
demned. And thus he had suffered the full penalty
of the sentence before it had been determined that
he had been guilty of any crime.

It was on this first trial that, as Lord Campbell

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* It is dated, April 21, 1778.

candidly and not, I hope, inadvertently, acknow-
ledges that his countryman, the noble earl, the ve-
nerable judge, " *confident* in the *anti-Yankee feel-
ings* " of the jury, *so framed* his charge as to secure
from them a verdict of Guilty ! !

And it is in introducing the event of the second
trial (referred to by Lord Brougham), that Lord
Campbell declares himself wholly at a loss to ac-
count for the infatuated obstinacy exhibited by
the Crown lawyers, after the trial and acquittal of
the first of the number charged with treasonable
conspiracy. " To the amazement of the public,"
says his Lordship, " it was announced that another
prisoner was to be tried on the same charge and
the same evidence, and that this prisoner was
JOHN HORNE TOOKE, a man popular by his
agreeable manners, admired for his literary acquire-
ments, who had ever conducted himself with cau-
tion and discretion (and), known to be aristocratic
in his inclinations . . . Yes! JOHN HORNE TOOKE,
with a constitution broken by age and disease, but
with a mind as alert and youthful as when he
wrote against Junius, and spoke against Thurlow,
was next called upon to hold up his hand at the
Bar of the Old Bailey." *

Thus much I have felt it incumbent upon me to
introduce, with a view to make the reader ac-
quainted with the true character of our Author;
and surely it is now high time that angry feelings
should subside, and that the offences of the man,

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* Lives of the Chancellors, vol. vi. p. 485.

whatever they may have been, should no longer
have an influence in estimating the value of his
work; and yet it unhappily must be acknowledged
that such feelings, even at the present day, are some-
times suffered to burst forth with all their early
virulence.

It is full forty years, be it remembered, since
Chantrey laid the foundations of his own fame and
fortune, by immortalizing the features of " the old
man, wasted by sickness, with a night-cap on his
head, totally unlike his former self, but fearfully
like him at the present moment."*   The old man
survived about fourteen months.

I am willing to believe, however, though pre-
possessions and prejudices are long preserved as
traditionary mischiefs, that in various quarters,
among scholars, and philosophers also, "The Diver-
sions of Purley" is a work which does now receive
a more candid and impartial, and consequently a
more enlightened consideration, than has been al-
lowed to it in times past.   Hence I derive some
encouragement to believe also that this my contri-
bution to the diffusion of the doctrines it inculcates,
will be welcomed as an acceptable addition to our
stock of philosophical philology.   It has been under

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* Stephens' Life of Tooke, v. ii. p. 412.   Chantrey's bust of
Horne Tooke was exhibited at Somerset House in 1811.   Tooke
died in March, 1812.   Such and so great were the acknowledged
merits of this bust, that it obtained for the artist commissions to
the amount of £10,000.   Nollekens was so pleased with this pro-
duction of a young artist, that he desired one of his own busts to
be removed, and Chantrey's put in its place.—See JONES' *Recol-
lections*, and HOLLAND'S *Memorial*, of Sir F. Chantrey.

this persuasion, and conceiving it to be an official duty entirely within my province, that I have undertaken the publication of this little book. My familiarity with the great work itself, and the constant, and I trust not unsuccessful, use I have made of its principles in the composition of THE ENGLISH DICTIONARY, may justify a presumption that I am, at least not ill, prepared for the performance; and especially so since, as I have already observed, the materials have been so long in manuscript before me.

There is one circumstance which I must not omit to notice; that modern philologers have far too singly directed their own researches, and diverted the views of the student in language, to other channels,—those of affinities or ethnological resemblances,—and, in pursuing their own course, have somewhat ungratefully ignored the very existence of the work of their great teacher.

But writers less confined, or I would say, much more enlarged in their speculations,* have arisen among us; and the attention of scholars in every class of society has recently been aroused to the peculiar and exclusive merits of " The Diversions of Purley;" particularly by Mr. Trench, in the Preface to his popular lectures " On the Study of Words."† He there declares his opinion, that " the first acquaintance with ' The Diversions of Purley'

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* See hereafter the quotations from " Guesses at Truth," &c. p. 95.

† Addressed (originally) to the Pupils at the Diocesan Training School, Winchester.

must have formed an epoch in the life of many a
student." In this opinion I most cordially agree.
But Lord Brougham bears more ample and decisive
testimony both as to the intrinsic merits and at-
tractive qualities of the work. " The simple gran-
deur," says his Lordship, " of the leading idea
which runs through the whole of Mr. Tooke's sys-
tem, at once recommends it to our acceptation.
But the details of the theory are its great merit,
for he followed it into every minute particular of
our language, and only left it imperfect in confining
his speculations to the English tongue, while
doubtless the doctrine is of universal application.
He had great resources for the performance of the
task which he thus set himself. A master of the
old Saxon, the root of our noble language; tho-
roughly and familiarly acquainted with our best
writers; sufficiently skilled in other tongues, an-
cient and modern,* . . . he could trace with a clear
and steady eye the relations and derivations of all
our parts of speech, and in delivering his remarks,
whether to illustrate his own principles, or to ex-
pose the errors of other theories, or to controvert
and expose to ridicule his predecessors, his never-
failing ingenuity and ready wit stood him in such
constant stead, that he has made one of the dryest
subjects in the whole range of literature or science,
one of the most amusing and lively of books; nor
did any one ever take it up and lay it down till
some other avocation tore it from his hands."—

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* In old and modern French and Italian, not only sufficiently
skilled, but deeply learned.

" And, as every thing which had been done before was superseded by it, so nothing has since been effected, unless in pursuing its views and building upon its solid foundations."*

The names of Brougham and Trench (to which that of Mackintosh may be added†) are the names of no common men, not indeed of learned linguists and grammarians, but of enlightened philosophers, and I must confess give me additional encouragement in this my long deferred attempt to extend the utility of the work by a full and fair exposition of its principles, and by an endeavour to illustrate " the simple grandeur of its leading idea," and also, as I proceed, to remove some wrong impressions, which have been received by writers of great ability and authority in those branches of philosophy not only most intimately connected with, but moreover indeed ultimately dependent on, the Philosophy of Language. To these objects I shall strictly confine myself. Much of the spirit, which the form of dialogue occasionally gives to the original, especially at the outset, must be necessarily lost, and those sallies of wit against some, and pungent sarcasms against others, by whom the author thought himself (and not unnaturally) both maligned and injured, are entirely withheld.

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* Statesmen in the Time of George III.—Mr. Horne Tooke.
† See infra, p. 36.

INTRODUCTION TO THE DIVERSIONS
OF PURLEY.

THE scene of the dialogue is laid at Purley, in the neighbourhood of Croydon, a seat there in the occupation of Mr. Tooke.* There Horne is found domesticated by the then Bishop of Gloucester, Dr. Richard Beadon, a friend of both host and guest, and who was called as a witness in defence of the latter, when arraigned as a traitor at the bar of the Old Bailey. The conversation commences by the Bishop's bantering Horne on his partiality to the spot; for it was formerly the seat of the noted Bradshaw, who sat as president at the trial of Charles the First; and very probably the place had its attractions on that account.

Politics, however, are said to be strangers there; and the Doctor is informed, that the last topic of discussion had been an opinion advanced by Horne (an opinion at this time very likely to find favour with numerous zealous advocates for the extension of Education *among* the middle, and *to* the humbler classes of society), " that all sorts of wisdom

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* From the place the book received its title, and from the occupier the author received his second name.

and useful knowledge may be attained by a man of plain sense without what is *commonly* called learning." Grammar, is, to the surprise of the Host and the Doctor, excepted by Horne; who thinks Grammar (meaning *Philosophical* Grammar) difficult; yet, though difficult, " to be absolutely necessary in the search after philosophical truth, which, if not the most useful, is at least the most pleasing employment of the human mind—and to be no less necessary in the most important questions concerning religion and civil society." Our English Grammar, the Doctor replies, may be sufficiently and easily learnt from Dr. Lowth, or from the *first** (as well as *best*) English Grammar, by B. Jonson. And when not grammar in the common acceptation, but the *causes and reasons* of grammar are stated to be the points on which satisfactory information is required, the Doctor with an air of triumph refers to the HERMES of HARRIS, a work which Lowth had pronounced to be " the most beautiful and perfect analysis that had been exhibited since the days of Aristotle." And if the skill of the workmanship (Mulciber illic) be alone considered, the praise may not be much exaggerated.

That book, however, is rejected by Tooke and Horne; the former asserting that he could not " boast of any acquisition from its perusal, except,

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* This is a mistake. Gill and Butler preceded Jonson. His grammar was posthumous; and not published till the year 1640, three years after the author's death. Gill's appeared in 1621, 2nd Ed. Butler's in 1633.

indeed, of hard words and frivolous or unintelligible distinctions."* And the latter subsequently describes it to be " an improved compilation of almost all the errours, which grammarians have been accumulating from the time of Aristotle down to our present days of technical and learned affectation."†

The introductory dialogue ends with Horne undertaking to attempt (though at the risk of exposing himself) an investigation into the principles of Philosophical Grammar: a subject‡ not entirely new to his thoughts; for he observes, " I very early found it or thought I found it, impossible to make many steps in the search after truth, and the nature of *human* understanding, of *good* and *evil*, of *right* and *wrong;* without well considering the nature of language, which appeared to me to be inseparably connected with them."§

" You will begin then," says the Bishop, " either with *things or ideas:* for it is impossible we should ever thoroughly understand the nature of the *signs,* unless we first properly consider and arrange *the things signified.*"

Our author acknowledges this to be true: but nevertheless determines to commence with " *The Distribution of Language,*" for as Hermes is re-

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* D. of P. Introduction, p. 7, 4to. Ed.

† C. 7, p. 120.

‡ It appears from the evidence of Dr. Beadon on Tooke's trial in 1794, that Horne, when at Cambridge, had directed and was eagerly pursuing his researches into this subject.

§ Introduction, p. 12.

corded to have put out the eyes of Argus, and as
it may be suspected he has likewise blinded phi-
losophy, it is to language we must resort with a
view to detect by what means the delusion has been
effected.

CHAP. I.

OF THE DIVISION OR DISTRIBUTION OF

LANGUAGE.

THE author starts with the first purpose of language — to communicate our thoughts. The ancient grammarians, confining themselves to this principle, reasoned thus : —words are the signs of things :—there must, therefore, be as many sorts of words or parts of speech as there are sorts of things. How many, then, are the sorts of things, and consequently the sorts of words ? Of the former it was agreed that there are two : 1. Res, quæ permanent; 2. Res, quæ fluunt. Therefore, there must be two of the latter : 1. Notæ rerum, quæ permanent, (or the noun); 2. Notæ rerum, quæ fluunt, (or the verb).*

But still there are words, neither Notæ rerum

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* Sanctius, in illustration of these expressions, " Res, quæ permanent," and " res quæ fluunt," observes, that whatever is spoken of, is either permanent; as arbor, a tree; durum, hard: or fluent; as currit, he runs; dormit, he sleeps. That is, a tree is (by nature) always a tree; but *he* (any man) does not (by nature) always run or always sleep.

" Quod Græci, ὃν vocant :—id partim significat *res permanentes* :—partim *fluentes*. In hac partitione tota vis orationis nostræ consistit :—Constantium igitur rerum notam, *nomen* dixere : earum vero, quæ fluunt, *verbum*." Scaliger de Causis, Cap. 72. And Sanctius :—" Quidquid enunciatur, aut est permanens, ut

permanentium; nor, Notæ rerum fluentium: call them all *particles* or inferior parts of speech: or, as, 'by their constant interposition between nouns and verbs, they seem in a manner to hold speech together, call them conjunctions or connexives. Here then were three parts of speech. About the time of Aristotle, a fourth, the article or definitive, was added.*

Here the search for different sorts of words from difference of things ended. The difficulty then was, under which of these four classes each word should be placed; and the method of proceeding became reversed; and still allowing that there must be as many sorts of words as of things, these learned grammarians adopted the converse—that there must be as many differences of things as of signs: and many laborious grammarians confined them-

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Arbor, Durum: aut fluens, ut *currit, dormit.* Res permanentes sive constantes vocamus, quarum natura diu perstat: harum notam NOMEN dixere. Fluentes dicimus, quarum natura est, esse tamdiu, quamdiu fiunt. Harum nota VERBUM est. Rursus verbis et nominibus deerat Modus, per quem causarum ratio explicaretur. Hic in nominibus dicitur PRÆPOSITIO: ut *versatur in tenebris propter ignorantiam.* In verbis est ADVERBIUM: Nam si qualitatem innuas, dices; *bene currit:* si tempus, *hodie* legam. Postremo orationes ipse inter se indigebant ligaturis: quare *conjunctio* fuit excogitata. Hæc Plato. Lib. de Ente. Sanctii Minerva, Lib. 1, c. 2.

* Veteres enim, quorum fuerunt Aristoteles atque Theodecles, verba modo, et nomina, et convinctiones tradiderunt. Videlicet quod in verbis, vim sermonis, in nominibus, materiam, (quia alterum est quod loquimur, alterum de quo,) in convinctionibus autem complexum eorum esse judicaverunt :—Paulatim a philosophis ac maxime Stoicis auctus est numerus, ac primum convinctionibus *articuli* adjecti, post *prœpositiones,* &c. Quint. Lib. 1. c. 4.

selves to the differences observable in words, without any regard to the things signified. Hence the parts of speech have varied in number; and at last eight became usually acknowledged, though many did not include the same parts in their list.*

Though modern grammarians (after Aristotle) assert words to be the signs—not of things, but of ideas, thus approaching so far nearer to the truth; the nature of language has not become much better understood, for they now *supposed different operations* of mind to enable them to account for what different things were to account before: adding operation after operation as they imagined a necessity to do so.

It has been said that the ancient grammarians *confined* themselves to the principle, that the first purpose of language was to communicate our thoughts; they neglected the second; viz. to communicate those thoughts with despatch.† And hence the course of error into which they have been misled. Proceeding upon the definition that words are the signs of things or ideas, they have assumed

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* For instance, GILL distinguishes the parts of speech into noun, verb, and consignificative; including the adjective and pronoun within the noun: and in the consignificatives, the article, adverb, preposition, conjunction, and interjection. BUTLER;—into noun and verb, preposition and adverb, including, as GILL does, the adjective and pronoun within the noun; and the conjunction he considers to be a sort of adverb. B. JONSON classes the article with the pronoun, the adjective with the noun (substantive) the interjection and preposition with the adverb, and distributes the conjunctions under several heads.

† Locke lays down distinctly these two obvious purposes, and yet he is guilty of the same neglect.

that all words are immediately so; whereas many are abbreviations employed for despatch, and are the signs of other words. The invention of all ages has been upon the stretch to add such wings to their conversation as might enable it, if possible, to keep pace in some measure with their minds. Not, then, from difference of things, not from different operations of the mind: but hence,—from abbreviations for despatch (those wings of Mercury) arises the variety of words.

Abbreviations are employed in language. 1. In terms. 2. In sorts of words. 3. In construction. Upon the two former the respective excellence of every language depends. To the first Locke's Essay is the best guide. The second is the subject of the Diversions of Purley.

CHAP. II.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF MR. LOCKE'S ESSAY.

THOUGH Locke himself had not the least thought when he first began his discourse of the understanding, nor a good while after, that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it,* yet is the whole of his essay a philosophical account of the first sort of abbreviations, that is, in terms. Inquiry into the origin of ideas is a proper commencement for a grammarian who is to treat

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* Essay, Book 3, Chap. 9, § 22.

of their signs; but he was not singular in referring them to the senses, nor in so beginning an account of language.* Had he sooner been aware of the inseparable connexion between words and knowledge, he might have discerned that there was no *composition* in ideas, but only in terms; that it was as improper to speak of a complex idea, as to call a constellation a complex star; that not ideas, but terms, are general and abstract. He would have weighed not alone the imperfections, but the perfections of language; these perfections not properly understood being one of the chief causes of the imperfections of our philosophy. He himself remarks in his last chapter, speaking of the doctrine of signs, " The consideration, then, of ideas and words, as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation, who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were *distinctly* weighed and *duly* considered, they would afford us another *sort* of logic and critic than what we have hitherto been acquainted with." Further he ac-

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* " Philosophers that highten Stoiciens wende that the soule had bee naked of hymself, as a mirrour, or a cleane *perchemine*" (parchment), " so that all figures musten comen for thynges fro without in to soules, and been emprinted in to soules right as we been wonte, some tyme by a swifte pointen to fixen letters emprinted in the smothnesse or in the plainesse of the parchemine that hath no figûre, ne note in it." Chaucer Boetius, B. 5, Met. 4. Dutens, in his very curious work, On the Origin of the Discoveries attributed to the moderns, refers to the authors from whom we may trace the axiom falsely ascribed to Aristotle—" That there is nothing in the understanding, but what entered into it by the senses."

knowledges that " when having passed over the original and composition of our ideas,* I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so intimate a connection with words, that unless the *force* and *manner of signification* of words are first well observed, there can be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge." But though this is the declared reason of writing his 3rd Book, concerning language as distinct from *ideas*, yet he continues to treat singly as before, concerning the *force* of words, " names of ideas in the mind," (which force depends on the *number* of ideas of which that word is the sign,) and has not advanced one syllable concerning the *manner of signification :* he had not settled his opinion on the subject; it remained with him a desideratum, as it did with our great Bacon before him.

The argument used by Locke against innate ideas, viz. that the supposition of them is unnecessary, is equally valid against the *composition of ideas* —*their* supposition is unnecessary. Every purpose for which it was imagined may be more easily and naturally answered by the *composition of* TERMS; while at the same time the latter does, likewise, clear up many difficulties in which the former involves us.

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* Tooke asserting that all in Locke's Essay, which relates to what he calls the composition, abstraction, &c. of ideas, does indeed merely concern language, observes, " It may appear presumptuous, but it is necessary here to declare my opinion, that Mr. Locke in his Essay never did advance one step beyond the origin of ideas and the composition of terms."

Locke must be allowed to give his own explanation of that operation of the mind which he calls the Composition of Ideas: it is that "whereby it puts together those simple ideas it has received from sensation and reflection, and combines them into complex ideas."* Though he would say that the word *man* was the sign of a *collection* of ideas, (and it is greatly to be regretted that he did not see the difference between the terms collection and composition,) and the word *army* to be the sign of a larger collection; he would compound these collections of ideas—of ideas of sensible qualities, consisting of an indescribable variety of forms and colours, into one complex idea of form and colour."† But if the essay be read with attention and the composition of *terms*, &c. be substituted wherever a composition of *ideas*, &c. is supposed, the conclusions of the author will be equally true and clear, and no other argument will be needed against the composition of ideas.

Further, it is an easy matter upon Locke's own principles, and a physical consideration of the senses and the mind, to prove the impossibility of the composition of ideas.

" Though the qualities," he tells us, ". that affect our senses, are in themselves so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them: yet it is plain the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses, simple and unmixed.

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* Essay, Book 2, Chap. 11, § 6.
† See hereafter Locke's Notions of Substance.

The hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax, yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses." It is true they are distinct, and must remain so: the mind must ever preserve them so; it has no internal sense wherewith to compound them. Locke's internal sense of reflection has no such power, and indeed no such power is ascribed to it by him. But the argument applied by Tooke is of itself sufficient,— their supposition is unnecessary.*

Locke, in his 3rd Book, Chap. 7, on Language in General, divides words into nouns and particles; the latter should then have comprized all the other parts of speech, not excepting the verb: he declares these particles to be all marks of some action or inclination of the mind: and adopting the opinion of Aristotle, Scaliger and Port Royal, that " is † and is not, are also the general marks of the mind, affirming or denying :" that thus affirming and denying are operations of the mind, he referred all the sorts of words classed by him under the name of particle, to the same source, namely, the operations of the mind: though if they had been so to be accounted for, it was almost impossible they could have escaped his penetration.

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* Essay, Book 2, Chap. 2, § 1.

† As to this copula, see Hobbes' Works, folio Edition, p. 400, Kingdom of Darkness, Part 4, Chap. 6.

CHAP. III.

OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH.

THE difference of things, the difference of ideas, the different operations of the human mind being rejected, as guides to the division of language into parts of speech, the *two* great purposes of speech, namely, communication and despatch, lead to the only principles upon which to proceed: First, to words necessary for the communication of thoughts: namely, the noun and verb. Secondly, to abbreviations employed for the sake of despatch, and which abbreviations are strictly parts of speech because they are all useful in language, and each has a different manner of signification. The distinction between the two classes should however still be observed.

The necessary words are not signs of different sort of ideas, nor of different operations of the mind ; such operations (so called) are merely the operations of language. The business of the mind, as far as it concerns language, extends no further than to receive impressions, that is, to have sensations or feelings. A consideration of ideas, or of the mind, or of things (relative to the parts of speech,) will lead us no further than to nouns, that is, to the signs of those impressions or names of ideas. The verb must be accounted for from the necessary use of it in communication. It is, in fact, the com-

munication itself, and therefore well called Pημα, dictum. For the verb is quod loquimur; the noun, de quo.

REMARKS ON THE THREE FIRST CHAPTERS.

WE are now arrived at the conclusion of the three first chapters, through which I have thought it advisable to continue in direct progress without interruption. Our Author has laid clearly before us the branch of Philosophical Grammar on which he has undertaken to treat; distinguishing it precisely from that to which he considers Locke to have confined himself.

He has further, on the way, insisted that terms, and not ideas, are complex, general, and abstract; and that all in Locke's Essay which relates to such supposed ideas, merely concern language.

Further still, he has put himself boldly at issue with the logician and metaphysician, (who have been, and I fear still are, too prone to undervalue his labours,) with respect to the *operations of the mind:* a stumbling-block, most undoubtedly, that usually encounters us at the commencement of treatises on logic.

Our Author asserts these operations to be merely operations of language. " What," says Dr. Stoddart, " can be meant by operations of language? Every operation must have an operator. It is the operator that causes the operation, and not the contrary. It is not the amputation that causes

the surgeon, but the surgeon* that performs the amputation. It is not the furrow that directs the ploughman, but the ploughman who, *guiding his plough*, gives shape to the furrow."†

These are truisms, correctly understood. The plough of the ploughman could not perform the operation of ploughing without *his* guiding hand; nor could the hand perform it without his guiding will. Neither could the ploughman himself perform the operation without the hand, nor the hand without the plough. Each has its office: the physical or material operation demands and employs physical or material agents. The will of the man sets those *agents* in motion, and guides the operation as *they* progressively perform it.

The grand truth on which the position of Horne Tooke rests is, not expressly indeed, but impliedly, as being manifest and unquestionable,—that the mind *wills* the whole operation: volition is its power, and by that power it puts in action, it actuates, guides and governs the physical organs of speech; and by them are the operations of speech performed.

But before I proceed with a more particular re-

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* Consistency requires, " The surgeon *guiding his instrument*, who."

† Philosophy of Language, p. 22. This work, which displays very extensive reading, is an entire reconstruction of the *Grammar* published upwards of thirty-five years ago, in the first vol. of the 4to. Ed. of the Encyclopædia Metropolitana. The objections there urged against this doctrine of Tooke differ from those quoted above, and were replied to in the Gentleman's Magazine for May, 1841, p. 477, and that reply may perhaps have occasioned the change.

ply to the objections of Dr. Stoddart, it seems expedient to direct attention to the *operations* of the mind as they are taught by our logical professors *at Oxford:* Logic is, I believe, the pride of that noble University, and it is scarcely a matter of choice, that I should adopt as a text-book on which to ground the ensuing commentaries, " The Compendium of the Art of Logic,"* still used as a manual (with which no rival is permitted to interfere) by those students who are ambitious to include that art within the circle of their acquirements.

The Author of this highly-prized little book† avows himself a disciple of Aristotle, and he evidences a great mastery over all the forms of his art, and great subtlety in arranging and expounding them. It is worthy of remark, in passing, that, though in almost every branch of science great changes have taken place, and great advancement effected, yet in these chapters in the Oxford Logic (on the operations of the mind,) scarcely has an attempt been made beyond the simplification of some forms and the correction of some incongruities in the detail of rules, which deserve no higher title than that of technical.‡

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* Artis Logicæ Compendium; first published 1692.

† Dr. Henry Aldrich, Dean of Christ Church.

‡ The Rev. H. L. Mansell has lately published " Artis Rudimenta Logicæ, from the Text of Aldrich, with Notes and Marginal References." The notes are at continual variance with the text, so that the Oxford student has the double duty of learning and unlearning. And yet Aldrich is declared to stand without a rival. These notes, however, have no bearing on the points at issue.

The Compendium commences with enumerating the operations of the mind to be *in the whole* three. 1. Simplex apprehensio. 2. Judicium. 3. Discursus. *Simple* apprehension is again divided into incomplex and *complex*. Simplex apprehensio, or Simple *apprehension*, that is to say, the *operation* of simple apprehension or of apprehending simply, is defined by Aldrich to be " Nudus rei *conceptus* intellectivus, similis quodam modo perceptioni sensitivæ." " Apprehensio simplex *incomplexa*, est unius objecti, ut calami; vel etiam plurium, *confusè*, ut calami, manus, etc. Complexa, plurium, sed cum ordine quodam et respectu; ut calami in manu."*

Dr. Whately says that *Logical writers define* the operation (or state) of mind called Simple apprehension, to be " that *act* or *condition of mind* in which it receives a notion of any object, and which is analagous to the perception of the senses."† And

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* Mr. Mansell observes, ' That this *confused* apprehension of many objects (said by Aldrich to be simplex incomplex) is in truth only a *succession* of single apprehensions:' surely not a succession, unless the objects are presented, not simultaneously, but successively. He condemns the distinction between incomplex and complex as inaccurate. It is really absurd to suppose any different operation of the mind employed; but, I would ask, does not Mr. Mansell himself use this word, apprehension, somewhat *confusè*. Such is no uncommon case. It is sometimes applied as the name of a faculty: sometimes as that of an operation: and again, as that of a thought, an opinion, a notion, or *concept*, (a favourite word with Sir W. Hamilton.)

† In editions of his logic previous to the year 1841, Dr. Whately's definition was, simple apprehension *is* " The notion (or conception) of any object in the mind analagous to the perception of the senses." This confusion of an operation with the notion (or conception) received by such operation, was pointed out in the

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he preserves Aldrich's division of *Simple* into In-
complex and Complex, and illustrates in a similar
manner.

There is something very offensive to the common
sense of common understanding in the distinction
asserted : That, when the objects are several, the
simplex incomplexa is a simple apprehension of these
objects " *confusè*," according to Aldrich, or " with-
out any *relation* being perceived between them," as
Dr. Whately expresses it; and that the *simplex
complexa* is a simple apprehension of these same ob-
jects, " sed cum ordine quodam et respectu," or
" with a relation between them."

To proceed to the next operation—Judgment.
" Judicium," says Aldrich, " est, *quo* mens non solum
percipit duo objecta, sed, *quasi* pro tribunali sedens,
expressè apud se pronuntiat, illa inter se convenire
aut dissidere." And adds, it is *affirmative* or *nega-
tive*. Dr. Whately, " Judgment is *the comparing*
together in the mind two of the notions (or ideas)
which are the objects of apprehension, whether
complex or incomplex, and pronouncing that they
agree or *disagree* with each other; (or that one of
them *belongs* or does not belong to each other)."
And he also adds, " Judgment, therefore, is either
affirmative or negative."*

Let us now retrace our steps. By the operation—
simple apprehension incomplex, we apprehend a

Gent. Mag. for May, 1841. And hence, it may be presumed, the
change from Notion (or conception) to the Act or condition of the
mind in which it receives a *Notion*.

   * The reader will observe a strange want of uniformity in the
generic terms of all these definitions.

pen, a hand—or, a man, a horse, cards: by the operation—simple apprehension complex, we apprehend the pen in the hand or the man on the horse, or the cards in a pack. By Judgment the mind compares the pen and the hand, the man and the horse, the cards and the pack; and pronounces that the pen is not the hand, nor the hand the pen; that the hand holds the pen, not the pen the hand; that the horse carries the man, and not the man the horse.

Now, in the first place, it is quite clear that the mind *pronounces* no such thing; and in the second, that in the whole process, instead of this shifting of operations, one power or faculty, and one alone, exists in act, and that from simple apprehension to final judgment, its persistence in act is described, and nothing more.

The mind perceives (by the *faculty* of apprehension or the operation, if it please the learned logicians so to name it) the hand, the pen, the man, the horse. It receives different sensations or ideas: it is conscious (or to use a word from the philosophy of Leibnitz, has an apperception) that these sensations differ, and this decides the whole matter—that the pen and man are not the hand and horse; that the pen holds the hand and the man rides the horse. The mind perceives this, and this is all that *per se* it can do. It pronounces nothing, it affirms or denies nothing to itself about agreement or disagreement; it recognises (or apperceives) *different* sensations, and there ends all that takes place in the mind.

But the faculty of speech enables it to communicate these different sensations or ideas existing in itself to others; to pronounce, to *affirm or deny* to others the agreement or disagreement (that is, the different sensations) recognized within itself: in other words, it is by speech that this operation is performed.

The ancient Epicureans went so far in their philosophy as to maintain that the *senses* neither affirm nor deny; that to perform this operation was the office of a superior faculty,* the *mind.*   In this,— the supposition that affirming and denying are *operations* of the mind, they are in unison with the Aristotelians.   But I think it may be shown that, though the perception of what ought to be affirmed or denied is the province of the mind, the operation itself is performed by words.   The contrary dogma has been assumed as unquestionable by the followers of the ancient philosophers, and has been taken for granted from their days to the present time without any discussion.

The question from its novelty and importance deserves to be stated and illustrated with every possible degree of perspicuity; and what I have

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* Non falli autem sensum ideò asserit: quod falsitas omnis in affirmatione aut negatione sita sit (quatenus nempe aliqua res aut talis affirmat, qualis non est, talis negatur qualis est).   Sensus autem neque affirmet neque neget, sed solum in se speciem sensibili, rei excipiat, nudeque apprehendat rem cujusmodi sibi per speciem apparet.   Pronunciare autem, sive judicare, talis ne revera sit aut non sit cujusmodi apparet, hoc sensus ipsius non est, sed superioris facultatis cui proinde, non vero sensui, subesse possit falsitas.—Gassendi Opera, N. 1, p. 53.

now to say will complete my reply to Sir John Stoddart.

Let me endeavour to illustrate my meaning :— " Will you," says Hamlet, " play upon this pipe? Govern these ventages with your fingers and thumb, give it breath with your mouth, and it will discourse most eloquent music." The recorder will speak; not by an operation of the mind, but by the operations prescribed by the poet.

We never say the mind amputates a limb, extracts a tooth, or couches a cataract.

We never ascribe the dissection of a human body to an operation of the human mind. We call it,— properly call this, chirurgery (or surgery) a manual operation, an operation of the hand; the hand and the knife are the instruments; they move, they act, they *operate*. There is in all such operations instrumentality governing subordinate instrumentality; the hand, itself a material instrument, guides in each case an appropriate subordinate instrument, and thus the operation is performed. The mind, the ruler of every voluntary motion, wills the movements of the hand; perceives, superintends, and directs them. Mastication, deglutition follow, the one the other, as voluntary motions, and we duly attribute them to their peculiar organs. The mind does not infuse volition into the hand, the jaws, and the throat; neither do they impart operation to the mind. But the mind by volition can put these respective organs into act, into operation; and they in return can perform its will.

So also is it with regard to affirmation or denial :

they are no eloquent music discoursed by an ope-
ration of the mind.   The mind perceives or appre-
hends; it does no more.   It perceives, or appre-
hends, that a pen is in the hand, that a pen is not
the hand; it does no more—it can do no more. Nor
is it necessary that it should. Language can do all
that remains to be done; but to this source philo-
sophers have never looked.   Certain effects were
to be accounted for, certain acts or operations to be
traced to their origin; and they cast their eyes upon
the power that rules every organ, by which the vo-
luntary motions of our frame are performed,—the
power that wills every action or operation, and to
it assigned the various offices of its subordinate
agents; yet in no one instance, except this of pro-
ducing articulate sounds, have they so done.

Language, we repeat, can do all that remains to
be done; it can expressly pronounce that any two
things agree or disagree; it can affirm or deny, or in
one word assert* their agreement or disagreement.
What share, it may be asked, has the mind in the
performance of all this? not a lip is opened, not a
breath conformed into intelligible sound without its
assenting power.   Agreed; the mind *wills* the ac-
tion or operation of those organs, by which audible
sounds, speech, language, are produced; it directs
and guides them, but the organs operate. Of these
audible intelligible sounds, signs of thought, visible
representatives, written characters, letters and com-
binations of letters have in succession of time been

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* See Wallis, Institutio Logicæ, L. 2, cap. 1.

invented.   But we never identify the act of wri-
ting with an operation of the mind.

To superficial enquirers all that has been here
advanced will seem little better than a dispute of
words, Verba obstrepunt.* But Dr. Whately is well
aware that "Logic is entirely conversant about
language,—that it is an indispensable instrument of
all reasoning."   It is indeed its province to teach
the use of terms in general reasoning; and if it has
been shown, as I presume it has, that the founda-
tions of our systems of logic are falsely laid, that
they rest upon an abuse of words, an essential ser-
vice has been rendered to the future logician, and
smoothed his way to what Locke calls "a very dif-
ferent sort of Logic and Critic" from any with
which he has hitherto been made acquainted.

There is another consideration which must not be
omitted.   The difference which has been enlarged
upon, perhaps to an unnecessary extent, is one be-
tween volitive and operative power—it marks a
boundary, an hitherto, as far as my reading extends,
undiscriminated boundary between mental power
or faculty and the action of organized matter.   And
I press the establishment of this difference very
earnestly upon those who participate in the appre-
hensions of Professor Stewart with regard to "the
tendency of some late philological speculations."

This train of reasoning may be pursued and suc-
cessfully applied to the observations of Mr. Smart.†

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* Bacon, Novum Organum, L. 1, § 59.

† Manual of Logic, p. 255.

He urges it to be among the " egregious errors"
of Horne Tooke, that " he attributes *every thing*
to language; that he is a decided sensationalist,*
who, admitting Locke's foundation, that our know-
ledge begins with sensation, admits nothing except
language, which is more than sensation; and while
he argues justly against Locke's doctrine of com-
plex ideas, sees nothing beyond the instrumentality
of language in all beyond sensation."

But it has not occurred to Mr. Smart, that as-
serting the instrumentality of language would be
perfectly nugatory, unless powers or faculties in
the mind to make use of that instrumentality were
assumed and granted. Mr. Smart should also have
inquired, what is this *every thing* that is attributed
to language? what purposes are to be effected by
its instrumentality?

It has been shown, I think, that one purpose is
that of affirming and denying. And a reference
to the various modes and figures under which these
operations of language are represented by logi-
cians, will illustrate very fully and very clearly the
uses for which it is adapted and to which it is ap-
plied.

Let us take the old and valuable " Logic" of
Port Royal, and the first Book of the Analytics of
Aristotle, we shall find that the subject and predi-
cate in the latter are expressed by letters; in the
former, by words. The purposes in both cases are

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* That Tooke himself had no respect for the master of this sect,
Condillac, is plain enough. See Div. of Pur. Vol. 1, p. 389.

the same, and are answered as effectually by the one as by the other. Collections of ideas are compared in both; the changes in the " modes and figures" of the syllogism manifest the changes in which different collections of ideas may be presented to the mind by a sign, whether that sign be a letter or a word. So also of any particular ideas of which any abstract or general term may be the sign.

And thus, to adopt the expressions of the eloquent historian, we may " severely reason with Aristotle ;" and escaping awhile from the rigid trammels of logic into those where the mind may find more ample room to expand itself, " we may sublimely speculate with Plato."*

CHAP. IV.

OF THE NOUN.

THE *noun* is defined to be " the simple or complex, the particular or general sign or name of *one* or *more* ideas."

And at this stage, an inquiry into the *force* of terms (which depends on the number of ideas of which any term is the sign) should commence; but this branch Locke has preoccupied. And he, perhaps intending to confine himself to the consideration of the *mind only,* did not advance to the *man-*

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* Gibbon.

ner of signification, to which that consideration
could never lead him.

Of the declension, number, case, and gender of
nouns there is no painsworthy difficulty or dispute.
In our language the names of things without sex,
(figure apart) are also without gender; because
with us the relation of words to each other is de-
noted by the place or by prepositions; which de-
notation, in the Greek and Roman languages, made
a part of the words themselves, and was shown by
cases or terminations.

CHAP. V.

THE ARTICLE AND INTERJECTION.

THEIR claims to the rank of parts of speech
are next examined, and those of the latter
are roughly rejected; the dominion of speech is
erected on their downfall.

The parts of speech, ex *instituto* non naturâ de-
bent constare.* The cries of animals, signa tris-
titiæ, aut lætitiæ, qualia in avibus, qualia in quad-
rupedibus;* every involuntary convulsion with oral
sound has almost as good a title to be called a
part of speech as interjections have. " Voluntary
interjections are only employed when the sudden-
ness or vehemence of some affection or passion re-
turns men to their natural state, and makes them

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* Sanctii Minerva, Lib. 1, c. 1.

forget the use of speech; or when, from some circumstance, the shortness of time will not permit them to exercise it."*

The ARTICLE is declared to be a *necessary*† instrument of speech; so necessary, that no language can do without *it*, or some *equivalent invention*. Let this expression be remarked,—some *equivalent* invention; for it has been disregarded by various opponents of Horne Tooke.

The necessity of the article follows immediately from the necessity of general terms, and their necessity is sufficiently proved by Locke. " The use of words," he observes, " being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas; and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea should have a distinct name, names would be endless."‡ " The far greatest part of words that make all languages, are *general terms.*"§ " *General* and universal belong not to the real existence of things, but concern only signs; signs of things, which are all of them particular in their existence: the general nature" (of those creatures of our own making—general ideas) " being nothing more but

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* Dr. Stoddart labours hard in behalf of interjections, and makes sad confusion between interjections, properly so-called, and verbal exclamations.

† Scaliger, (de Causis, Chap. 131,) says that the Greek article is superfluous; for it may be supplied in Latin by *is*, or *ille:* these, if not called articles, are the *equivalents*. He also plainly shows that the Latin has an article in the pronouns *qui* and *quis;* the former being Καὶ 'ο, and the latter Καὶ 'ος; and the Latin terminations *us*, *a*, *um*, are the Greek article, 'Ος, η, ὸν.

‡ Essay, B. 2, c. 11, § 9.   § Id. B. 3, c. 3.

the capacity they are put into of signifying or re-
presenting many particulars."* The generality of
terms is reduced by the article, which thus ena-
bles us to employ general terms for particulars; so
that the article in combination with a general term
is merely a substitute (for a particular term) dif-
ferent from the substitutes ranked under the gene-
ral head of abbreviations, because it is necessary
for the communication of our thoughts, and sup-
plies the place of words which *are not* in the lan-
guage; whereas abbreviations are not necessary
for communication, and supply the place of words
which are in the language.

CHAP. VI.

OF THE WORD " THAT."

THE word THAT† appropriately follows the
article.   The question started is, what is the
conjunction THAT? the answer is, it is the same
word, with one and the same signification as the
article or *pronoun*.   Unnoticed abbreviation in con-
struction (which ought always to be carefully distin-
guished from the *manner* of signification of words)
and difference in position have caused this appear-
ance of fluctuation, and misled the grammarians of

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* Essay, B. 3, c. 3, § 11.
† The Chapter " Of the word *that*," with the 7th, " Of conjunc-
tions," and 8th, " Of English conjunctions," formed the subject of
the Letter to Dunning.

all languages, both ancient and modern; for in all
they make the same mistake.

It seems expedient here to anticipate a little, and
explain whence we have derived these two words,
THE and THAT, and to add to them for the same
purpose the so-called *neuter* pronoun, *It*, or, as an-
ciently written, *hit.* The reader will thus be put
into possession of a foretaste of the entertainment
and instruction that await him.

The English article THE, is the imperative of
the Anglo-Saxon *the-an*, to get, to take, assume; *
the Anglo-Saxon article *se*, is the imperative of the
verb *se-on*, to see; and THAT is the Anglo-Saxon
thæt, that is, *thead, theat*, and means *taken, as-
sumed*, the past participle of the same Anglo-Saxon
verb. IT or HIT is the past participle of the An-
glo-Saxon *hæt-an, nominare*, and means *nominatum,
the said.* IT and *that* are used plurally and singu-
larly, and in the masculine and feminine, as well
as neuter gender: they may be illustrated thus
(as article or pronoun):—

The man *that* hath not music in himself is fit for
treasons, stratagems and spoils, that is, *take* man, or
see man : *taken* man hath not music, &c. ; *said* man,
or *taken* man is fit for treasons, &c. THAT is used
in the plural by Sir Thomas More and others,
" *that* days," " *that* angels." IT is so used by
Piers Plouhman, and in masculine and feminine
by Chaucer and others. Custance says, " *It* am I,

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* Piers Plouhman and Chaucer both use the expression, " so
thee ik," i. e. so get I; so may I get, take, or (as Mr. Tyrwhitt)
thrive.

that is, I am *she*, your daughter." " Quod he; *It*
am I, frend, that is, I am *he*, frend."

IT and THAT always refer to some thing or
things, person or persons, *taken, assumed or spoken*
of before; such only being the meaning of those
two words. They may therefore well supply each
other's place, as we say indifferently, and with the
same meaning, of any action mentioned in discourse;
either, " *It* is a good action," or, " *That* is a good
action," that is, " The *said* (action) is a good action;"
or, " *the assumed* (action) is a good action;" or,
" the action *received* in discourse is a good action."

In replying to the question, what is the conjunc-
tion *that?*—the Latin *ut* (or uti); the Greek 'οτι;
the Latin (qu'otti, quodde) *quod;* the Greek και
'οττι, κ'οττι (Latin *que*, from which the *e* was cut,
as the αι in Greek), are produced to show that in
those two languages the conjunctions *ut* and *quod*
come within the same conditions as the English
*that.**

Thieves rise by night THAT they may cut men's
throats.

Ut jugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones.

Resolution. Thieves may cut men's throats; (for)
that (purpose) they rise by night.

Latrones jugulent homines, (δι) οτι surgunt de
nocte.

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* So the French preposition *car* (anciently *quhar*), corresponding
to our preposition *for*, is *quá re* or *que*, (that is, και) eâ re. (See
Menage.) The reader will find by referring to the Port Royal
Logic, Part 2, Ch. 1, and to their Grammar Supplement to Ch. 9,
a remarkable coincidence with our author as to the French con-
junction *que*.

Dryden, writing to Walsh, says, " I find *that* you do not make a due distinction between *that* and *who.*"

Res. " You do not make a proper distinction between that and who." I find *that* (fact.)*

I wish you to believe *that* I would not wilfully hurt a fly.

Res. I would not wilfully hurt a fly; I wish you to believe *that* (assertion).

And here, as Tooke's general remarks on the interchange of letters will have particular applications in the succeeding pages, it is expedient to subjoin them. It is, moreover, but an act of justice that they should be put prominently forward, as they evidently lay the foundation for Grimm's Law; and to this it may be added, that he was well aware of the value of what it is usual to call the " crude" form in etymological researches. Thus in tracing the Latin *ros* and *mors* to an Anglo-Saxon origin, he writes *ror*-is, ros; mor*t*-is, mors. *Qu* in Latin was sounded not as the English, but as the French pronounce *qu* (that is as the Greek κ) and it is thus he accounts for the change of και 'οτι into *quod*, so far as the *k* and *q* are concerned; and the perpetual change of *t* into *d* is familiar to all, and there is an organical cause for these and other changes; of B into P; V into F; G into K; Z into S; J into SH;

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* Dryden's Works, Bell's Edition, 1853. Dryden proceeds to say, " A man, *that*—is *not* proper; the relative *who* is proper. *That* ought always to signify a *thing; who*, a person." Dryden may be supposed well acquainted with the grammatical usage of his day.

and the Anglo-Saxon Ð, that is, TH, as pronounced
in *that*, into their θ, that is, TH, as pronounced in
thing.   The first of each pair (including D into T)
differs from its partner " by no variation whatever
of articulation, but simply by a certain unnoticed
and almost imperceptible motion or compression of
or near the larynx, which causes what Wilkins calls,
" some kind of murmure."   This compression the
Welsh never use, as those acquainted with Sir
Hugh Evans and the " *f*alorous gentleman" in
Henry the Fifth, well know.

Tooke illustrates the whole series of these or-
ganic changes in a single line, in which his soreness
to the quick as a politician is manifested.   When
a Welshman, instead of

" I vow, by God, Ðat Jenkin* iz a wizzard,"
pronounces it thus:

" I fow, py Cot, θat Shenkin iss a wissart;" he
articulates exactly as we do†; but, failing in the
compression, he changes seven of our consonants:
to which compression we owe seven additional letters
(that is, seven additional sounds in our language).

The following changes are purely organic.

Robbed	Robb'd	
Snapped	Snap't	
Braced	Braç'd	(c = s)
Pleased	Pleas'd	(s = z)
Lapsed	Laps't	
Amazed	Amaz'd	

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* By Jenkin was intended Jenkinson, the first Lord Liverpool.
† i. e. uses the same organs of articulation.

Girded	Girt
Stuffed	Stuff't
Heaved	Heav'd
Ragged	Ragg'd
Cracked	Crackt

And in the termination *es*

Thing*es*	Thingz
Thinkes	Thinks
Leafes	Leafs ·
Leav-es	Leaves

CHAP. VII.

OF CONJUNCTIONS.

TO proceed now to a survey of the remaining chapters of this volume, on the conjunctions, prepositions, and adverbs.

It will be incumbent upon me not only to present a full detail of the etymologies proposed by our Author, but to state clearly and illustrate sufficiently his general principles; and also, as an act of justice, to say a word on his claim to originality.

I will dispose of the last, though in itself least important, topic, first. I believe that his claim remained undisputed from the year 1778 to 1790, when it was questioned by a writer who, under the signature of J. Cassander, addressed a letter to H. Tooke, Esq. containing " Criticisms on the Diver-

sions of Purley."* It may be safely affirmed, that
if Tooke had himself allowed this slight pamphlet
to pass unnoticed, the public would have done the
same.† And it seems highly probable that Tooke
would have permitted this to be the case, had he
been able to resist the temptation which invited
him to vent his acrimony against Mr. Windham,
the then member for Norwich, in return for that
gentleman's acrimony against himself.‡ *Him* the
angry politician treats as the abettor, if not the co-
adjutor, of Cassander in his attack : *him* he accuses
of having assiduously and invidiously endeavoured
to detract from his claim to originality, and to have
very unjustly transferred that honour to Professor
Schultens. That Schultens had not, and did not
make any pretensions to the honour asserted in his
behalf,—of teaching that all particles are nouns or
verbs,—is very manifest from the entire passages,
which are quoted from his work in the Diversions
of Purley. He carefully adopts the qualifying ex-
pressions used by grammarians, and especially by
Latin grammarians long before he wrote, and many
of whom Tooke had quoted for the purpose of re-

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* **Rev. J.** Bruckner, of Norwich, who died 12th May, 1804.
See Taylor's Edition of Diversions of Purley, p. 12.

† One thing is clear, that Cassander so little understood the
work he undertook to criticise, as to suppose, " that among the
abbreviations *employed* for despatch," (Diversions of Purley, p. 45,)
or, as he improperly terms them, words *necessary* (Criticisms, pp.
7, 8, 25) for despatch, articles, prepositions, and conjunctions were
comprised.

‡ In a second edition of his first volume, published 1798, i. e.
eight years after the offence was committed by Cassander.

commending by the *partial* authority of their *partial* hints and suspicions his own general doctrine.

In 1818, six years after Tooke's death, Dr. Stoddart* (now Sir John Stoddart) started a new candidate for *priority* of discovery,—C. Koerber, who, so long ago as 1712, published at Jena a little volume, called " Lexicon Particularum Ebræarum, vel potius nominum et verborum, vulgo pro particulis habitorum." Dr. Stoddart gives us very scanty information of the contents of this very rare volume,† certainly not sufficient to enable us to form a judgment as to the full extent of the principle upon which Koerber's Lexicon is constructed.

The Author's tutor, Danzius, it appears, in the preface to the work taught " that *most*, if *not all*, the separate particles were in their own nature nouns;" that this was indeed " a new and unheard of hypothesis," but that on investigation, the reader would find reason to conclude *universally (in respect to the Hebrew language at least)* that all the separate particles are either nouns or verbs. His own words (Dr. Stoddart adds) are these : " Particulæ separatæ *si non omnes*, certe *pleræque* suâ naturâ sunt nomina." " Hanc thesin hactenus novam et inauditam," and again, " Omnes omnino Ebræorum particulas separatas aut nomina esse aut verba." It is quite clear that Koerber piqued himself upon laying before the public a discovery, and it is but just that his title should be better known than it

* See Encyclopædia Metropolitana, V. I, p. 19, and repeated in the Philosophy of Language, p. 43.

† It is not in the Library of the British Museum.

yet is, as far as that title extends; for he uses the
limiting expression, " si non omnes, pleræque;"
nor does it appear that he reasoned on any general
principles.   Dr. Stoddart admits that Tooke very
probably made (what he, Dr. S. calls) a *bona fide*
discovery, so far as regarded his own reflections,
though not one entirely new to the world.*

What then was this discovery? "Horne Tooke's,"
says Sir James Mackintosh, " is certainly a won-
derful work; but the great merit is the original
thought."   What was this thought, so highly prized
by one so able to appreciate its worth ?   That words
are the signs of ideas ($\sigma\upsilon\mu\beta o\lambda a$ $\pi a\theta\eta\mu a\tau\omega\nu$), and
that all are nouns significant ($\kappa a\iota$ $\sigma\eta\mu a\iota\nu\epsilon\iota$ $\tau\iota$), are
positions that had long been acknowledged in the
schools, and taught there upon the express autho-
rity of Aristotle.   As an undeniable consequence,
Tooke inferred that those classes of words com-
prized under the general head of particles were also
nouns or verbs, and had of course a signification.

The whole system is founded on general reason-
ing.   In the letter to Dunning† he had pronounced
that, " there is not, nor is it possible there should
be, a word in any language which has not a com-

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* Dr. Stoddart (Philosophy of Language, p. 43) has the merit
of starting another candidate for *priority* of discovery, in the per-
son of J. D. Van Lennep, whose work, De Analogia, was not
published till the year 1790, i.e. twelve years after the letter to
Dunning, and four after the 8vo. Edition of the 1st Pt. of Diversions
of Purley.   Coleridge had previously asserted, " That all that is
good in Tooke's book is taken from Lennep."   Lennep reasons
on no principle, and limits his dictum to " omnia fere."   (Len-
nep, De Analogia, c. 3, p. 38.)

† Page 23, note.

plete meaning and signification, even when taken
by itself. Adjectives, prepositions, adverbs, &c.
have all complete separate meanings, not difficult
to be discovered."

This was the grand principle, thus early em-
braced and declared; and the subsequent *thought*
then was, " that if this reasoning is well founded,
there must be in the original language from which
the English (and so of all other languages) is de-
rived, *such* and *such* words bearing precisely such
and such meanings."* And he was the more pleased
with this suggestion, because he was ignorant of
the characters even of the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic
languages; and he had to learn those languages as
a mean to ascertain whether he had made a *disco-*
very; and the event exceeded his expectation.

It may be as well here to observe that he sub-
sequently offers as a general rule, " That where
different languages use the same *particle*, that
language ought to be considered as its legitimate
parent, in which the true meaning of the word can
be found, and where its use is as common and fa-
miliar as that of any other verbs or substantives."†

I do not know that this rule has anywhere been
directly questioned, but it is certainly in practice
wholly disregarded, and etymologists still continue
" by unnatural forced conceits to derive the Eng-
lish and all other languages from the Greek or
the Hebrew, or some imaginary primæval tongue."‡

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* Diversions of Purley, 1, 125.
† Ib. V. 1, p. 300, note *.   ‡ Ib. 1, 147.

" That word," he says in another place, "is always sufficiently original for me in that language where its meaning, which is the *cause of the application*, can be found."*

Bearing these important preliminaries in mind, the reader is now prepared for our Author's chapters on those parts of speech, which (according to Mr. Harris,† " appear in grammar, like zoophytes in nature; a kind of middle beings, of amphibious character, which, by sharing the attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the whole together."

In the distribution of the parts of speech, the name of conjunction is given to words connecting sentences, and of preposition to those connecting words; and the same word may (and it is not at all extraordinary that it should) be used both as conjunction and preposition, as it is the apparently different application to single words or to sentences that constitutes the difference between them. And the distinction is useful on account of the *cases* which they govern when applied to *words*, and which they cannot govern when applied to *sentences*. Conjunctions are not in their *nature* a separate sort of word, or part of speech, by themselves; they have not a separate manner of signification, although not devoid of signification. There is not one in any language, which may not, by a skilful herald, be traced home to its own family and origin. Abbreviation and corruption are always busiest with

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* Diversions of Purley, Vol. 2, p. 204.   † Hermes, B. 2, c. 2.

the words which are most frequently in use; yet the words most frequently used are least liable to be laid aside.

The conjunctions, then, may thus be reduced to one general scheme of explication; though Johnson declared it to be a task which no man, however learned or sagacious, had been able to perform.

If		Gif			Gifan	To give
An		Ӕn			Ӕnan	To grant
Unless		Onles			Onlesan	To dismiss
Eke		Eac			Eacan	To add
Yet		Get			Getan	To get
Still	are the Imperatives	Stell	of their respective verbs		Stellan	To put
Else		Ӕles			Ӕlesan	To dismiss
Tho' or		Thaf or			Thafian or	To allow
Though		Thafig			Thafigan	
Büt		Bot			Botan	To boot
Büt		Be-utan			Beon-utan	To be-out
Without		Wyrth-utan			Wyrthan-utan	To be-out
And		Ӕn-ad			Anan-ad	Dare congeriem

Lest is the past participle Lesed of Lesan, to dismiss: from Les (the imperative of the same verb) placed at the end of nouns and coalescing with them, we have such words as hopeless, fearless, &c.

Since
{ Sithan
Syne
Seandes
Siththe
or
Sin-es }
is the participle of Seon—To see.

THAT is the article or pronoun— *That—As*, is *es*, a German article, meaning *it*, *that*, or *which*. *So* is *sa*, a Gothic article of the same import.

Or is a contraction of the Saxon *oder*, other, something different, and often contrary. There are others, which it would be useless to explain.

CHAP. VIII.

ETYMOLOGY OF ENGLISH CONJUNCTIONS.

Examples and Resolutions.

IF and AN may be used mutually and indifferently to supply each other's place.

> IF *that* the king
> Have any way your good deserts forgot,
> He bids you name your griefs.
> > *Hen.* IV. P. 1, 4, 3.

Res. The king hath your deserts forgot; *give* or *grant that;* he bids you name your griefs.

> Nay, *an* thou dalliest, then I am thy foe.
> > *Ford, Lover's Melancholy,* 3, 3.

Res. Give or grant, that thou dalliest, then, &c.

IF was variously written in old authors: *gif, yeue, yef, yf.* GIN, used in our northern counties, and in Scotland, is *given, gién, gén;* this being *given,* gien or gin.

IF (as *and, unless,* &c.) may be used both as conjunction and preposition.

Ex. How will the weather dispose of you to-morrow? *If* it is fair weather, it will send me abroad; *if* it is foul, it will keep me at home. Here the *datum* is a sentence. It is fair weather: *Give* (*that* understood), it will send, &c. How will, &c.; *if* fair (weather), it will send, &c.; *if* foul, it will

keep me at home.   Here the verb *if* (under the grammar name of preposition) governs the *noun.* In the former case (under the name of conjunction) *if* governed the sentence.

THOUGH, ALTHOUGH.   *Though* and *if* may very frequently supply each other's place.

Ex. *Though* (that is, allow) all men should forsake you, yet will not I.

If (that is, give, grant) all men should, &c.; the Scotch would say, *suppose.*

UNLESS, ELSE, WITH-OUT, BŪT, (BE-OUT,) LEST.   Unless was written *onlesse, onless, oneles,* as late as the reign of Queen Elizabeth.

Ex. No man commeth to me *onlesse* my father drawith him.   *Gardiner.*

Dismiss the fact that my father draweth him, no man cometh to me.

Les or *less*, is used both by B. Jonson and Beaumont and Fletcher.

    To tell you true, 'tis too good for you,
    Less you had grace to find it.
                Ben Jonson, Bartholomew Fair.

Unless, without, that is, *be-out,* might in this and the preceding example have been used with propriety.   UN*less,* WITH*out* and BŪT, *were* used both as conjunctions and prepositions : *without,* now commonly as preposition; *but* and *unless,* as conjunctions.

Ex. The commendation of adversaries is the greatest triumph of a writer; because it never comes *unless* extorted; otherwise, unless *it* (the commendation of adversaries) *is* extorted.   In the

former case, *unless* is a preposition; in the latter, conjunction.* See ante, IF.

Ex. It cannot be read *without* the Attorney General consents to it. *Lord Mansfield.*

It cannot be read *without* the consent of the Attorney General.

Ex. And oon of them shal not falle on the erthe *with outan* youre fadir (sine patre vestro; in Anglo-Saxon, *butan* eowran fæder). *Wic. Mat.* 10, 29.

But is used constantly in old authors as a preposition, equivalent to *with-out;* it is still frequently used as a preposition; as, all *but* one; all *but me* are gone. And *without,* though not now in *approved* usage, is frequently heard in common speech, where *unless,* or an equivalent, would be deemed more correct.

LEST, LEAST, are used by Gower and Bale as the regular past tense, contracted from *lesed, leased.*

In an houre

He *lest* (amisit) all that he mai laboure

The long yere. *Conf. Aman.* B. 4, fo. 68.

He (Becket) sore amended whan he was once consecrated Archbishop of Canterbury; and *least* (dimisit, he dismissed; he put away) his accustomed embracinges, and became in life religious.

Actes of Religious Votaries.

Ex. Watche, therefore, for ye knowe not when the master of the house wyll come; *leste* if he come sodenlye, he shoulde fynde you sleepynge.

Mathews' Bib. Mark, c. 13.

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* *Obs.* The Latin conjunction *ni si,* and preposition *si ne,* i, e. *ne sit, sit ne,* are the same word.

Res. Watch, therefore, for, &c. (the act of watching being *dismissed,* or put away,) coming suddenly, he find you sleeping.

Less, lest or *least,* always preserve the significa-tion of dismissing, separating, or taking away ; and, as the Latin *minus,* diminishing.

Less or *lesser,* used comparatively, from which *some* is dismissed or taken away ; *least,* used su-perlatively, from which some *more* has been dis-missed or taken away.*

ELSE is very variously written, *alyse, alys.* Gower and Chaucer write *elles, els.*

Ex. You shall have a fool's cap for your pains, and nothing *else.*

Res. You shall have a fool's cap for your pains, and *nothing, unless.* (Būt, be-out, except, if not,) dismiss a fool's cap.

BUT. All animals have sense,

But a dog is an animal. Therefore, &c.
i. e. Add or superadd, a dog is an animal.

And so in all such cases, where būt introduces a minor premiss.

The difference between būt and bŭt, is estab-lished by an abundance of quotations; an instance will be sufficient here.

Ex. Bot thy werke shal endure in laude and glorie *but* spot or falt. *G. Douglas.*

Res. Add (or *and*) thy work shall endure in praise and glory, *be-out* or *without* spot or blemish.

But may interchange with *and.*

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* See infra, Much.

Ex. But his disciples axiden him, what his parable was. *Wic. Luke* 8, 9.

And his disciples axed him. *Mathews, Ib.*

But that that fel among thornes. *Wic. Luke* 8, 14.

And that whiche fell amonge thornes. *Mathews, Ib.*

They have mouths, *but* they speak not;
Eyes have they, *but* they see not.

> *Ps.* 115, *Bible version.*

They have mouths *and* speak not; eyes have they *and* see not.   *Ib. Common Prayer version.*

In the expression, *But* a moment, my lords, and I will show, &c. *but* is a preposition; in, *But* indulge me with a moment, my lords, it is a conjunction: or in the one case a verb, governing or affecting the *noun;* and in the latter, a verb, governing or affecting the sentence.

EKE.   *Ex.* Waters he hath *eke,* good enow.

> *R. Gloucester.*

Res. Add (or *and*) he hath waters good enough.

Ex.   At the siege *eke* hadde he be
   Of Algesir. *Ch. Prol.* l. 56.

Res. Add (to the places at which he had been) he had been at Algesir.

Why should I not as well *eke* tell you all
The purtraiture that was upon the wall.

> *Id. Knight's Tale,* l. 1969.

Add (to what I have already told) why should I not as well tell.

YET, STILL.   These may be mutually used for each other.

Therfore Jesu seide to hem, ʒit a litil tyme I am
with you. *Wic. John* 7, 33.

Then Jesus said unto them, *yet* a little while am
I with you, and *then* I go unto him that sent me.
Ib. Modern version.

Res. Yet a little while (or little while being *got,*
obtained) I am with you, and then, &c.

Still as you rise the state exalted to,

Finds no distemper while 'tis raised by you.
Waller.

Still, put or place ⎱
Yet, get or obtain ⎰ that you rise, the state, &c.

AND. *Ex.* You *and* I *and* Peter rode to Lon-
don.*

Res. You rode; *add,* I rode; *add,* Peter rode.

Ex. John *and* Jane are a handsome couple.

Res. John *add* Jane are a handsome couple.

In the first example, *and* governs the sentences
I rode, Peter rode; in the second it governs the
noun Jane, and is in the one case a conjunction,
and in the other a preposition.

It has already been said more than once, that
various words usually classed as conjunctions and
conjunctions only, do also perform the office of
prepositions; *and* is now added to the number.
" And if," says Tooke, " this *(grammatical)* defini-
tion of conjunction be adhered to, I am afraid that
the *grammarian* will scarcely have an entire con-
junction left; for I apprehend that there is not one

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* In the Wiclif Bible, *and* is not unusually employed where
subsequent versions employ *also.*

of those words which *they* call conjunctions, which is not sometimes used (and that very properly) without connecting sentences." Vol. 1, p. 221.

[If, as Sir J. Stoddart suggests,* we substitute the imperative *add* for the conjunction *and*, we get rid of the question, which is merely whether *and* is to be called conjunction or preposition; and this depends entirely on the office it performs.

THAN is a conjunction not noticed by Tooke, but I introduce it because there is a grammatical difficulty with regard to it, which this rule, for so I now consider it, that the same word may be used with propriety both as a conjunction and a preposition, will help to remove.

Lowth maintains, that when the qualities of different things are compared, the latter noun is governed, not by the conjunction *than* or *as*, (for a conjunction has no government of cases,) but by the verb or the preposition, expressed or understood; as, " thou art wiser than I (am);" " you love him more than (you love) me." Such forms of speech as " thou art wiser than *me*," he condemns as bad grammar; and then, as is not unusual with him, he produces examples of the constant usage of such forms by Swift, Congreve, Prior, Atterbury, and Bolingbroke. It might be defended as an English idiom, but there is no occasion for any subterfuge at all. *Than*, in all the instances quoted, is a preposition, performing its proper office, that of connecting words; and so it is, and nothing else, when

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* Philosophy of Language, Part 1.

followed by the objective case of the relative pro-
noun,

Beelzebub, than *whom*

Satan except, none higher sat. *P. L.* 2, 229.

Dr. Latham, I am glad to see, at least *seems* in-
clined to concur in this opinion: after quoting
some such instances as those in Lowth, he says,
" none of these expressions are correct; or, *if so,*
they are correct only under the idea that the word
than is sometimes a conjunction (when it cannot
govern a case), and sometimes a preposition (when
it can govern a case)."*

As, is a conjunction noticed, but not illustrated,
by Tooke.

Prior writes:

The sun, upon the calmest sea,

Appears not half so bright *as thee.*

And this usage may be justified on the same
grounds.]

SINCE. This is so remarkable a word, that I
must transcribe at length all that Tooke has so
carefully written concerning it.†

Since is a very corrupt abbreviation, confounding
together different words and different combinations
of words, and is, therefore, in modern English made
(like *but*) to serve purposes which no one word in
any other language can answer; because the same
accidental corruptions, arising from similarity of

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* Elementary English Grammar, § 375. See also his Hand-
book, Ch. 26.

† I transcribe from the Letter to Dunning; for so early had
he *concluded* his researches.

sound, have not happened in the correspondent words of any other language.

Where we now employ *since*, was formerly (according to its respective signification) used:—

Sometimes, 1. Seoththan, siothhan, seththan, siththan, siththen; sithen, sithence, sithens, sithnes, sithns:

Sometemes, 2. Syne, sine, sene, sen, syn, sin:

Sometimes, 3. Seand, seeing, seeing-that, seeing-as, sens, sense, sence:

Sometimes, 4. Siththe, sithe, sith, seen-that, seen-as, sens, sense, sence.

Accordingly, *since*, in modern English, is used four ways; two as a preposition, connecting (or rather *affecting*) words; and two, as a conjunction, *affecting* sentences.

When used as a PREPOSITION, it has always the signification either (1.) of the past participle *seen* joined to *thence*, (that is, *seen and thenceforward*); or (2.) else it has the signification of the past participle *seen*, only.

When used as a CONJUNCTION, it has sometimes the signification of the present participle *seeing*, or *seeing that*; and sometimes the signification of the past participle *seen*, or *seen that*.

As a PREPOSITION, 1. Since, (for siththan, sithence, or *seen* and *thenceforward*;) as,

" Such a system of government as the present has not been ventured on by any king SINCE the expulsion of James the Second."

2. *Since* (for syne, sene, or seen); as,

" Did George the Third reign before or SINCE that example ?"

3. SINCE. As a *conjunction*, (for seand, seeing, seeing-as, seeing-that;) as,

" If I should labour for any other satisfaction than that of my own mind, it would be an effect of frenzy in me, not of hope ; SINCE it is not *truth*, but opinion, that can travel the world without a passport."

4. SINCE (for siththe, sith, seen-as, or seen-that;) as,

" SINCE death in the end takes from all, whatsoever fortune or force takes from any one ; it were a foolish madness in the shipwreck of worldly things, where all sinks but the sorrow, to save that."

Since and *sith*, though now obsolete, continued in good use down even to the Stuarts. Hooker in his writings uses *sithence*, *sith*, *seeing* and *since*. The two former he always properly distinguishes ; using *sithence* for the true import of the Anglo-Saxon *siththan ;* and *sith* for the true import of the Anglo-Saxon *siththe :* which is the more extraordinary, because authors of the first credit had very long before Hooker's time confounded them together, and thereby led the way for the present indiscriminate and corrupt use of SINCE in all the four cases mentioned.

Seeing, Hooker uses sometimes, perhaps (for it will admit of doubt) improperly : and *since*, (according to the corrupt custom which has universally prevailed in the language,)he uses indifferently either for *sithence*, *seen*, *seeing*, or *sith.**

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* I refer the inquisitive reader to my English Dictionary,

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The article, pronoun or conjunction, *that*, it is remarked, generally makes a part of, and keeps company with, most of the other conjunctions, as, *if that, an that, unless that*, &c. ; *since that, save that*. It exists also in sith, or sithe (Anglo-Saxon sith-the); *the* in the Anglo-Saxon meaning *that*. And *since* is also considered to be a corruption of *seen-as, seeing as ;* the *as* has been explained to be an article, written in German *es*, and to have the same meaning AS *it, that, which,* have : (otherwise, the same meaning THAT it, &c.)*

Es, in the old English *al-es, als ;* and *so* in *al-so,* both mean *it, that*.

Al before *es*, was used in comparison before the first *as* or *es*, but not before the second: it is now dropt. Thus,

Sche

Glidis away under the fomy seis

Als swift *as* Ganȝe or fedderid arrow fleis.

<div align="right">*G. Douglas*, p. 323, v. 46.</div>

In modern English,

As swift *as* darts or feathered arrows fly.

Res. 1. (With) *all that* swiftness (with)*which,*&c.

2. (With) *that* swiftness (with) which, &c.

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where he will find quotations from Hooker exemplifying his usage of *since, sithence, sithe,* and *seeing that.* He will also find copious illustrations from the earliest times. I may add, that where Wiclif reads *sithe, sithen,* Mathews has *sen, sence. Sen, sin,* or *syne,* is preserved in the common speech of our Northern Counties. The reader will do well also to refer to the Dictionary of Dr. Jamieson.

  * Other illustrations of this, and of *als, also,* are given in my Dictionaries.

It is plain that many conjunctions may be used (with a little turn of the expression) almost indifferently for each other.

Take this one instance :

And *soft* he sighed, *lest* men might him hear; substitute, *that* men might *not;* or, *else* men might, &c. Or change the order; thus, *unless* he sighed soft; *but that* he; *without* he; *save* that he; *except, outcept, outtake** he : or, again, *if that,* and *an, set that, put case, be it,* he sighed *not* soft, men might him hear.†

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* If *out-take* be a conjunction, why not *take ?* See infra, p. 73.

† Webster, after giving Tooke credit for the first explanation of certain indeclinable words called conjunctions and prepositions, adds, " I have made no use of his writings in this work." He has, however, done so, and very largely, to the great advantage of his work; with respect to these conjunctions most especially; and how he could go so far, and no farther, it is impossible to conjecture.

Of *lest,* he says, it means *loosing* or separation; and he resolves two sentences after the example of Tooke.

If and *eke* he adopts; *unless,* he derives with Tooke from *on-les-an ;* but *else* he consigns to the Latin *alias. An,* after referring to Greek, Arabic, &c. he allows may be probably an imperative, *annan,* or *anan,* to give. *Yet* may be from the root of the verb *to get* (which, he asserts, means primarily to *throw ;* and then, as the primary explanation, we have, to *procure*). *Still,* means *set, fixed* (sc. time), and a passage from Addison is resolved accordingly. *Though* may be an imperative of a verb (Ir. *daighim*) meaning grant, admit, allow ; but he does not name the Anglo-Saxon *Thaf-ian. That,* conjunction, he resolves after Tooke's examples. He acknowledges that there are two *buts.*

CHAP. IX.

OF PREPOSITIONS.

THE words used as prepositions, Mr. Harris unfortunately declares to have *no* significa- tion of their own, and yet to transfuse *something* of their own meaning (that is, of what they have not) into the words with which they are compounded.*

Of different languages, the least corrupt will have the fewest; the number depends on how many of the most common words have become obsolete or corrupted: and this being mere matter of particular fact and of accident, can have no place in general or philosophical grammar.

Language is an art springing from the necessi- ties of artless men, who invented it to supply those necessities, not the device of philosophers sitting in council; they took such and the same words as they employed on other occasions to mention the

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* Mr. Smart, *if* I understand him rightly, goes a step beyond this. He says, " *If* our theory is true, the words of a sentence understood in their separate capacity, do not constitute the meaning of the whole sentence, (i. e. are not parts of its whole meaning,) and therefore, as parts of a sentence, they are not by themselves significant." Might he not as well say, that the several numbers which together amount to a total number, do not constitute — are not parts of that total number; and that the figures representing such several numbers are not by themselves significant. Smart, Beginning of a New School of Metaphysics, p. 55.

same *real objects*, for *prepositions* are the names of
real objects. They, like conjunctions, are only
nouns or verbs, disguised by repeated corruptions.
It is the same sort of corruption that has disguised
both, and ignorance of their true origin has be-
trayed grammarians and philosophers into the mys-
terious and contradictory language which they have
held concerning them. As the necessity of the
article (or of some equivalent invention) follows
from the impossibility of having in language a dis-
tinct name or particular term for each particular
individual idea; so does the necessity of the prepo-
sition *(or of some equivalent invention)* follow, from
the impossibility of having in language a distinct
complex term for each different collection of ideas
which we may have occasion to put together in
discourse. The addition or subtraction of any one
idea to or from a collection, makes it a different
collection; and (if there were degrees of impossi-
bility) it is still more impossible to use in language
a different and distinct complex term for each dif-
ferent and distinct *collection* of ideas, than it is to
use a distinct particular term for each particular
and individual idea. To supply, therefore, the
place of the complex terms which are wanting in a
language, is the preposition employed : by whose
aid complex terms are prevented from being infi-
nite or too numerous, and are used only for those
collections of ideas which we have most frequently
occasion to mention in discourse. And this end is
obtained in the most simple manner in the world;
for having occasion to mention a collection of ideas

for which there is no single complex term in the
language, we either take that complex term which
includes the greatest number, though not *all* of the
ideas we would communicate ; or else we take that
complex term,* which includes *all* and the fewest
ideas, more than those we would communicate ;
and then by the help of the preposition, we either
make up the deficiency in the one case, or retrench
the superfluity in the other.

For instance, 1. A house *with* a party wall.

2. A house *without* a roof.

WITH (1.) is the imperative of withan, *to join;*
and sometimes (2.) of wyrthan, *to be.* The instance
then stands thus: a house, *join* a party-wall; a
house *be-out* a roof; in the first, the complex term
is deficient; the preposition directs to add what is
wanting: in the second, the complex term is re-
dundant; the preposition directs to take away
what is superfluous.

THOROUGH. The French peculiar preposition
chez, is the Italian *casa* or *ca*, (a house); and the
English preposition *thorough*, is the Gothic sub-
stantive *dauro*, or the Teutonic substantive *thurah*,
and means *door*, gate, passage ; and as the English

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* Locke calls such terms, names of complex ideas; teaching,
that without the name be first invented, we cannot have that par-
ticular complex idea. " Though the killing of an old man," he
says, " be as fit in nature to be united into one complex idea, as
the killing of a man's father ; yet there being no name standing
for the one, as there is in the name of *parricide*, to mark the other,
it is not taken for a particular complex idea, nor a distinct species
of action from that of killing a young man or any other man."
B. 2, c. 22, § 4. We might then easily add to our stock of complex
ideas of killing, by the coinage of such words as *senicide*, &c.

preposition is very variously written, from its sub-
stantive, so are* also the Gothic, Anglo-Saxon,
Dutch, German and Teutonic prepositions from
the substantives in their respective languages:
Gothic *dauro*, Anglo-Saxon *dora*, Dutch *deure*,
German *thure*, Teutonic *thurah*, *dure*. In the
Greek (which the Gothic in many particulars re-
sembles) it is θυρα; and both the Persian (which
in many particulars resembles the Teutonic) and
the Chaldean use *thu*, for *door*. It is worthy of
remark, that in the Teutonic, *thurah* is used both
as preposition and substantive; in the Dutch, *door*
is used for both; in Anglo-Saxon, *door* is either
*d*ure or *th*ure; in modern German, *th*ur is *d*oor,
and *d*urch is *th*orough. And this difference pre-
vails between the German and the English, thus:
German, *d*istil and *d*orn; English, *th*istle and
*th*orn. German, *th*eur, *th*aler, *th*eil; English, *d*ear,
*d*ollar, *d*eal.

Mr. Harris supplies an instance which will ex-
emplify the identity of our substantive *door*, and
our preposition *thorough, thurg, thro'*.†

Ex. The splendid sun, *with* his beams genially
warmeth *thro'* the air the fertile earth.

Res. The splendid sun, *join* his beams, genially
warmeth *passage* the air (or the air being the *pas-
sage* or medium) the fertile earth.

[Wachter says of the German preposition *durch*,

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* *Through* indicat *medium;* et proprie quidem *medium* locale;
sed et etiam medium physicum et morale. Wallis, Gram. p. 85.

† The Greek has the same contraction ουρηϑρα, the urethra,
or urine passage, from ουρον and ϑυρα.

" Dicitur de *transitu* per locum in omnibus dialec-
ticis;" and Johnson's second explanation is, " no-
ting passage;" an explanation equally applicable to
his other three.]

FROM is the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic noun
frum, beginning, origin, source, fountain, author.*

   Ex.   Figs *came* FROM Turkey.
           Lamp *falls* FROM ceiling.
           Lamp *hangs* FROM ceiling.

This example is from Harris, who ascribes to
from three different relations: first, that of being
detached from body; a second, of *motion;* and a
third, of *rest:* the two last contradictory to each
other. Tooke thus solves the difficulty involved
in this asserted contradictoriness of meaning:

Came, is a complex term for one species of motion.
Falls, for another species of motion.
Hangs, for a species of attachment.

We have not complex terms to express the be-
ginning of these motions and this attachment, and
the place where they begin; and we add, therefore,
the signs of those ideas, viz. the word *beginning*
(always the same) and the name of the *place* per-
petually varying. Thus:

Figs came			Turkey
Lamps fall	}	BEGINNING	Ceiling
Lamp hangs			Ceiling.

That is

Turkey			to come
Ceiling	}	the *place* of beginning	to fall
Ceiling			to hang.

* *From* innuit terminum a quo. Wallis' Gram. p. 84.

From relates to every thing to which *beginning* relates; and therefore to *time* as well as to *motion*, without which there can be no *time*.

Ex. From morn *till* night th' eternal larum rings.

The larum rang, BEGINNING morning; or morning being the time of its *beginning* to ring. In Mr. Harris's example it is plain the characters of detachment, motion and rest, belong to the words *came and fall*, and not to the word *from*.

[It cannot be insisted upon too strongly that in their interpretation of words, Lexicographers, following the same course with Harris, transfer to the word they are explaining the signification of some other word in the sentence; and this they do, not only in the case of prepositions, but of every other part of speech.

Johnson has seventy interpretations of this preposition; the two first stand opposed to each other. 1. Privation. 2. Reception; and the words in the sentences are: 1. *Take, drew* from; 2. *Receive* from. Afterwards we have, Out of, noting emission.

> Th' Eternal Father *from* his secret cloud
> Amidst, in thunder *utter'd* thus his voice.

The emission is expressed by the verb *uttered;* and the *beginning*, whence the *utterance* or *emission* came, was *the midst of the cloud.*

10. Out of; noting extraction.

> *From* high Mæonia's shores I came,
> Of poor descent.

The *extraction* is expressed by, or rather implied from, the verb *came*, connected with, of poor descent; and the *beginning* of it was, the shores of Mæonia.

12. Out of; noting the ground, or cause of any thing.

'Tis true, *from* force the strongest title 'springs;
I therefore hold *from* that which first made kings.

The ground or cause is expressed by the substantive *force*; and the *beginning*, whence the title springs, was *force*; and is expressed by *from*.]

To. "The preposition TO (in Dutch, written *toe* and *tot*, a little nearer to the original) is the Gothic *taui* or *tauhts*, that is, *act*, effect, result, consummation; which Gothic substantive is, indeed, in itself no other than the past participle *tauid*, of the verb *taujan*, agere; and what is *done*, is *terminated, ended, finished.*" To "has not *perhaps* (for I am not sure that it has not) precisely the signification of *end* or *termination*, but of something tantamount or equivalent."*

"In the Teutonic the verb is written *tuan* or *tuon*, whence the modern German *thun*; and its preposition (varying like its verb) *tu*. In the Anglo-Saxon the verb is *teog-an*, and the preposition TO. The Latin preposition *ad*, *to*, is also merely the past participle of *agere*; and that past participle is likewise a Latin substantive."

Agitum, agtum,	agdum,	agd,	ad
	or	or	or
	actum,	act,	at.

To return to Mr. Harris's instances:
These figs came *from* Turkey *to* England.

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* *To* vel *unto*, innuit terminum *ad quem*, atque idem terminum relationis.   Wallis' Gram. p. 84.

The lamp falls *from* the ceiling *to* the ground.

The lamp hangs *from* the ceiling *to* the floor.

As *from* denotes the commencement of the motion, so does *to* the *end* or *termination;* which is, England, or ground, or floor.   In

From morn *to* night th' eternal larum rings—

From is opposed to *to,* and if we read, from morn *till* night, it is still so opposed; *till* being compounded of *to* and *while,* that is, *time.* From morn *to time* night.*

FOR. As *from* and *to* are as opposite as *beginning* and *end;* so are *for* and *of,* as *cause* and *consequence.*

FOR, I believe (says Tooke) to be no other than the Gothic substantive *fairina,* CAUSE. †

He *imagines,* also, that OF (in the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon *af* or *āf*) is a fragment of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon *afara,* posteritas, &c. ; *āfora,* proles, &c.; that it is a noun substantive, and ·

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* Common people say, I will stay *while* evening. *Till* is, in our older writers, applied to *place* as well as *time:* as, he fled *till* Ireland; they go *till* Athens; and it is still in use in the north of England in that sense. See Richardson's Dictionary.

† *For* innuit finem cui, vel *pro quo.* Wallis' Gram. p. 84.

Sir John Stoddart thinks it most extraordinary, that Tooke, who asserts universally that prepositions are the names of *real objects,* should say of the preposition *for,* " I believe it to be no other than the Gothic substantive *fairina,* CAUSE." What real object is *cause?* How is *causation* to be apprehended by sense ? That we have a *conception* of *cause* is certain; but it is equally certain that we come at it by *means* of our *mind,* and that it is in truth " a *pure idea* of *intellect,*" which sense *alone* never did and never can give." Philosophy of Language, p. 174. Surely it is nothing extraordinary that Tooke should be consistent. He consigned all " pure ideas of intellect " to the same limbo with Locke's Triangle, and Crambe's Lord Mayor. See infra, On Abstraction.

means always *consequence, offspring, successor, follower,* &c.

It is remarked that the Russian patronymic termination was *of;* now *Vitch,* that is, *fitz, fils,* or *filius;* that of the English, *son;* as in Peterhof, Petervitch, or Petrowitz, Peterson. *Fitz* is also a common patronymic prefix in English. In the Welsh *ap, son,* coalesces with many names, as in *Ap,* Rhys, *Price, Ap-*Howel, *Powel.** Johnson has forty-six meanings of the preposition *for,* and two hundred instances in proof of them. Greenwood has eighteen meanings with above forty instances. A single instance is selected from each of these, and explained by our author; in which *cause* takes the place of *for,* and a slight change is made in the form of expression. Greenwood's general explanation is:† " The preposition FOR has many significations, and denotes chiefly for what *purpose, end,* or *use;* or *for* whose benefit or damage any thing is done: as, ' Christ died *for* us.' "

Res. Christ died *cause* us ; or we being the cause of his dying.

He then subdivides this general explanation into eighteen specific ones.

1. It serves to denote the *end or object* which one proposes in any action; as, to fight *for* the public good (that is, *cause* the public good ; or, the public good being the *cause* of fighting).

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* De Brosses. Mech. du Langage, Ch. 12, § 5, observes that the Latin termination *ius,* in proper names (Œmil*ius*), is very probably from the Greek υἱος, filius.

† English Gram. p. 95.

To proceed more briefly :

2. He does all things *for* the love of virtue. Greenwood includes *cause* in his explanation.

3. It marks the use for which a thing is done: as, Chelsea Hospital was built *for* disabled soldiers; disabled soldiers (or the use of disabled soldiers) being the *cause* of its being built.

4. It denotes profit, advantage, interest: as, I write *for* your satisfaction.

5. It denotes for what a thing is *proper* or not: as, It is a good remedy *for* (the cure of) a fever.

6. It denotes agreement or help: as, The soldier fights *for* the king.

There can be no difficulty in explaining these examples. Others there are, which require to be stated more at length.

8. It denotes retribution, or requital and payment: hither we refer the phrases, Eye *for* eye, &c. (that is, an eye destroyed by malicious violence being the *cause* of an eye taken from the convict in punishment).

11. It denotes the condition of persons, things, and times: as, He was a learned man *for* those times (that is, the darkness or ignorance of those times being the *cause* why he may be considered as a learned man).

I hope the number of examples that have been presented to the reader, will suffice to enable him to put the remainder of Greenwood's, and the whole of Johnson's, to a fair trial.

Dr. Lowth conceiving FOR, in its primary sense, to be *loco alterius*, in the *stead or place* of another,

censures our two greatest masters of the English
language.—DRYDEN, for saying, You accuse Ovid
for luxuriancy of verse; and SWIFT, for saying,
Accused the ministers *for* betraying the Dutch.
The meaning of the passages plainly is,

Betraying the Dutch⎱ *Cause* of the accusation.
Luxuriancy of verse⎰

Both Greenwood and Johnson give, Instead of,
in the place of, as one of their explanations: I
subjoin them with the example from each, with
Tooke's explanation.

GREENWOOD.   It is used to denote *instead* of,
in the place of: as, I will grind *for* him (that is,
he being the *cause* of my grinding).

JOHNSON.   In the place of, instead of: as, To
make him copious is to alter his character; and to
translate him line FOR line is impossible (that is, line
cause of line; or each line of the original being the
cause of each line in the translation).

[It may be worth while to produce some old
usages of the expression *for to,* now deemed a vul-
garism:

And led hir unto France, spoused *for to* be.
                                    R. Brunne.

What wenten ye out *for to* se.   *Wiclif.*

For he was late ycome fro his viage,
And went *for to* don his pilgrimage.   *Chaucer.*

To be spoused, *cause* of her being led to France.
To see what, was the *cause* that ye wenten out.
To do his pilgrimage, the *cause* he went.]

But *for* and *of* differing so widely as *cause* and
consequence, it remains to account for the indifferent

use of them in the following passage from Wycherley's Country Wife:

Well! 'tis e'en so; I have caught the London disease they call Love. I am sick *of* my husband, and *for* my gallant.

So also we have, sick *of* hunger; sick *for* hunger; sickness *of* hunger; sickness *for* hunger.

Here are, sickness *of* love; sickness *for* love.

Between the respective terms,—sickness, hunger—sickness, love,—it matters not which of the two prepositions is inserted; the only difference is, that if *of* be inserted, it is put in *apposition* to *sickness*, and *sickness* is announced as the *consequence*; if *for* is inserted, it is put in *apposition* to *hunger* or to *love*, and *hunger* or *love* is announced the *cause*.

Scaliger, in his Chap.* entitled *Appositio*, says truly, " Causa propter quam duo *substantiva* non ponuntur sine copula, è philosophia petenda est.— Si qua substantia ejusmodi est, ut *ex ea et alia, unum* intelligi queat; earum duarum substantiarum totidem notæ (id est *nomina*) in oratione sine injunctione cohærere poterunt."

" And this," says Tooke, " is the case with all those prepositions (as they are called) which are really *substantives*. Each of these ejusmodi est, ut ex ea et *alia* (to which it is *pre*fixed, *post*fixed, or by any manner attached) unum intelligi potest."

In illustration of this doctrine of Apposition, it is important to add, that " the Dutch are supposed to use *van* in two meanings, because it supplies in-

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* Cap. 127, De Causis, L. L.

differently the places both of our *of* and *from*; not-withstanding which, *van* has always one and the same meaning: namely, *beginning*. And its use, both for *of* and *from*, is to be explained by its different *apposition*. When it supplies the place of FROM, *van* is put in *apposition* to the same term to which *from* is put in *apposition*. But when it supplies the place of OF, it is *not* put in *apposition* to the same term to which *of* is put in apposition, but to its *correlative*. And between two correlatives, it is totally indifferent to the meaning which of the two correlations is expressed.*

> *Ex.*   Comen *van* Amsterdam.
>
> To come *from* Amsterdam.

Motion and place are the correlations; *van* and *from* are in apposition to the place where motion began.

> *Ex.*   Hy is *van* goed geslacht.
>
> He is *of* a noble stock.

VAN is in apposition to *noble stock*; (one correlative;) *the beginning*, whence, *he is* (what he is) begins.

But OF is in apposition to *he is*, (the other correlative,) as consequence or offspring of noble stock.

OF.   It is now necessary to return to the preposition *of*, and first, as to its etymology.

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* It is worthy of note, that Sir John Stoddart quotes this with approbation, which shows that he understood and embraced Tooke's Doctrine of the effect of apposition and also of correlation. And yet in the last sentence of his elaborate Chapter on Prepositions, seems to insinuate that Tooke knew as little of the nature of a *preposition*, as those whom he censures for their ignorance of it.

" *Af*, from *af*-ara or *af*-ora," (says a critic in the Quarterly Review, September, 1835, and an *Alter idem* probably in Blackwood's Magazine, April, 1840,) " no more than the Latin *post* from the English, *posterity*." He would have been nearer the chance of a truth, if he had said, " As much as the Latin *post*, from *positum*." He proceeds to assert that the Gothic noun *afar*, is from the *particle afar*, *post*, and this evidently from *af*. What then is *af?* It is Sanscrit *apa*, Greek ἀπὸ, Latin *ab*, Old German *aba*, *apa*, English *of*. And thus we are driven back to the old scheme of etymology, deducing a noun from a *particle*, and leading us through a variety of synonymous affinities, and ending in, " True no meaning—puzzling more than wit." Tooke's doctrine required that he should look into our own language or its immediate parent for some noun substantive from which the preposition, that is, the prepositive or rather appositive noun, might have derived to us. And he says, he imagines the Gothic *afara* to be that substantive. The corruption is slight, and the meaning clear.

A few instances selected from Johnson will serve to illustrate this meaning, and at the same time to show further his practice (or rather the general practice) of imputing, as a meaning to the word he has to explain, a meaning that pertains to some other word in the sentence.

9. Noting *power*, ability, choice.

Some soils *put forth* odorate flowers *of* themselves. — Odorate flowers are the *consequence* or offspring; soils, the cause.

10. Noting properties, qualities, or conditions.

" Its (the eglantine's) odours were *of power* to raise from death." That is, the odours *of* the eglantine were odours *of* power to raise from death. In the first case, odours were *consequence* and eglantine *cause*. In the second, odours (their being such odours *as they were*) the *consequence*, and the power to raise from death the *cause* (of their being such).

11. He was *a man of* ancient family.

A man; *consequence* or offspring;—ancient family ; *cause*, source.

13. Noting the matter of the thing.

The chariot was of *cedar*, and borders *of gold*, &c. &c. need no explanation.

BY is the next important word : it is written *bi* or *be*. *By* cause, *bi*-cause, *be* cause, *by* right, *bi* right, *be* right (in Anglo-Saxon *bi*, *be*, *big*). It is the imperfect *Byth* of the Anglo-Saxon BE-ON, *to be*.* It is *frequently* used with an abbreviation of construction, or sub-audition of instrument, cause, agent, &c. and the meaning of the omitted word is often attributed to *it*. *With*, the imperative of *wyrthan*, is used indifferently for *by* (when the imperative of *beon*), and with the same sub-audition and implied meaning.† *By* was also used (not improperly and with the same meaning) where now are used *for, in, during, through*. One quotation

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* Hence *by-an*, to continue to be, to dwell.

  † Yet custom has established a difference in the usage. Though we say, " he was slain *by* a sword or *with* a sword," we should not say, " he was slain *with* me *by* a sword," but " *by* me *with* a

from the old chronicler Fabyan will exemplify these usages.

" When he (the holy Byshop Aldelme) was styred *by* his gostly enymy to the synne of the flesh, he, to do more torment to himselfe and of hys Body, wolde holde within his bed *by* hym a faire mayden *by* so long a tyme as he myght say over a holy sauter." *Fabyan,* lxxvi.

By his gostly enymy (his ghostly enemy *being* sc. the agent).

Wolde holde *by* hym. Hym *being* the *cause* of holding.

Wolde holde *by* so long a time; so long a time *being, continuing, during.* He might have written *for* so long a time as; so long a time as to perform a certain act, being the *cause* of his so holding her. He might also have written *through* so long a time; so long a time *being* the *passage* or *medium* to the performance of the act.

" Sleynge the people without mercy *by* all the wayes that they passed." *Fabyan,* lxxviii.

In all the ways, &c.

Johnson in his four first explanations accords very well with Tooke: in the subsequent twenty, a meaning implied from some other word in each quotation is introduced.

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sword," *by* being connected with the *agent,* and *with* connected with the *instrument.* Again we may say,

He was killed *by* (*agent*) me.

He was killed *by* or *with* (*instrument*) a sword.

He was killed *by* or *with* (*cause or means*) sensual indulgences.

With seems never to be connected with the principal agent.

5. It shows the *manner* of an action. " Seize her *by force*."

7. The quantity. " Sell *by* the *ounce*."

8. Place. " Battle *by* sea."

12. Noting ground of judgment. " Judge the event *by* what has passed."

It is clear that in these instances *force* expresses the *manner; ounce,* the *quantity; sea,* the *place;* and *what has* passed, the ground of judgment.

SANS, formerly, sometimes used instead of *without,* is a substantive, and means *absence* (Italian Assenza). It is from the Italian preposition *senza.*

So the Greek preposition χωρίς, *asunder,* is the corrupted imperative of χωρίζειν, to sunder, to sever, disjoin, separate.

The German preposition *sonder,* Dutch *zonder,* are the imperative of the respective verbs *sondern, zonderen,* with the same meaning as the Greek χωρίζειν.

The Latin preposition SINE, that is, sit ne, *be not.* The Spanish *sin,* from the Latin *sine.*

FURTHER. The Greek θυρα became the Doric φορα, and the Latin *fora,* whence *fores, foris,* whence the Italian *fuora, fuore, fuori,* and the French *fors,* which in the *prepositive* and *conjunctive* state, the French have latterly changed to *hors;* but they have not so changed it when in composition, as *forsbourg.* From the French we still have, and once had many more English words preceded by *for* in this meaning, as *for*feit, *fore*close, &c.

[Our law-writers (I may remark) were quite aware of this origin of *for;* they render *forfeit* by

foris-facere, q. extraneum facere.* To these two I will add a few in very common use, *forbear, forbid, forget, forgive, forsake.*

FOR-BEAR, *v.* to abstain, says Mr. Tyrwhitt, that is, to hold or keep away from; and so to *forbear* is *forth*-bear, that is, to bear forth or away from, to hold off or away.

FOR-BID, *v.* to bid *forth* or away from; sc. any thing doing or to be done.

FORGET, *v.* to get *forth;* to cause or suffer to get or go forth, pass out, or escape; sc. from the mind or memory.

FORGIVE, *v.* to give *forth,* out or away; to remit or release, and consequentially, to pardon (*per donare*).

FORLORE, Robert of Gloucester writes VER-LORE. Chaucer, Gower, Spenser write *forlore,* which Tyrwhitt properly interprets, *utterly* lost. Hence *forlorn,* which Latham interprets *lost* only, omitting the force of *for.*

FORSAKE, *v.* to seek *forth,* out or away from; and thus, to go away or depart from.

There is another old law term, which will serve for further illustration:

FORIS-FAMILIATE, *v.* in Law Latin *foris familiare,* to put, drive, or expel (*foris familiam*) *forth* from his *family.* A son is said to be *foris familiate* (foris familiatus) when he has received from his

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* To do or cause to be out or away from, to do amiss or misdo. Chaucer writes: " All this suffred our Lord Jesu Crist, who never *forfaited.*" *Parsones Tale.*

And also, to do away or lose his property, sc. for some crime.

father a share or portion of the inheritance, and is to expect no more. *Spelman.*]

BETWEEN. *Betwixt, between,* (formerly written *twene, atwene, bytwene,*) is a dual preposition, having no word correspondent in the Greek, Latin, Italian, French, &c. and being almost peculiar to ourselves. *Between* is the Anglo-Saxon imperative *be* and *twegen, twain.* *Betwixt* is the same imperative, and the Gothic *twos* or two. It is written by Chaucer *by-twyt.*

BE-*fore,* BE-*hind,* BE-*low,* BE-*side* can require no explanation.

BE-NEATH. *Neath,* now obsolete, has left *nether, nethermost* in common use. The House of Commons was anciently (in the time of Henry VIII.) called the *nether* house of Parliament: and the word occurs several times *seriously* used in Paradise Lost, though now used otherwise. The Gothic *nadr,* Anglo-Saxon *nedre,* applied to the whole serpentine class, is much more ancient in the northern languages than the introduction of astronomy among them, and with that their word *nadir.* The Anglo-Saxon *neothan, neothe,* (in Dutch *neden,* Danish *ned,* German *niedere,* and the Swedish *nedre* and *neder,*) is as much a substantive, and has the same meaning as this *nadir.*

From the *top* to the *bottom* is in the collateral Dutch, " Van *boven* tot *beneden,*" and in both the nouns are at once acknowledged.

UNDER, in Dutch *onder,* is *on neder,* though by the sound seeming to have so little connection with *beneath.*

BEYOND, (in Anglo-Saxon not only *biʒeond, be-geond,* but *withʒeond,*) is *be* and *geond,* the past participle of the verb GAN, *ganʒan,* or *gongan,* to go, to pass. So that " beyond any place," means *be passed* that place, or *be* that place *passed.*

[*Obs.* YON, YONDER, Ben Jonson classes among the pronouns.]

WARD, in Anglo-Saxon *ward* or *weard,* is the imperative of *wardian* or *weardian,* to look at, to direct the view, and is the same word as the French *garder.* Our word *reward,* usually by help of other words in the sentence, conveys to *recompense,* to *benefit,* for some good action done; and by the same help it conveys the notion of punishment, but is no other than the French *regarder,* to *regard,* to look again, that is, to *re-member,* to *re-consider,* the natural consequence of which will be either the apportionment of benefit or the contrary, according to the action or conduct *reviewed.*

It is in a figurative or secondary sense that *garder* means to *protect,* to keep, to watch, to ward, to guard. It is the same in Latin: *Tutus,* guarded, *looked* after, safe, is the past participle of *tueor, tuitus, tutus.* So *tutor,* he who *looks* after. So we say either *guard* him well, or *look* well after him. And a *looker,* a warden, a warder, an overseer, a keeper, a guard or a guardian, is a name for the same agent or officer.

WARD may be joined to any place, person, or thing, as in our old poets and divines, to Rome*ward,* to God*ward,* to Grace*ward.*

In *toward* and *fromward* we direct to *look* at or

regard either the end or beginning of any *action*
or *motion* or *time.*   *Ward* always in composition
retains the same meaning, namely, *regard, look at,*
see, direct your view.

The Latin preposition *versus,* (French *vers,* Ita-
lian *verso,*) from the Latin verb *vertere,* to turn, is
equivalent to the English *ward,* as *ad-versus* is to
toward; it is *versus,* the past participle, *turnèd,*
namely, in order to look at, to regard.

ATHWART, that is, *athweort* or *athweoried,* wrest-
ed, twisted, curved, is the past participle of *thweo-*
rian, to wrest, to twist.   *Thwart* or *athwart* has
corresponding prepositions in German, Dutch, Da-
nish and Swedish, and from the same source are
the English *swerve* and *veer.*

AMONG.   EMONGE, AMONGE, AMONGES,
AMONGEST, AMONGST, AMONG, is the past parti-
ciple gemœncged, gemencged (the Dutch *gemengd,*
gemengt, Old English *meynt**), of the Anglo-Saxon
verb *gemœncgan,* and the Gothic verb *tamaingan;*
or rather the preterperfect, *gemang,gemong,gemung,*
or amang, among, amung, (of the same verb *mœn-*
gan, mengan,) used as a participle, without the ter-
mination *od,* ad, or ed, and meaning *mixed, mingled.*
The Anglo-Saxons usually prefixed A. Æ. *be. for.*
ge. especially to their past participles.

YMELL, with the same omission of termination,
means y-medled, that is, *mixed, mingled.   Medley*
is still common.   To *medle, mydle, mell,* merely to
mix, are as common in old writers.

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* See infra, MANY.

AGAINST. Mr. Tooke knows not the verb, of which this must be the past participle.

AMID or AMIDST. The Anglo-Saxon is On-middan, on-midder, *in medio: Mid, middle* (that is, mid-dæl) *midst.*

ALONG. *On long* or *on length;* the Anglo-Saxons used Andlang or Endlong.

ALONG. (It was *along* of you). The Anglo-Saxons used Gelang, the past participle of lenʒian, and means *produced.* Our most ancient writers observed the same distinction.*

It is *along* of you; it is *produced* by you; "I *long* for his return." We express a moderate desire for any thing by saying we *incline*, that is, bend ourselves to it; and an eager desire by saying that we *long* for it, that is, make long, *lengthen,* or stretch ourselves out *after* it or *for it:* observe, we say, incline *to* or *towards, Long for* or *after.*

Lenʒian is also written *lanʒian,* and " *Lanʒath* the awuht, Adam, up to Gode," Lye renders; (est quod) elevabit te aliquid, Adam, sursum ad Deum: and Tooke, " *longeth* you, *length*eneth you, *stretch-eth* you up to God."

DURING is the participle of the verb *dure,* formerly common in our language. PENDING, OPPOSITE, need no explanation.

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* *Belong,* v. on the meaning of the verb lenzian, to *long,* that is, to make long, to lengthen, to stretch out, to produce, I have founded my explanation of to *belong,* " to reach, to attain, to pertain, to appertain," an explanation which leads to and accounts for that *consequential* usage which Johnson and Webster concur in giving as the *primary* meaning, " to be the property of," (rather to be or become).

SAVE is the imperative of the verb.

OUTCEPT is whimsically composed of *out* and *capere*, instead of *ex* and *capere*. *Out-take* and *out-taken* were formerly in very common use.

NIGH, NEAR, is the Anglo-Saxon adjective *nih, neh, neah, neahg, vicinus;* and NEXT, the Anglo-Saxon superlative *neahgest, nehst.*

INSTEAD, in Anglo-Saxon is *on* or *in stede,* that is, *in place.* Hence *Step* or *sted-father,* Anglo-Saxon steop-fæder; in Latin *vice* or *loco,* Italian *in luogo,* in Spanish *en lugar,* French *au lieu,* in Dutch *in stede* or *in plaats,* German on *statt,* Danish *istæden,* in Swedish (as we use either home*ē*stead or home-stall) it is *istàellet.* [Wachter had so far anticipated the etymology of *step*-father, &c. as to write, "Vide annon *stief-vater,* sit *vice-pater; stief-muter, vice-mater; stief-son, vice-filius,* sc. representatione aut substitutione." But he refers both the German *stief* and the Anglo-Saxon *steop* to the Anglo-Saxon *stow* of the same meaning, namely, *place.* In Danish the compounds are all written *stied-fader, moder, broder,* &c.; and "at være een i *fader's stied,*" is " to be one in a *father's stead.*" And our own Miles Coverdale thus feelingly writes: " Haue compassiō, oh, christen woman, upon those yonge innocent Orphans, which know not, nor have any confort nor helpe upon erthe, save only the. Consider that God the Lord hath ordeyned the (in *steede* of their own mother) to be to thē a right true mother, and requireth the to loue thē and to do thē good. *The Christen State of Matrimony,* lxx.]

ABOUT is from the Anglo-Saxon *boda* (whence

our English word to *bode;* See but, abut;) which means the *first outward extremity or boundary of any thing.*

AFTER is the comparative of the noun *aft,* still used by our sailors: Gothic *aftaro,* Anglo-Saxon *æfter,* Dutch *agter, achter,* Danish *efter,* Swedish *efter, atrâ, achter;* AFTER is used as a noun adjective in Anglo-Saxon, in English, and in most northern languages. *Hind, aft,* and *back,* have all originally the same meaning. In Danish *for* og *bag* is our *fore* and *aft,* or *before* and *behind.*

DOWN. *Adown,* Anglo-Saxon *dun,* Ꝺdun, *of dune,* deorsum.

Camden and Bishop Gibson consider the rivers *Dan* or *Daven* (whence *Dan*port or Davenport) the *Don* or *Doven,* the *Dun, Dune,* or *Duven,* to be so called, because carried in a channel, *low, sunk* in the ground, and to be from *Duffen,*—Britannicè, sunk or low (*depressum*). Tooke agrees that *duffen* is the origin not only of the names of the rivers, but also of our word *down* (as perhaps Camden), but he is of opinion that *duf-*en is the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb *duf-ian, dof-ian, daf-ian;* and also *dyfian,* to *dive,* mergere, to sink, to plunge, to *dive,* to dip.

[The Anglo-Saxon *dun, dune,* Somner explains to be *mons,* a hill or mountain, a *down.**

A DOWN is a place (*doffen*) *sunk* or *low* (*locus*

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* Mr. Taylor (8vo. edition) suggests that *down, adown,* is a contraction of *of-dune,* off or from hill, downhill, proclivis, and adds that the Latin *pronus* is rendered from Boethius, by Alfred *of-dune,* and by Chaucer *adowne.*

mersus, depressus). To *be* on the *down* or downs
is to be on a place *sunk* or *low.*

To go or come to the *down* or *downs* is to go or
come to the place *sunk* or *low.*

To *go* or come *down* is to go or come, place or
to place, *sunk* or *low,* and, with relation to those
on the top, to descend.

The Downs are the hills *dipping* down to the sea
along the coast of Kent, under which our ships ride
in safety. Of the same description are the *Dunes*
on the coast of Holland, whence *Dun*kirk.

Down is sometimes used as a verb, or with the
sub-audition of a verb, as " *down with him !* "

Locke writes, " If he be hungry, more than wan-
ton bread alone will *down.*" Again, " I know not
how absurd this may seem to the masters of de-
monstration, and probably it will hardly *down* with
any body at first hearing."

Johnson supposes an ellipsis of *go,* to *go* down,
and he explains Locke's usages thus: " to be re-
ceived, to be digested :" he should have added, " to
be swallowed." This, be it observed, is his first
explanation ; his second is " to descend."

The first affords a remarkable illustration of his
method of interpretation, namely, to transfer to the
word he is explaining a signification implied from
the context. Mr. Trench observes that THE great
fault in Johnson's Dictionary is the non-recognition
that a word has originally but *one* meaning, and
that all the applications may be deduced from it.
It is indeed THE great fault, inasmuch as it is the
fruitful parent of nameless others. Dr. Webster,

it is to be regretted, treads in Johnson's footsteps, and follows his mode of interpretation, and goes so far as to say that EYE *means*—direct opposition; and that MOUTH *means*—desires, necessities, reproaches, calumnies, &c. &c.]

UPON, UP, OVER, BOVE, ABOVE, have a common origin and signification. It is not necessary to trace these particles farther than to some noun or verb of a determinate signification, and this noun is the Anglo-Saxon *ufa, ufera, ufamœst;* altus, altior, altissimus; *yp, upon; upper, over: upmost, uppermost; upperest, overest.*

Bove is Beufan, bufan; *above* is on-bufan, " but I believe that *ufon, ufa,* upon, up, means the same as top or *head,* and is originally derived from the same source." Head* is in Anglo-Saxon *heafod, heafd,* the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon *heaf-an* or *heof-an,* to *heave* or lift up, whence *uf-*on, with the same signification, may easily be derived. " And I believe the names of all abstract relation (as it is called) are taken either from the adjectived names of common objects, or from the participles of common verbs. The relations of *place* are more commonly from the names of some parts of our body."

Under this, or some such impression, Wilkins constructed his diagram, to explain the local prepositions, by the help of a man's figure; and from Wilkins the Abbé de l'Epée borrowed his method of teaching the prepositions to his deaf and dumb scholars.

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* See infra, Heave, head, &c.

IN, OUT, ON, OFF, AT. Tooke cannot satisfy himself about these words. In the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon there is the substantive *inna*, meaning uterus, viscera, venter, interior pars corporis (and in a secondary sense the Anglo-Saxon, *inn*, inne, is used for *cave, cell, cavern*). *Out*, not improbably from a word originally meaning *skin*, and thus *in* and *out* would come from two nouns meaning those parts of the body.

CHAP. X.

OF ADVERBS.

ALL the indeclinables, except the *adverbs*, are now considered, and they are no more a separate part of speech than conjunctions and prepositions. They will give little trouble.

All adverbs in *ly* (the most prolific branch of the family) receive their termination from the corruption of *like*, which word "*like*" is at this day in Scotland frequently used instead of the English *ly;* e. g. A good*like* figure.

ADRIFT is the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb Drifan, Ӕdrifan, *to drive.*

AGHAST, AGAST. Tooke is inclined to think that the Gothic Ӕgids, territus, the past participle of *agjan, timere,* may have become *agisd, agist, agast.* But the constant application of the word to that, which is Gazed, agazed, agaz'd (agast) upon with terror or consternation, seems sufficient to account

for its restriction to denote those feelings. *Ague* is from the Gothic *agis, fear, trembling.*

Go, Ago, Ygo, Gon, Agon, Gone, Agone, are used indiscriminately by our old English writers, as the past participle of the verb *to go.*

Asunder (originally from the Anglo-Saxon *sond,* that is, *sand*) is the past participle ᚼ*sundren,* or ᚼ*sundred,* separated (as the particles of *sand* are), of the verb *sondrian,* &c. *to separate.*

Astray is the past participle ᚼ*stræged,* of the Anglo-Saxon verb *strægan, to stray, to scatter.* Hence straw, strow, strew, straggle, stroll, and also the *straw* (that is, *straw-d, stray*)-*berry.*

Atwist is the past participle *Ge-twised,* ᚼ*twised,* ᚼ*twisd,* of the verb *twisan,* &c. *torquere; twisan,* from *twa, twæ, twi, twy, tweo, two.*

Awry is the past participle ᚼ*wrythed,* ᚼ*wrythd,* of the verb *wrythan, writhan, to writhe.*

Askew, in the Danish *skiæv,* is *wry, crooked, oblique.* Skiever, *to twist, to wrest.* Skiævt, *twisted, wrested.*

Askant, Askance, probably are the participles *aschuined, aschuins.* In Dutch *schuin, wry, oblique; schuinen, to cut awry; schuins, sloping, wry, not straight.*

Aswoon is the past participle *asuond,* of the Anglo-Saxon verb *Suanian,* ᚼ*swunan, deficere animo.*

Astound is the past participle *estonnéd,* of the French verb *estonner, etonner, to astonish.*

Enough, in Anglo-Saxon *genoᚷ* or *genoh,* appears to be the past participle *genoged, multiplicatum, manifold,* of the Anglo-Saxon verb *genogan,*

multiplicare. In Dutch *genoeg,* from *genoegen,* to content, to satisfy.

FAIN is the past participle *fægened, fægen, fægn, lætus,* of the Anglo-Saxon verb *fægenian, fægnian, gaudere, lætari* (to be glad, to rejoice, to *fain.*)

Somner.

LIEF, LIEVER, LIEVEST, leof, leofre, leofest. Leof (for leofed or lufad, or lufod or luf) is the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb lufian, *to love,* and always means *beloved.* Tooke considers this word *lief,* &c. to be a vulgarity which no modern author would use. Yet Junius (his victim as he imagined) had written, " Though I use terms of art, do not injure me so much as to suppose I am a lawyer: I had *as lief* be a Scotchman." *Letters,* V. i. p. 312. Woodfall's Edition.

ADIEU, FAREWELL. The former is from the French *à dieu,* from the Italian *addio.* The latter is the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb *faran, to go* or *to fare.* How *goes* it? how *fares* it?

HALT is the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb healdan, *to hold.* Hence also to *hold,* formerly written *to halt.* In German *still halten,* Dutch *still houden,* to halt or stop, German *halten,* Dutch *houden,* to hold.

LO is the imperative of Look. " Lo, you there."

NEEDS. *Need is,* used parenthetically, and anciently written *nedes* and *nede is.* So *certes* for *certain is.*

PRITHEE, I pray thee.

To WIT is the infinitive of the Anglo-Saxon verb *witan,* and means *to be known, sciendum ;*—rather

from the second infinitive *to-witanne* (as Mr. R. Taylor suggests).

PERCHANCE. *Par-escheant, par-escheance,* the participle of *escheoir, echeoir, echoir,* to fall.

PERCASE (anciently *parcas, parcaas*) is *per casum,* participle of *cadere.*

PERADVENTURE, anciently *peraunter, paraunter.*

MAYBE, MAYHAP. In Westmoreland and other parts they use *mappen,* that is, *may happen.*

PERHAPS, UPHAP. By or through *haps* ; Upon a *hap.*

HAB-NAB. *Hap ne hap; happen or not happen.*

BE-LIKE, perpetually occurring in our best old writers, is in Danish *lykke,* in Swedish *lycka,* and means *luck,* that is, CHANCE, *hazard,* HAP, *fortune, adventure.*

A-FOOT, *On foot.* Foot-hot means *immediately, instantaneously,* without giving time for the *foot* to cool. So our court of *Pie poudre,* pied poudré, in which matters are determined before one can wipe the dust from one's feet. So *E vestigio.*

ALOFT, on loft, on luft, on lyft; that is, in the *luft* or *lyft* (or the article omitted as superfluous, as in Anglo-Saxon and old English), in lyft, &c. In Anglo-Saxon *lyft* is the *air* or *clouds;* in Danish and Swedish *luft* is *air;* in Dutch, *de loef hebben,* to sail before the wind; *loeven,* to ply to windward; *loef,* the weather-gage. And from the same root are *loft, lofty,* to *luff, lee, leeward,* to *lift,* &c.

AWHILE, *Atime. Whilst* is a corruption of *whiles*—time, that or which.

AUGHT or OUGHT is the Anglo-Saxon Hwit, *a whit, o whit.* O was formerly written for the ar-

G

ticle *a* and the numeral *one.* So *naught* or nought,
na whit, or no whit.

FORTH, from the Latin foris; the French had
fors (their modern *hors*), and hence*forth,*—whence
the old adverbs *outforth, inforth,* &c. See ante
FOR in composition.

MUCH, MORE, MOST.

Mow or *mowe,* is the preterperfect, and *mowen* or
meowen, the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon
mawan, metere. Drop (as is customary) the ter-
mination *en,* and there is left *mowe* or *mow,* mean-
ing simply that which is *mowed* or *mown;* and as
this was put together in a *heap;** hence, figuratively,
mowe was used in the Anglo-Saxon to denote ANY
heap,† though we now confine it to a *heap* of coun-
try produce; as a *barley-mow,* a *hay-mow,* &c. The
past participle or substantive was variously written,
ma, mæ, mo, mowe, mow, which when regularly
compared, give *ma,* ma-er (that is, mare), ma-est,
(that is, mæst). *Mæ,* mæ-er (that is, mære), mæ-est
(that is, mæst). *Mowe,* mow-er (that is, more), mow-
est (that is, most). *Mo,* mo-er (that is, MORE),
mo-est (that is, most).

Much has taken the place of *mo,* which was con-
stantly used by our old writers, and is the diminu-
tive of *mo,* passing through the gradual changes
of mo*h*el, my*k*el, *moclil, mucheh, moche,* MUCH.‡
The interchange of *k* and *h* is common.

[It is objected to this etymology (first I think by

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* Cockeram explains the verb *to mow* to acervate.

† G. Douglas uses it for a heap of wood, or a funeral pile.
(Dido's) Æn. B. 4. p. 117.

‡ See Stoddart, Philosophy of Language, p. 238.

the learned Dr. Jamieson, who always treats Tooke with the respect and courtesy so becoming from one scholar to another), that *ma* is as really a comparative as *mare,* both being used adverbially in the sense of *plus, magis.* But this is not the only instance in which words expressing a positive state, affording a standard of comparison, have been used to denote a comparative degree. This has been so with *less* and *worse.* To *less* is to *loose* or put away, and the remainder of that from which any part has been *lest* or *lost* is an object of comparison with the original whole. And thus *less,* sufficiently denoting comparison, the grammatical form of *lesser,* used by our old writers, has fallen into disuse as unnecessary. The same has been the fate of *worser.* To *worse* is to *wear* or *waste ;* and *worse, worsen* (as the Latin deterior, from *de-terere,*) is *worn, wasted,* and admits of comparison with that which is not.

With *mo* the process has been eventually different. *Mo* or *mow,* that is, a *heap* (acervus), is a positive object, formed by accumulation of parts, and affording a standard of comparison in relation to those parts. Successive accumulations or coacervations of *mow* upon *mow,* afforded other standards of comparison, requiring successively the terminations of *er* and *est* to express their relative degrees of comparison in the progress of increase. And this increase, commencing with that of *mo* or *mow* into *mo-er* or *more,* and not of the constituent parts of *mo,*—*mo* or *mowe* has not maintained its ground as a comparative, but is used simply to express the positive object.]

RATHER. *Rath, rather, rathest,* are in most com-

mon use, both as adjectives and adverbs, in our older
English writers, and are simply the Anglo-Saxon
RATH, Rathor, Rathost, *celer, velox.* The Italians
have received the word from our Northern ances-
tors, and pronounce it *ratto.*

Chaucer writes, " Why ryse ye so *rathe ?* " *Mil-
ton,* " Bring the *rathe* primrose that forsaken dies."
Chaucer, " Come the *rather* out." " Thou lan-
guyshest for desyre of thy *rather* fortune." " The
werst speche is the *rathest* herde."

FIE is the imperative of the Gothic and Anglo-
Saxon verb fian, *to hate.*

QUICKLY is Gwic, the past participle of gwiccian,
vivificare, and *like,* and means *life-like* or *lively.*

SCARCE, in Dutch Skæars, is *rare, unfrequent.*

SELDOM. The Dutch have also the adjective
zelden, selden ; the Germans selten, the Danes seld-
som, the Swedes sellsynt, *rare, unusual, uncommon.*

STARK in Anglo-Saxon is *strong.* German
Starck, Dutch Sterk, Danish Stærk, Swiss Stark.

VERY means *true,* and is from the French adjec-
tive *Vrai ;* anciently written by them and us, *veray.*
(*Chaucer, Gower,* &c.)

ONCE, AT ONCE, TWICE, THRICE, are merely
the genitives, *anes,* &c. of Æne, Æn, twai, twa, twez,
twiz, thri, thry, &c. (the substantive *time, turn,* &c.
omitted). In a *trice ;* in the time in which we can
count *three ;* one, two, *three,* and away. [Gower
writes *treis.*]

ATWO, ATHREE, are on twa, on thry ; *in two,
in three.*

ALONE, ONLY, are *all-one* (or *one* being *all*),
one-like.

ANON, in Anglo-Saxon On-an, is *in one, instant, moment,* &c. subaudition.

SPICK AND SPAN NEW. *Spyker* in Dutch means *a warehouse or magazine;* in German *spange* means any thing *shining.* Spick and Span-new means *shining new from the warehouse.*

In Anglo-Saxon *ān* means *one,* and *on* means *in,* which word *on* we have in English corrupted to *an* before a vowel, and to *a* before a consonant, and in writing and speaking have connected it with the subsequent words; and from this double corruption has sprung a numerous race of adverbs, which (only because there has not been a similar corruption) have no correspondent adverbs in other languages.

ASIDE, *on side;* ABLAZE, *on blaze;* ABOARD, *on board;* ALIVE, *on live, in life:* and numerous others needing no explanation.

Aye or Yea is the imperative of a verb of northern extraction, and means, have *it,* possess it, enjoy it; and *yes* is ay-es, *have,* possess, or enjoy *that.*

No and *Not* have the same extraction. In the Danish nödig, in the Swedish nódig, and in the Dutch noode, node, and no, mean *averse, unwilling.*

Thus is the reader put into possession of Mr. Tooke's Etymology of English conjunctions, prepositions, and adverbs, which are traced (the reader will perceive) with the most scrupulous minuteness, and, in general, supported by a great variety of well-chosen authorities, from which I have made, I hope, selections to a sufficient extent. And thus terminates the first volume of the Επεα Πτεροεντα.

VOL. II.

THE second volume opens upon us with the
announcement of topics of more attractive
importance than the distribution of the parts of
speech, and the etymologies of conjunctions and
prepositions: for, though these in the hands of
Horne Tooke bear a very different character from
that with which any other grammarian has con-
trived to invest them, yet it must be allowed that
chapters on the rights of man and on abstraction
are far better calculated to arrest and engage the
attention of the philosophical enquirer.

CHAP. I.

OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN.

THE words to which we are first introduced
are *right, just,* and *law ;* also *wrong* and *left :*
and on these it is necessary that our Author
should be heard somewhat at large :—

RIGHT, etymologically, is " *rect*-um (regit-um),
the past participle of the Latin verb reg-ere."

JUST, is *(juss*-um), the past participle of the
verb jub-ere.*

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* Whence the Italian Ritto; and from the past participle *Di-
rectum,* of the compound *Di-rigere,—Diritto, Dritto,* the ancient
French *Droict,* and modern Droit.

LAW (or as anciently written, *lagh*), " is the past participle of Laȝ, or Læȝh, of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb lagj-an, Lecg-an; ponere," to lay down.

RIGHT, is that which is ruled or ordered.

JUST: that which is ordered or commanded.

LAW: that which is *laid* down, as a rule, order, or command.

" When a man demands his *right;* he asks only that which it is *ordered* he shall have:" (that which is *just,* which is *laid* down, as a rule, that he should have).

A claim of *Rights* by the people, " is the strongest avowal of their subjection (to the law). Nothing can more evidently show the natural disposition of mankind to obedience than their invariable use of this word *right,* and their perpetual application of it to all which they desire, and to everything which they deem excellent.

" A *right* conduct, a right reckoning, is that which is *ordered.*

" A *right* line, is that which is *ordered* or *directed* to be pursued, not a random extension, but the shortest between two points.

" A *right* road is, that *ordered* or directed to be pursued (for the object you have in view).

" To do *right* is to do that which is *ordered* to be done.

" To be in the *right* is to be in such situation or circumstances as are *ordered.*

" To have *right* or law on one's side, is, to have in one's favour that which is *ordered* or *laid* down.

" A *right* or *just* action is, such a one as is *ordered* and commanded.

" A JUST man is, such as he is commanded to be—qui leges juraque servat—who observes and obeys the things *laid down* and *commanded.* But that which is *laid* down, may be different by different authorities ; and it is the authority that *lays* down, *orders* or *commands*, which must decide the question of obedience.

" The *right* I revere is not the *right* adored by sycophants : the *jus vagum,* the capricious *command* of princes or ministers. I follow the *law* of God (what is *laid* down by him for the rule of my conduct) when I follow the *laws* of human nature;* which without any human testimony we know must proceed from God; and upon these are founded the *rights* of man, or what is ordered for man. I revere the constitution or constitutional laws of England; because they are in conformity with the laws of God and nature, and on these are founded the rational rights of Englishmen."

The other party to the dialogue commences the second chapter in the same strain: bringing us back to the etymology :—

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* JUS *naturale* est quod Natura omnia animalia *docuit* (he might have said, *jussit*), H. T. Ulpian. Dig. book 1. tit. 1. law 1. parag. 3.

" The general and perpetual voice of men is the sentence of God himself. For that which all men have at all times learned, Nature herself must needs have taught; and God being the Author of Nature, her voice is but his instrument. By her from him, we receive whatsoever in such sort we learn." Hooker, Ecc. Pol. b. 1, § 8.

" Before," he says, " there can be any thing
rect-um, there must be *reg*-ens, *reg's, rex*,* that is,
qui or quod *reg*-it.† And I admire (continues the
speaker) more than ever the maxim of—rex, lex
loquens; lex, rex mutus. I acknowledge the senses
he has given us, the experience of those senses,
and reason (the effect and result of those senses
and that experience), to be the assured testimony
of God; against which no human testimony ever
can prevail. And I think I can discover, by the
help of his etymology, a shorter method of deter-
mining disputes between *well-meaning* men, con-
cerning questions of *right;* for if *right* and *just*
mean *ordered* and *command*ed, we must at once
refer to the *order* and *command;* and to the *autho-
rity* which ordered and *commanded.*"

[And what that authority should be is (I may
add) most emphatically, yet with admirable sim-
plicity, declared by the Apostles Peter and John:—
" And they called them, and *commanded* them not
to speak at all nor teach in the name of Jesus.
But Peter and John answered and said unto
them: Whether it be *right* in the sight of God to
hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye."
And again, by Peter and *the other* Apostles, " Did
not we straitly *command* you that you should not
teach in his name? . . . Then Peter and the other

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* In the same way are formed judex, dux, vindex, index, sim-
plex, from the present participle, judicans, ducens, &c. Some
one judicating, leading, &c.

† " Effects are produced by power, not by laws. A law cannot
execute itself. A law refers us to an agent." Paley, Nat. Theol.
c. 24.

Apostles answered and said; We *ought* to obey *God* rather than *men*."*]

[*Right* and *just*, consistently with what has preceded, I have thus explained.†

" *Right* implies a rector or ruler—over man as a created being; God, or the laws of God, his Creator:—over man, as a member of a particular state or society; the laws of the land or of the society according or consistent with those of God.

" RIGHT also implies a correlative *Duty:* if there be no such duty, the *right* or *rule* is a mere unauthorized order or command."

JUST. Commanded (sc.) by the laws of God; by the laws of human authorities acting in conformity to those of God, as manifested in the nature of man: and, consequently, our notions of justice depending upon our interpretation of those laws.

A *just man* is one who acts in a manner—and a *just action*, that which is—obedient and conformable (in the words of Hooker, b. 1, § 16) to the law, " which He (God) hath made for His creatures to keepe: The Law whereunto by the light of reason men finde themselves bound in that they are men: the law which they make by composition for multitudes and politique societies of men to be guided by; the law, which belongeth to each nation; the law that concerneth the fellowship of all; and lastly, the law which God himself hath supernaturally revealed."

LAW. Tooke's etymology is not original. The

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* Acts iv. 19, and v. 29.   † New English Dictionary, in vv.

very learned Wachter had adopted the opinion of a
still older lexicographer,* who asks, " What is
law, but that which is *laid* down, or imposed by
God or nature, or by a people binding themselves,
or by a prince governing a people?"† Wachter
goes farther, and observes, that if we were to de-
rive the Latin *lex* from the same source, we
should not wander far,—nec a sensu vocis nec a
ratione temporis; since Scythian words are far
more ancient than the Latin, and increased the
Latin with many additions.]

Wrong (written Wrang, wrong, or wrung), like
the Italian *torto*, and the French *tort*, is the past
tense or past participle of the verb, *to wring*, wring-
an, *torq*uere; and means merely *wrung* or wrested,
from the *right* or *ordered* line of conduct.

Wiclif gives an amusing instance of this literal
sense; he renders the Vulgate Latin, *tortus nasus*,
a *wrong* nose: and Tooke produces the following
remarkable example of the literal usage of the two
opposite words. Right and wrong (that is, straight
and wrested). " The dóme of God is lykened to a
bowe, for the bowe is made of two thinges, of a
wronge tree and *ryghte* strynge, &c. And as the
archer in the stretynge taketh the *wronge* tree in
hys *lyfte* honde, and the ryght strynge in his *ryght*
honde, and draweth them atwynne, &c."—*Dives
and Pauper*, 8th Comm. cap. 15.

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* Stiernhielmius.

† Servius on Virg. Æn. i. 507, Jura dabat legesque viris,
makes this distinction in usage between *jus* and *lex*. *Jus* generale
est; sed *lex* est juris species. *Jus* ad non scripta etiam pertinet.
Leges ad *jus* scriptum.

[*Wrong,* used a substantive, in a figurative sense, I find as early as Robert of Gloucester, " Gret *wrong,* thou woldest don us." And of the verb, formed on the past participle of to *wring, Gower* has this striking instance :

· " For whan that Holy Churche *wrongeth,*

I not (know not) what other thyng shall right."]
And this brings me back to account for the opposition of *right* and *left.*

The *right* hand is that which custom and those who have brought us up have *ordered* or directed us to use in preference, when only one hand is employed; and the *left* hand is that which is *leaved, leav'd, left,* or which we are taught to *leave* out of use on such occasion.

Though the people of Melinda use as their *right* hand that which with us is the *left,* yet the people of Melinda are *right* handed, in as much as they obey the *order* established by the usages of their country.

In the following quotation from Spenser, the *left* arm is that which we so call :—

" And whiles he (the Giant) strove his combred clubbe to quight

Out of the earth, with blade all burning bright,

He (Arthur) smott off his *left* arme."

Faerie Queene, c. 8, § 10.

In the following, the *left* is the *right,* but the only one *left,* or the giant would be presumed to have had two *left* arms :

" In force, which wont in two to be disperst,

In one alone *left* hand, he now unites,

Which is, through rage, more strong than both
were erst."—*Ibid.* c. 8, § 18.

[It would have been more agreeable to Tooke's
principles and practice, and exemplified in the op-
posite, Wrong, to have given his explanations of
right line and *right* road the priority, since they
include the literal meaning of the word, on which
all the others depend. " The voice of a crier in
desert. Make ʒe redi the weie of the Lord, Make
ʒe hise pathis *riʒt.* (*rectas* facite semitas ejus)."—
Wiclif, Luke iii. 4.

The transference of this literal to the figurative
meaning is thus happily illustrated by Hooker:—

" As they, which travel from city to city, en-
quire ever for the *streightest* way, because the
streightest is that which soonest bringeth them to
their journey's end; so we, *having* here, as the
Apostle speaketh, *no abiding city*, but being always
in travel towards that place of joy, immortality and
rest, cannot but in every of our deeds, words, and
thoughts, think that to be best, which with most
expedition leadeth thereunto, and is for *that very
cause* termed *right*."—*Sermon on Pride.*

" Goodnesse in actions is like unto *straightnesse:*
wherefore that which is done well we terme *right:*
for as the *strait* way is most acceptable to him that
trauaileth, because by it he commeth soonest to his
journeyes end: so in action, that which doth lye
euenest between us and the end wee desire, must
be the fittest for our use."—*Eccles. Pol.* b. i. § 8.

Having thus the true meanings of the words,
right, just and *wrong*, traced to their source, and

the foundation of their various applications laid before us, I shall proceed to present the reader with my own views, as to the meaning of two words of equal importance, *due* and *ought*, the correlatives or reciprocals of *right, just* and *wrong*. The latter of the two (*ought*), the το δεον, in the neoteric compound, *deontology*, has figured very conspicuously in some modern works on morals.

DUE, is from the French *deu*, past participle of the verb *debvoir, devoir;* the Latin *deb-ere,* that is, *de-habere* (which is to say, de alio habere), to have or hold of or from another: and thus a *due* or *debt* (*debit*-um, debt) is "Any thing had or held of or from another: his right or property; that which is *owed* to him."

The identity of meaning conveyed by our own word *ought* is well worthy of consideration from the student in philology.

Ought is the past tense of the verb, to *owe*, owed, ow'd, *owt* or *ought;* from the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb *aig*-an, ag-an, to have or hold.

OWN is also the past participle *owen, own,* from the same verb. And both *ought* and *own* are used as verbs, formed on the respective past participles.

To owe, in our older writers, is constantly employed in its primitive meaning, to have, hold, or possess; and is so explained by the commentators of our dramatic writers.

Bishop Hall uses *ower* and *owner* as equivalent: he speaks of God, in one place as *Ower*, and in another as *Owner*, of Heaven. "And Oon (debtor) *ought* 500 pens," is Wiclif's rendering of—unus *debe*bat. And Tyndale employs the same word.

" For neither sones *owen*: Nec enim filii *debent*:" "quantum *debes* domino, (that is, de-habes domino,) How much *owist* thou my Lord?" is, " How much hast thou, *holdest* or retainest thou, that belongs to, which is the property of, is *due* (*debit*um) to my lord, which *ought* at some time to be delivered or paid to him."

I am afraid I may have in some degree subjected myself to the charge of prolixity by writing so copiously on these few words; but their meaning and usage are so essential in every question of morals and system of morality, that I cannot think any apology required.

I have dedicated a long period of my life to the task of endeavouring " to draw out the stores of thought, which are latent in our native language, and to give distinctness and precision to whatever is confused or dimly seen." And it is a great retributory satisfaction to me to find that the value of such employment is rising in the estimation of some of the most distinguished of those who have felt " an inward call to teach and enlighten their countrymen."

I do not hesitate to claim the thanks of my readers for the following quotations.

" A language will often be wiser, not merely than the vulgar, but even than the wisest of those who speak it. Being like amber in its efficacy to circulate the electric spirit of truth, it is also like amber in embalming and preserving the relics of ancient wisdom, although one is not seldom puzzled to decipher its contents. Sometimes it locks up truths which were once well known, but which in

the course of ages have passed out of sight and been forgotten. In other cases it holds the germs of truth, of which, though they were never plainly discerned, the genius of its framers caught a glimpse in a happy moment of divination. A meditative man cannot refrain from wonder, when he digs down to the deep thought lying at the root of many a metaphorical term employed for the designation of spiritual things, even of those with regard to which professing philosophers have blundered grossly; and often it would seem as though rays of truths, which were still below the intellectual horizon, had dawned upon the imagination as it was looking up to heaven. Hence they *who feel an inward call to teach and enlighten* their countrymen, should deem it an important part of their duty to draw out the stores of thought which are already latent in their native language, to purify it from the corruptions which Time brings upon all things, and from which language has no exemption, and to endeavour to give distinctness and precision to whatever in it is confused, or obscure, or dimly seen."—*Guesses at Truth.* First Series, p. 295.

" I would urge on you how well it will repay you to study the words which you are in the habit of using or of meeting, be they such as relate to the highest spiritual things, or our common words of the shop and the market and all the familiar intercourse of life. It will indeed repay you far better than you can easily believe. I am sure, at least, that for many a young man his first discovery of the fact that words are living powers, has been like

dropping scales from his eyes, like the acquiring of another sense, or the introduction into a new world; he is never able to cease wondering at the moral marvels that surround him on every side, and ever reveal themselves more and more to his gaze."— *Trench.* Study of Words, pp. 1, 2.

" Language may be considered as the outward vesture of thought; thought as a body which is contained within this clothing; and we may attend especially to the one or the other; to the body or to the garment. But further, language includes within its folds, not merely thought, the result of the reason operating purely and simply, but thought excited, unfolded, and swayed by the various feelings which belong to man."

" The body of which language is the clothing, is not the reason merely, but *the whole nature of man.*"—*Whewell.* Liberal Education, Sec. 2, § 11.

I repeat that I think myself entitled to the thanks of my readers for laying the above quotations before them. They point out to them very precisely the great advantages that will result to them from the study of words; from a diligent search for the relics of ancient wisdom, the germs of truth, some forgotten, some never plainly discerned, which they contain. They are promised that scenes scarcely short of exciting wonder will open upon them, when they dig down to the deep thought that lies concealed below. That they will be introduced to a new world with moral marvels surrounding them on every side, and ever revealing themselves more and more to their gaze.

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They are told in few but comprehensive words, that language includes within its folds *thought*, not merely mental or the result of reason, but *thought* however affected by our feelings. In short, that language being the vesture of the whole nature of man, must be unfolded to enable us to discover that nature.

I close these quotations on the grand acquisitions that may be expected from the study of language, with repeating the plain and simple words of the author, whose principles I am endeavouring to unfold and illustrate.

" I very early found it, or thought I found it, impossible to make many steps after *truth* and the nature of *human understanding*, of *good* and *evil*, of *right* and *wrong*, without well considering the nature of language, which appeared to me to be inseparably connected with them."]

But I have yet a few words more to say, on RIGHT and JUST, as they mean ordered or commanded. The expression of Locke, " God has a right,"* and the common one, " God is just," appear to be improper, as inapplicable to the Deity, concerning whom nothing is ordered or commanded. " They are applicable *only* to man, to whom alone language belongs, and of whose sensations only words are the representatives."

[The expressions are certainly improper, but they are perhaps unavoidable in our well-meant attempts to bring the attributes of God more familiarly

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* Essay, b. 2, c. 28, § 8.

within our apprehension by supposed analogies to ourselves, and our conformity to the rules or laws to which we acknowledge our subjection. The use of such expressions is of the nature of that anthropomorphism which was the consequence of a too literal interpretation of the text of Scripture, " So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him."*

From this error of applying words so inapplicable to the Deity, our moralists and divines have found themselves plunged into difficulties without any means of escape. Among the most deservedly celebrated of the latter is Dr. Samuel Clarke. If he, so famed among the famous for his reasoning powers, both as divine and metaphysician, had been aware of the meaning of the words he was employing and of the source of that meaning in the nature of man, he would not have involved himself and his readers in such verbal entanglements as unfortunately he has done. He is assuredly correct in asserting " that whatever God does, we are sure it is *right, because* he does it;" for the proposition is purely identical. But he proceeds to say, in *explanation,* " yet the meaning of this is not that God's willing or doing a thing makes it *right*," (that is, makes it the thing *ruled* or commanded), " but that his wisdom and goodness is such that we may depend upon it even without understanding it, that whatever he wills was in itself *right, antecedent* to

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* For Paley's solution, see Moral and Political Philosophy, B. 1. c. 9.

his willing it, and that therefore he willed it because
it was *right*."*

We must undoubtedly rely on our own under-
standings and the best exercise of the faculties with
which our Creator has endowed us, to attain a
knowledge of what is RIGHT, that is, of what are
the laws willed by him for securing our " being's
end and aim," the happiness of our kind. And ac-
cording to the conclusions at which we arrive, so
should we order and direct our conduct.

" What is written in the Law? How readest
thou?" " Understandest thou what thou readest."
These are the solemn questions that we have all to
answer, and well is it with those who enter on the
enquiry with eyes not blinded and with hearts not
hardened.

" Right," I may be allowed to continue in the
words of one of our most sensible and sagacious
moralists,† " Right is consistency with the will of
God. And, as the will of God is our rule, to en-
quire what is our duty or what we are obliged to
do in any instance, is in effect to enquire what is
the will of God in that instance, which consequently
becomes the whole business of morality." And he
further very justly observes, on " the absurdity of
separating natural and revealed religion from each
other. The object of both is the same, to discover
the will of God, and provided we do but discover
it, it matters nothing by what means."

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* Serm. 9, and to the same effect, Ser. 10.

† Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy, B. 2. c. 9. and 4.

It will now, I think, be a matter of little difficulty to dispose of the unjust remark of Professor Stewart* (bordering more closely on sarcasm than is usual with that agreeable writer), that Tooke attempts to found a theory of morals on a philological *nostrum* of past participles. The very reverse is the fact. The *nostrum* of past participles is the resort of language to express those principles of morals (and these when combined constitute a theory of morals) which are written in the heart and mind of man, " in the whole nature of man" by the hand of his Maker.]

CHAP. II.

OF ABSTRACTION.

THE enquiry now proposed is, Will this manner of explaining *right*, just, law, *droit* and *dritto*, extended to other words of the same character, enable us to account for what is called *abstraction* and *abstract* ideas. The answer is, " I think it will, and if it must have a name, it should rather be called *subaudition* than *abstraction*, though I mean not to quarrel about a title."

[This then is the proper stage, before proceeding with the etymologies, to come to an understanding of the doctrine of abstraction and of abstract ideas,

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* The accomplished Professor is said by no unfriendly critic to have been " not a little susceptible of hasty but inveterate prejudices." Hallam, Literature of Europe, Pt. 3, c. 4.

as we find it taught by Locke and rejected by Berkeley, as it is with this doctrine peculiarly that our author has to encounter; and then it may be both expedient and appropriate to subjoin some changes that have been made in the usage of those terms by modern philosophers and logicians.

" The use of words," says Locke, " being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken ·from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in should have a distinct name, *names* must be *endless*. To *prevent* this, the mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become *general*, which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existences, as time, place, or any · other concomitant ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby ideas taken from particular beings, become general representatives of all of the same kind, and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such *abstract* ideas. Such precise naked appearances in the mind, without considering how, whence, or with what others they come there, the understanding lays up, with names commonly annexed to them, as the standards to rank real existences into sorts, as they agree with these patterns, and to denominate them accordingly." B. 2. c. 11, § 9. " General ideas," he afterwards writes, " are *fictions and contrivances* of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does

it not require some pains and skill to form the idea of a *triangle*, which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult, for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none at the same time." B. 4. c. 7. § 9.*

Had Locke been labouring to cast ridicule upon the doctrines of an antagonist, he could scarcely have fixed upon a more happy circumstance than this same triangle. It is barely exceeded by the universal Lord Mayor of Crambe, a Lord Mayor " not only without his horse, gown, and gold chain, but even without stature, feature, colour, hands, head, feet, or any body ;"† and this Crambe supposed was the abstract of a Lord Mayor.

In about five years after the death of Locke, his doctrine of abstraction and of abstract ideas met with an opponent in Bishop Berkeley, who expresses himself thus: " I own myself able to *abstract* in one sense, as when I consider some particular part or parts separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them.‡

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* Gassendi had the palm of priority, and he ought not to be deprived of it. " At difficile quidem est ne dicam impossibile ita purè hominem in commune imaginari; ut neque magnus, neque parvus, neque mediocris staturæ sit; ut neque senex, neque infans, neque intermediæ ætatis; ut neque albus neque niger, neque alterius specialis coloris. At *mente* saltem tenere oportet, hominem, quem communiter consideratum volumus, debere esse his omnibus discriminibus absolutum." Gassendi, Op. V. 1. p. 95. Logica, P. 1. Can. 8.

† Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, ch. 7.

‡ See the quotation from Stewart infra.

But I deny that I can *abstract* one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated, or that I can frame a general notion by *abstracting* from particulars in the manner aforesaid. Which two last are the proper acceptations of *abstraction?*"*

Locke advances it to be his opinion, that the faculties of brutes cannot attain to *abstraction*, and Berkeley agrees with him. But the reason given by Locke is, that they have no use of words or other general signs, on the " supposition," says Berkeley,† " that the making use of words implies the having general ideas, from which it follows, that men who use language are able to abstract or generalise their ideas." For " since all *things* that exist are only *particulars,* how come we by general terms?" Thus: " words become general by being made the signs of *general ideas.*"‡

To which the Bishop answers: " But it seems that a word becomes general by being made the sign not of an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind."

To the same effect, Hume: " All general ideas are in reality particular ones attached to a general term, which recalls upon occasion other particular ones that resemble in certain circumstances the idea present to the mind."§

And still further to the purpose the Bishop ob-

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* Principles of Knowledge, Introd. § 10.
† Introd. § 11.   ‡ B. 3. c. 3. § 6.
§ Enquiry, Note P. And see Hobbes' Leviathan, P. 1, Ch. 1.

serves: " A little attention will discover that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for: in reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter* suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for." § xix.

The complete solution of the difficulty awaited the aid of the philosophical grammarian; for even the very acute Bishop, who clearly saw how much the nature and abuse of language were involved in the question, and that for the purpose of communication the supposition of abstract ideas was unnecessary, did not embrace the whole truth, and that merely because he mistook the *general sign* to be a general idea. He says, " I do not deny absolutely that there are *general ideas,* but only that there are any *abstract general ideas;* we shall acknowledge that an *idea,* which *considered in itself* is *particular,* becomes *general* by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line into two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length,—this, which *in*

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* This letter or sign is in the language of modern philosophers, " the idea objectified." Morell, Elements of Psychology, Ch. 5. § 3.

itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with *regard to its signification,* general; since, as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general. And as that *particular line* becomes *general* by being made a *sign,* so the *name* line, which taken absolutely is particular, by being a *sign,* is made *general.*"*

Now this is the whole of the matter; *the sign is general,* but that is all, and when Locke affirms that " *general* ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind," and Dr. Whately, " that genus and species are creatures of the mind," the same sort of answer may be given,—that the only fiction or contrivance or creature is the name, the sign.

Professor Stewart's view of abstraction (" if it can be properly called abstraction")† is not far different from Berkeley's. " The power of considering certain qualities or attributes of an object apart from the rest; or, as I would rather choose to define it, the power which the understanding has of separating the combinations which are presented to it, is distinguished by logicians by the name of *abstraction.*"‡

" When we *draw off,*" says Dr. Whately, " and contemplate separately, any part of an object presented to the mind, disregarding the rest of it, we are said *to abstract* that part." " Thus a person might, when a rose was before his eyes or mind,

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* Principles of Knowledge, Introd. § 12.
† Id. ib. P. 1. § 5.   ‡ On the Mind, C. 4. § 1.

make the scent a distinct object of *attention,* laying aside all thoughts of colour, form, &c. And thus, though it were the only rose he had ever met with, he would be employing the faculty of *abstraction.*"*

The Abstraction of Professor Stewart and Archbishop Whately is not the Abstraction of Locke. It simply represents, according to the illustration of the Archbishop, a matter of fact, that when various qualities centered in one object are presented at the same time to our senses, we may indulge one sense in preference to another: and this explanation of the word conveys in itself a harmless truth, but metaphysicians and logicians contrive to invest it with great and perplexing importance; thus Mr. Mansell tells us that " in the sense" (of withdrawing the attention from one portion of certain phænomena given in combination tó fix it on the rest) " Geometrical magnitudes are called by Aristotle, τα εξ αφαιρεσεως, because the geometer considers only the properties of the figure" (that is, I presume, *objectifies* the figure, and that alone) " separate from those of the material in which it is found. On similar grounds, he continues, is formed the scholastic distinction of *abstract* and *concrete* terms, since in the former the attribute is considered apart from the subject in which it is perceived by the senses, *e. g.* sight presents us only *alba*" (the attribute); " the mind forms the conception *albedo,* (the subject or sub-stratum). And so *universals* are gained by abstraction, that is, by separating the

* Logic, B. 1. § 9.

phænomena in which a group of individuals* resemble each other from those in which they differ."

I cannot undertake, and it is not necessary, to enter further into the doctrines of abstraction and generalization as they are taught by contemporary writers on logic and metaphysics.† Some of these writers seem busily employed in disinterring Aristotle and searching among his remains to discover doctrines that have not reached their understandings; they have yet to satisfy themselves whether he was realist, nominalist, or conceptionalist. It is gratifying, however, to observe that they are paying the same tribute of respect to the merits of our immortal countryman, Locke. Mr. Morell, who seems so thoroughly acquainted with all that has been written abroad and at home towards the advancement of mental philosophy, has the great good sense to recommend that " the whole chapter on words and language in general, should be well studied by every student of mental science." He should not have omitted to recommend the " Diversions of Purley," and he should particularly have directed their attention to the positions laid down in the first chapter of the first volume of the work, that " the errors of grammarians have arisen from supposing all words to be *immediately* either the

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* Meaning " the individuals of a group." Artis Logicæ Rudimenta, p. 21, Note *o*.

† I must refer them to the larger works of Sir William Hamilton and the smaller of Mr. Mansell, and of Mr. Morell (Laws of Thought), and the Chapter on Objects, &c. in Mr. De Morgan's Formal Logic.

signs of things or the signs of ideas,* whereas in fact many words are merely abbreviations employed for despatch, and are the signs of other words;" and that these are " the artificial wings of Mercury, by means of which the Argus eyes of Philosophy have been cheated."

Such words, I may add, contribute to those "perfections of language, which, not being properly understood, have been one of the chief causes of the imperfections of our philosophy."†

But not only the Latin past participle, but the Latin present, has supplied us with a stock of words of this description. The termination *ence* and *ance*, so rich in the names of qualities, being merely the neuters plural in *entia* from the present participle in *ens.*‡ On this termination I will pause for a moment, as I am here again supplied with an opportunity of presenting some views to my readers which I trust will have the effect of throwing a little light on the theory of language.

" Every body will allow," say the sagacious authors of the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, " that if you debar a metaphysician from *ens, essentia,* and *entitas,* &c. there is an end of him."

There is one word of this class, of much use with metaphysicians and logicians, which to me appears

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* Other names are the names of names. Hobbes. Leviathan, p. 4. c. 46.

† So also negative terms, from which arose the doctrine of *negative* ideas.

‡ ENCE is in old writers not uncommonly written *ent, ents,* as consequent, consequents, by Frith, Hobbes, J. Taylor, and Stillingfleet.

peculiarly obnoxious to remark, and that is the word difference. On difference and its opposite resemblance all scientific classification depends.

Let us consider whence the origin and common application of this word, and we shall at the same time learn the origin and application of all words of the same description.

The Latin *differentia*, the neuter plural of *deferens*, means (things) which are different, differing, or which differ: and when we say, for instance, that A and B are different, or A and B differ, we say no more than that they cause different impressions or ideas.

From this, the true meaning of the word *differentia*, it became applied specifically to *that*, by or in which A and B for instance, differ from each other.

Thus then the word *difference* has acquired an established usage in the comparison of greater or less in number and quantity: a greater number being eleven and a less ten, we see and say they differ; and we further see and say they differ by one, and we call one *the* difference. Hence the expressions that two numbers differ by one, and the difference between two numbers is *one*, are precisely equivalent. But it must be manifest that this equivalence can only subsist in cases which contain within them a specific quantity or number in or by which A and B, for instance, differ, and to which the word difference may be applied. Let us call this difference C. Then the expressions—A and B differ or are different by C, and—there is a difference C, between A and B are completely equivalent.

But there are cases of a very dissimilar nature. Let us take two colours or two shades of what we call the same colour; a darker or greater blue, A, and a lighter or less blue, B. They differ or are different, and by common usage we are allowed to say we perceive the difference. Call this difference C, and a moment's consideration will convince us of our error. We receive two different impressions; one called a darker, A, and the other a lighter blue, B, but we have no third impression of difference, C, as we had in our first supposed case of number. We may say with entire truth, that the darker colour, A, and the lighter, B, differ, but we cannot add by C. And unless we can include this last term, by C, in our proposition, we are curtailed of a portion necessary to constitute the equivalence of which we have spoken.

A second illustration may be borrowed from sound. We hear a higher A, and a lower key, B; we feel that they differ; we receive two different impressions, but we do not receive a third impression, C, that is, we do not hear *the* difference.

Custom, however, permits us to say—we perceive the difference between two colours or two sounds, when the fact is we receive impressions that differ, and nothing more.

Let us now subject to the same investigation a word opposed to that which has just been dismissed, and see to what conclusion it will lead us; that word is *resemblance*. Upon this word Dr. Brown rests a whole theory of generalization, the theory of a sect, to which he would give the name of

" notionist or relationist" in preference to that of
" conceptionalist" bestowed upon Dr. Reid and his
followers.

Let the very elegant lecturer be allowed to speak
in his own words:* " We perceive two or more
objects; this is *one* state of mind; we are struck
with the *feeling of* their *resemblance* in certain re-
spects.   This is a *second* state of the mind.   We
then in a *third* stage give a name to these circum-
stances of felt remembrance, a name which is of
course applied afterwards only where this relation
of similarity is felt.   It is unquestionably not the
name which produces the feeling of resemblance,
but the feeling of resemblance which leads to the
invention or application of the name."†   In other
places this feeling is called a *general notion*.

Dr. Brown is equally anxious to disclaim Crambe's
universal Lord Mayor and Locke's abstract idea of
a triangle, but if the mind can form one single ge-
neral or abstract idea or notion, it surely is not so
limited in its faculty as to be unable to form more,
and it would have tried the ingenuity of the Doctor
to fix a boundary at which it must cease to act.
Locke seemed to be quite aware of the extremes
to which his doctrine must necessarily extend, and
he had the candour to display them fully without
the least attempt to evade or even to palliate.

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* Brown on the Philosophy of the Mind, Lec. 47.

† So Locke; " Words become general by being made the signs
of general ideas." B. 3. C. 3, § 6.   And does the negative *idea*
give rise to the negative term?   And see the quotation from
Locke, supra, p. 54 n.

And this unequivocating honesty is one of the great charms of the Essay of Human Understanding. Successive writers have endeavoured to refine upon the principles of Locke, but they are still the same, however varied may be their guise, nor can any subtle change of phraseology strip them of the extravagant consequences with which he himself has invested them. He triumphs, it is true, in the discovery that the " whole mystery of genera and species which make such a noise in the schools, and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract ideas." Yet, perplexing as this whole mystery undoubtedly was, the abstract idea of a triangle, as expounded in the Essay, is a very fair match to it.

Without entering into any further account of the gradations by which this doctrine of abstraction has been step by step reduced into the form in which Dr. Brown endeavours to preserve it from that disregard into which the genera and species of the schools have so long fallen, let us proceed at once to his feeling or general notion of resemblance.*

He says, " We are struck with the feeling of their resemblance. This is the *second* state of the mind." To perceive the objects themselves, the *different* objects, is the first. Is it possible to perceive *different* objects, and not perceive that they are different, not be conscious of different impressions.

To resume the instances of colour and sound:—

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* Locke was quite sensible of the influence of resemblance and difference upon the construction of general terms. B. 3. c. 3, § 7, 8.

We perceive two objects; we see two pictures; we hear two voices: we say that the colours of the two pictures, the sounds of the two voices, are similar or alike; that they resemble. In conformity with the usages of speech, we say that we perceive *a* similarity or likeness. Pursuing the former illustration (of the usage of the word, Difference), calling the colours of the first picture A, and of the second B, there is nothing to represent a resemblance C. We received in the former case a number of different impressions, or of impressions which we were conscious differed. In the latter we receive a number of like, similar, resembling impressions, or impressions which we are conscious resemble; and of these we employ the complex and general term *resemblance* as the sign or name. And thus, I think, I may conclude, that the Doctor's hypothesis of a second state of mind in the process of generalization is a mere fiction or contrivance, creature or illusion, of his own imagination.]

To return to the question from which this digression has been made:—Will this manner of explaining right, &c. extended to other words, enable us to account for what is called Abstraction and abstract ideas?

These other words (included in the question) are generally participles or adjectives, used without any substantive—any name of person or thing —expressed in the sentence, to which they can be joined; and are therefore, in *construction*, considered as substantives. Such words form the bulk of every language. In English, those bor-

rowed from the Latin, French and Italian, we easily
recognise: those from the Greek are more striking.
Those which are original in our own language have
been almost wholly overlooked, and are quite unsus-
pected.

These words, participles and adjectives, have
been coined into moral deities, moral causes and
qualities; and having been poetically embodied and
substantiated, have caused a metaphysical jargon,
and a false morality, which can only be dissipated
by etymology.

To this etymology, the second, and also the third,
fourth and fifth chapters are devoted, for the pur-
pose of accounting for this so-called Abstraction.

The second contains a miscellaneous assortment,
the greater portion from the Latin, with a few
through the French and Italian, from which it will
be sufficient to select only such as present anything
worthy of the distinction; and among these the
substantive *post*, from its various applications, first
presents itself. POST is aliquid *posit*-um,* used in
English as substantive, adjective or verb, as:—

> A *post* in the ground.
> A military *post*.
> To take *post*.
> A *post* under government.
> The *post* for letters.
> *Post*-chaise. *Post*-horses.
> To travel *post*.

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* Observe that in English we use our article *precedent* to the
verb. In Latin it is *sequent*.

and is always merely the past participle of *ponere.*
And thus in our *present* situation, intelligence of
" the horrors of war," will be probably conveyed
by *post;* but whether by positis equis, or positis
hominibus, or positis ignibus, or positis telegraphis,
or beacons of any kind, all will be by *posit* or
post."*

Then follows a list of upwards of fifty Latin
verbs, whose past participles, with those of their
compounds, have enriched our language with an
abundant stock of abstract terms.   Some of these
have come to us (together with an immediate Latin
progeny) not immediately from the Latin, but the
French,   For instance :—

FEAT, defeat; *fit,* benefit, comfit, profit, coun-
terfeit, forfeit, surfeit; from the French, faict, fait,
faire; Latin, factum, *facere.*

TRAIT, portrait (formerly traict and portraict),
treat, treaty, retreat, entreat; French, traict, trait,
traire; Latin, tract-um, *trahere.*

VENUE, avenue, revenue; French, *venir;* Latin,
venire.

SUIT, suite, pursuit, lawsuit; French, *suivre.*

VIEW, review, interview, counterview, purview,
purvey, survey; French, *voir.*

PRIZE, price, from the French *prend*re.   Latin,
pre-*hend*-ere, *prend*-ere, prens-um.

[The history of this word is remarkable.   The
Anglo-Saxon *hent*-an, to hold or take (as the *hand*
does), is the Latin *hend*-ere, used only in composi-

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* See Trench, Lecture VI.

tion. From the Latin past participle *prensum*, came the old French *prins*, modern *pris*, on which latter is formed the verb *prizer*, to take, with not a letter of its Anglo-Saxon root remaining. From this verb, and past participle, we have *prize*, and its compounds Apprize, comprize, em- and enter-prize, mainprize, misprize, reprize, sur-prize : prison, misprision, culprit, reprieve.]

ᶦ To these I will add a few scattered etymologies, not appearing so intimately connected with the rest.

ᐧ ALERT, is the Italian all'erecta, all'ercta, all'erta, from the Italian verb ergere. Latin *erigere*, to erect.

ᐧ To cucol (not cucol*d*), from the Italian cucolo, a *cuckow*, is to do as the *cuckow* does : and *cucol*-ed, cucol'd, cucold, its past participle, means *cuckow*-ed : served as the cuckow serves other birds.

POLTROON, is pollice truncus. Multi præ ig-navia *pol*lices *trunc*abant, ne militarent. And such by Valentinian and Valens were condemned to be burnt. Hence also *paltry*.

" Those sham deities, FATE and DESTINY, aliquid *fat-um*, quelque chose *destinée*, are merely the past participles of *fari* and *destiner*."

CHANCE (high arbiter), ACCIDENT, and Es-CHEAT are from *escheoir, cheoir*, and *cadere*, to fall.

CHAP. III.

ABSTRACT terms formed from past participles of verbs; terminations *ed, en.*

BRAND, brened, bren'd, brend, from the verb to *bren,* now written burn (by a common transposition of R; see infra, BRAWN). Hence a fire-brand, a brand of infamy; (that is, stigma;) itself a participle of Στιζ ειν, to prick, to burn, a mark (on runaway slaves). *Brand*-new, newly *burned.*

BLIND, blin-ed, blin'd. Old English to *blin,* Anglo-Saxon *blinn-an,* to stop; *blind* of one eye, of both eyes, stopped of one or both eyes, the sight totally *stopped.* The French have *borgne* for the first, and *aveugle* for the second.

BRAID, BREAD. Brayed, bray'd, *bread.* To *bray,* (formerly a very common word,) French *broyer,* to pound, to beat to pieces. The subauditum (in our present use of the word *bread*) is corn or grain, &c. Pounding or beating to pieces (now grinding) was the first step in the process of making *bread.* [He to *braide* his clothes (*Gower*). To beat his clothes. The devel to *brayde* hym. *Wiclif.* MS. *Tare* him.] See infra, DOUGH, LOAF.

COWARD, that is, cowred, cowered, *cower*'d; one who has *cower'd* before an enemy. To *cowre* or *cower* is still in common use. *Supplex,* supplicant, is of the same import. So suppliant and supple.

CUD. To chew the *cud* is to chew the *chewed* (*ch* to *k*, or *k* to *ch*, common changes). Anglo-Saxon *ceow-ed*, from ceow-an. [Hence perhaps *cow*, the animal which ceoweth, or *chews*, sc. the *cud.*]

DASTARD, dastriged, dastriyed, dastried, dastred, *dastr'd*, territus. Anglo-Saxon *dastrig*-an, terrere. [On this past participle Dryden formed the verb, "And *dastards* manly souls."—*Conquest of Mexico.*]

FIELD, anciently written *feld*, felled, fel'd, to *fell;* Anglo-Saxon *fæll-an*, be-fæll-an, to cause to fall. *Field* land is constantly opposed to *wood*-land, and means land where the wood has been *felled*. In the collateral languages the same correspondence subsists between the equivalent verb and the supposed substantive. [Chaucer writes, " The *felde* hath eyen, and the *wood* hath eares;" a very intelligible contrast. Gower also, " In *woodde*, in *felde*, or in citee."]

FLOOD, LOUD; merely flowed, flow'd, and lowed, low'd.

HEAD, heaved, heav'd, *head*. Anglo-Saxon heaf-od, from *heaf*-an, to heave. *Head*, anciently written *heved*, is that part (of the body or anything else) which is *heav'd*, raised, or lifted up, above the rest.*

ODD, owed, ow'd. When we are counting by couples or pairs we say one pair, two pairs, &c. and one owed or ow'd to make up another pair. It has the same meaning when we say, an *odd* man, an *odd* action; it still relates to pairing (or matching),

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* See infra, p. 125.

and we mean without a fellow, *unmatched*, not such another, one *owed* to make up a couple. Sir Thomas More writes, " God in soveraine dignity is *odde*," that is, unmatch'd.

SHRED, SHERD. Shered, sh'red, or shered, sher'd. Anglo-Saxon *scyr-*an, to sheer. See infra, to sheer, &c.

WHINID, VINEW'D, FENOWED, vinny or finie, past participle of Anglo-Saxon *fynig-*ean, to corrupt, to decay, to wither, to fade, to pass away, to spoil in any manner. *Finie hlaf* is, in Anglo-Saxon, a corrupted or spoiled loaf, whether by mould or any other means. Hence the Latin *van-*us and *van-esco*, and a numerous issue in Italian and French. And see infra, *faint, fen*. [Grose says vinied, fenny, mouldy. *Exm.*]

WILD is willed, will'd (or self-willed), in opposition to animals, &c. tamed or subdued to the *will* of others or of Societies.

FIEND and FRIEND are not past participles, but from the so-called present participle.

FIEND, Gothic *fiands*, Anglo-Saxon *fiand*, from *fi-an*, to hate (subaud. some one, any one); *hating*.

FRIEND, Anglo-Saxon friand, freond; from *frian*, freon, to love (subaud. some one, any one); *loving*.

BENT. A person's *bent* or inclination. Bended, bend'd, *bent*.

DRAUGHT, Anglo-Saxon *drag-*an, to draugh, (now draw); draugh-ed, draugh'd, *draught*.

GAUNT. Ge-wan-ed, gewan'd, gewant, g'want, *gaunt;* past participle of *ge-wan-*ian, to wane, to

decrease, fall away. *Ge* is a very common prefix to Anglo-Saxon verbs. See infra, WANT. ———

HAFT, haved, hav'd, *haft*, by which the knife, &c. is *haved* or held.

HEFT, heved, hev'd, *heft*. " He cracks his sides with violent *hefts*."— *The Winter's Tale.*

HILT, held, helt, hilt, by which the sword is *held*.

MALT, MOULD; French *mouillé*, past participle of *mouiller*, to wet, to moisten, becomes in English mouilled, mouill'd, *mould*; then moult, mault, *malt*. The wetting or moistening of the grain is the first and necessary part of the process in making malt.

TIGHT, tied, ti'd, *tight*. " He halt him *taied*," that is, he held him *tight.—Gower.* " A great long chaine he *tight*."—*Spenser.*

TILT, to till; Anglo-Saxon *til*-ian, to raise, to lift up, to turn up (the ground). *Tilt* of a boat or waggon, the cover raised over it. To *tilt* (more properly to till) a vessel. See *Tall*, &c. infra.

TWIST, twiced, twic'd, *twist*; Anglo-Saxon ge-*twys*-an, torquere.

WANT, waned, wan'd, *want*; Anglo-Saxon *wan*-ian, decrescere, to wane, to fall away (sc. as the moon). See infra, WANE, WAN.

Such words as cleft, clift, or cliff, drift, desert, feint, gift, joint, quilt, rent, rift, theft, thrift; from the respective verbs cleave, drive, deserve, feign, give, join, quill, rend (to tear), rive, rift, theft, thrift; speak for themselves.

BACON, swine's flesh *baken* or dried by heat. Anglo-Saxon *bac*-an.

BARR-EN, that is, barr*ed*, stopped, strongly closed

up; which cannot be opened, from which can be no fruit or issue. See BAR, infra.

BEARN or BEARNE, boren, borne, born. A *bearn* or *barne* (still common in northern counties) is a child bear-*en* or bar-*en*. Born is, borne into life.

CHURN, chyr-en, chyr'n, chyrn or *churn;* Anglo-Saxon *cyr*-an, to move backwards and forwards. See infra, CHAR, CHAIR, &c.

CRAVEN; one who has crav-*ed* or crav-*en* his life from his antagonist; dextramque precantem protendens. [On this word Shakespeare has formed the verb, to craven. " A prohibition so divine *cravens* my weak hand."—*Cymbeline.*]

DAWN, daw-en, daw'n, *dawn;* Anglo-Saxon, *dag*-ian, to *daw;* lucescere, to grow light. [There *daweth* me no daie.—*Chaucer.*] See infra, *Day.*

HEAVEN (some place, any place). Heav-*en* or heav-*ed.* See infra, to *heave.*

LEAVEN; that by which the dough is *raised.* French *lever.* The Anglo-Saxons called it *haf*-en, from *heaf*-an, to raise.

· STERN, ster-en, ster'n, that is, stirred. A *stern* countenance is a *moved* countenance, moved by some passion. The *stern* of a ship is the *moved* part of a ship, or that part of a ship by which the ship is *moved.* Anglo-Saxon *styr*-an, stir-an, movere (to *stir* or steer).

[The early version of the Bible by Wiclif and his followers, renders the Vulgate Latin *austerus*, *austerne*, or hausterne; the later version, *sterne.* And the Glossarist to G. Douglas says *asterne*, *austere*, fierce; Latin *austerus.* The Anglo-Saxon

stir-an, *a-stir*-ian, will give an intelligible origin to both the Latin *austerus* and Greek Αυστηροç.]

YARN, yare, yaren, *yarn;* prepared (subaud. cotton, silk, or wool) by spinning. See infra, YARE.

ED and EN are qualified by their meaning, for adjective as well as participial terminations; as gold-en, brazen, wooden, &c., and formerly silver-en, ston-en, treen-en, &c.

· BRAWN is an adjective, and means *boar-en,* or *boar's* (subaudition) flesh. Our English word *boar* is the Anglo-Saxon *bar,* pronounced bawr, of which bar-en or bawr-en, bawrn, was the adjective; and by the common transposition of *r, bawrn* has become *brawn.*

By the same transposition the Anglo-Saxon gærs has become grass; byrht, bright; wyrht, wright; thersc-ian, thresh. Nostril (written by Wiclif and Chaucer, nose-thirles; by Sir Thomas Elyot, nos-thrilles) is in Anglo-Saxon neis-thyrl. [Anglo-Saxon *thirl*-ian, to *drill,* to bore.] And see ante, *brand.*

The broad pronunciation of *a,* as in *bawr,* is still common in northern counties. Thus Anglo-Saxon *bat,* a boat, is pronounced bawt; *ban,* a bone, bawn; *ham,* home, hawm, &c. &c.

CHANGE OF CHARACTERISTIC.

CHAP. IV.

OF ABSTRACTION (*continued*).

THIS chapter is devoted to such substantives as are received from the past tense of verbs, formed by the various changes of the characteristic vowel, or vowel or diphthong, which in Anglo-Saxon immediately precedes the infinitive terminations *an, gan,* &c. Those from *i* or *y* are most numerous, but some from *a, e,* &c. will be found intermixed in the following alphabetical arrangement. And these will be interesting not only as curious specimens of etymological sagacity, but as furnishing further and less familiar instances in illustration of our Author's doctrine, that a great multitude of abstract terms existing in our language have been supplied by past participles used substantively, that is, with a substantive (an aliquid) always understood. In selecting from the great number produced, I shall prefer first those which assign a common origin to a large family of words, most remote in their customary applications, and whose relationship was before undetermined, and then a few less extensively related, but entitled to regard from the novelty they claim.

Though much that is here presented has been

transferred to our grammars of the better class, it will be necessary to lay before the reader sufficient to facilitate his apprehension of the apparently strange changes that have taken place in the mode of writing and speaking the same word, when taking a different direction in its usage; preserving to each mode its different usage, without losing sight of its one original meaning.

It will also be necessary to premise a brief statement of the mode pursued or rules adopted by our ancestors in forming the past participle. The only mode they had was to add *ed* or *en*, either to the indicative mood of the verb or to the past tense. But the most usual method of speech was to employ the past tense itself, without *participializing* it by the addition of *ed* or *en*. And so they commonly used their substantives without *adjectiving* them, in imitation of some other languages, and by adoption from them.

As an instance, take the verb to *heave*, Anglo-Saxon heaf-an.

By adding *ed* to the *indicative* they had the participle   *heaved.*

By changing *d* to *t*, and *v* to *f*,   *heaft.*

By adding *en* they had the participle   *heaven.*

Their *regular* past tense was (Anglo-Saxon haf, hof)   *hove.*

By adding *ed* to it, they had the participle   *hoved.*

By adding *en*, they had the participle   *hoven.*

And all these they used indifferently. The ship or any thing else was

Heaved		Head (1)
Heaft	And these have	Heft (2)
Heaven	left behind them in	Heaven
Hove	our modern lan-	Hoof, Huff, and
.	guage the supposed	the diminutive
.	substantives, but	Hovel
Hoved	really unsuspected	Howve or hood .
	participles.	Hat, Hut
Hoven		Haven, Oven

The past tense, Anglo-Saxon haf, hof, English *hove*, was variously written *heff*, *hafe*, *howve*.

The *hoof* of an animal was written *hove* or *howve*. And so was a *hood* for woman's or monk's-*head*.

Huff, now applied to *raised* displeasure.

Hovel and also *hut*, a small *raised* building.

Haven, a place raised for security (embanked at a river's mouth).

Oven, a place—for fire or furnace—*raised*.

To *huff*, to raise, is used by our old writers.

To *hove* or *hoove*, is used by Chaucer, Gower, and others, as we now use to *hover*.

Returning to the word *wrong*, which has been called a past participle. It is not a past participle, but the regular past tense of the verb to wring. Our ancestors used a past tense where the languages we are most acquainted with used a past participle; and as from the grammars of the latter (or distribution of their languages) our present grammatical notions are taken, this word and others are considered and called past participles.

In English or Anglo-Saxon (being the same language) the past tense is formed by change of

the characteristic letter, that is, of the vowel or diphthong immediately preceding the infinitive termination an, gan, &c. To form the past tense of *wring-an*, to *wring* (as of other words), the characteristic vowel *i* or *y* was changed first into *a* broad, and this, from difference of pronunciation, was written either *a* broad or *o* or *u;* as from wring, wrang, wrong, wrung. *O* from Alfred to Shakespeare prevailed in the South; *a* in the North. During the former part of that period " so greate diuersite" was in use, that Chaucer complains of it. Since that time the fashion has changed to *ou* and *u*, and in some instances to *oa*, *oo*, and *ai.*

Many, as the common grammars teach whose characteristic is *i*, continue to give the past tense in *o*, from some of which we have substantives, as abode, drove, Shrove-tide, road (formerly rode), from the verbs abide, drive, shrive, ride.

Many now written with *a, u, ou, i*, formerly were written with *o :* as gove, gave; dronk, drunk; fond, found; slode, slid. These specimens must suffice and be borne in mind in reading the following pages.*

ADDLE becomes ail, and idle becomes ill, by sliding over the *d* in pronunciation. *Idle* and *ill* are both applied to weeds. An addle egg, an addle pate or brains, an idle head, are common expressions. Wiclif; the erthe was *idel* and voide.

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* Dr. Latham says, " Verbs may be said to fall into two conjugations. Words like *sang* are called strong, because they are formed independently of any addition. Words like *fill-ed* are called weak, because they require the addition of the *sound d.*"

Inanis et vacua. Feith withouten workis is *idel.*
Mortua. Anglo-Saxon aidlian; to be weak or sick,
inert, useless, or fruitless; to spoil or corrupt.

BAR; Gothic *bairg*-an, Anglo-Saxon *byrg*-an.
A BAR, in all its uses, is a defence; that by which
any thing is fortified, strengthened, or defended.
[A bar to secure a door, &c.; bar of an inn; bar
of a court of justice.]

A BARN (bar-en, bar'n) is a covered enclosure
in which grain, &c. is protected from weather, &c.

A BARON, an armed, defenceful, or powerful
man.

A BARGE, a BARK, a strong boat, a stout vessel.

A BARGAIN; a confirmed, strengthened agree-
ment.

The BARK of a tree is its defence from weather,
&c.; of a dog, defends us from harm.

A BARKEN; an enclosure (near the house from
the open fields).

[A BARTON. A strong, secure enclosure.]

A BARRACK. A strong, defended building (com-
pared with tents).

A BARRIER; to keep off a mob; to secure
against inroad or invasion.

A BURGH or BOROUGH; formerly a fortified
town. See TOWN.

A BURROW for rabbits; to defend or protect
them.

A BOROWE; a security; any person or thing by
which repayment is *secured.* [To *borrow;* to take
or receive, on pledge or security to repay or re-
turn].

BURY; to deposit in a secure, protected place.

So the Latin sepelire; from seps, a hedge, a fence.

HAUBERK or habergeon; armour to protect the neck and breast; from *hals*, the halse or neck, and berg-en, to protect, to defend.

The French changed *hals* into *hau*, and made the word hauberg, and the Italian made it *usbergo*.

BOUGH, BOW, BAY; in Anglo-Saxon written *bogh, bug, beah;* past tense of byg-an, to bend or curve.

BUXOM. Anglo-Saxon bog-sum, boc-sum, buh-some; Old English bough-some, easily bended or bowed to one's will; obedient (easily moved to good fellowship).

Bow, an inclination of the body, an instrument of war, of music; a kind of knot; the curved part of a saddle; the arc-en-ciel; curved or bended legs; branches of trees, now written boughs; a recess of the sea-shore (a bay, Latin sinus); also in buildings, barns, or windows (now a bow window). In all these applications the word means bended or curved. [From the same source we have the *bosom*. So the Latin sinus and Greek κολπος, a bay, a bosom.*]

BROOK or *Broke.* " The struggling water *breaks* out in a *Brook.*"—*Faithful Shepherdess.*

[A BROACH; any thing *broken* or split off, so as to pierce. A broach of eels is a *stick* of eels; so many eels *broched* or *stuck* through a *spit*, a *pin*, are also so called; by which meat is stuck or pierced

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* And I may refer to the word *bag* in the additions to my 8vo. Edition, where I have enumerated many words not noticed by Tooke.

through; by which ornaments of dress are stuck on. To *broach* a vessel; to *break* into it, by boring or piercing through.

To *broach* a doctrine; to break it open; to disclose it.

A BRAK or BREAK; for a horse; that by which his unruliness is *broken*: by which he is tamed or subjected to use.]

A BREACH or BREAK. "Is it no *breake* of duetie to withstande your kinge?"—*Cheke.*

BREECHES: to cover those parts where there is a *breach* in the body, or where the body is *broken* into two parts.

Hence also the Lat. *bracca*: and, as Wachter, with Tooke, believes, βραχιων, brachium. All from the Gothic Brikan: Anglo-Saxon Brecan, bræcan, to *break*.

BROWN. All colours in all languages *must* have their denominations from some common object, or from some circumstances that produce those colours.

BROWN is the past participle of the verb to Bren, or to brin, now to *burn* (Fr. brun, Italian bruno, and also bronze, bronzo). Brown is merely burned (subaudition, colour). It has the colour of things *burned.* The brunt (bront, brount) of the battle is the *heat* of it.

GREEN: gren-ian, virescere, viridis, verdant, from virere (and so Wachter).

GREY: geregn-an, inficere, to stain.

YELLOW: Italian Giallo, French gialne, jaune, Anglo-Saxon ge-ælged, ge-ælg, ge-ælgen: past participle of ge-ælan, accendere, to kindle. As Latin flammeus, flavus, from φλεγω, φλεγμα, flamma,

flame.   See infra, ch. v. ALE.   Hence also YOLK,
GOLD.

WHITE : Gothic Hwath-an, spumare, to foam.

CAGE ; a place shut in and fastened, in which
birds are confined.   Also a place in which male-
factors are confined.

GAGE ; that by which a man is bound to certain
fulfilments.

WAGES ; by which servants are bound to per-
form certain duties.

GAG ; by which the mouth is confined from
speaking.

KEG ; in which fish or liquors are shut in and
confined.

KEY ; by which doors, &c. are confined and
fastened.

QUAY ; by which water is confined and shut out.
All from the Anglo-Saxon verb Cægg-ian, obserare;
and hence also the French cage, gage, &c. the
Italian gaggia, &c. and ancient Latin *caiare*.

CHAR.   A char or chare is a turn : a chare-
woman, a woman who does not abide in the house
where she works, as a constant servant, but *returns*
home to her own place of abode, and *returns* again
to her work when required.   [(Qy ?) One who has
a *turn* at work.   It is my *turn* now ; that is, it
comes to me by rotation among others.   When the
post-chaise was in fashion, the drivers were called
first or second *turn* boys.   And this agrees with
Tooke's explanation of *char*, a turn or bout ; that
char is char'd ; that *turn* is turned : one good *turn*
deserves another.]

CHAIR, is a species of seat, not fixed, but move-able—*turn*ed about, and returned at pleasure; a turn-seat.

CAR, CART, CHARIOT, and the Latin *Carrus* [a word which Ihre and Wachter had previously agreed was introduced into the Roman language by Julius Cæsar, and which is never used either by him or Livy except when speaking of the military vehicles of the Gauls]. Such vehicles were so called, in contradistinction to the sledge [the traha or trahea of Virgil].

ACHAR or AJAR: a door on the turn or return to shut or open further on the hinge, or *car-do*, on which the door is turned and returned.

CHAR, the fish; because (as Skinner) it so rapidly turns itself in the water.

A *chur*-worm; so called, for the same reason.

A CHUR'N. [A vessel, in which, by constant *turning* of milk, butter is made.]

CHARCOAL [called by Chapman, the cole-turned wood. HOM. *Od*. b. 3].

All from the same verb, Cyran, acyran; and meaning *something* turned, turned about, backwards and forwards.

DEAL, or as anciently, dell, or dole, is a part, piece or portion of *any* thing: to *deal* the cards; to give each his part or portion: his dole or dowle (his part distributed), as the attendant beggars at the gate. [The stones also which are used in boundaries to divide land from land are hence also called *dowle-stones*—*Somner*, in v. Dælan.]

" He wolde him tere every *doule* " (*Chaucer*), every piece of him, all to pieces: piecemeal. Skin-

ner reasonably thinks that *dollar* also belongs to *dal*, a part or portion, because it is the half part of the golden ducat.

All from the Gothic *Dailjan*, Anglo-Saxon *deelan*, to *deal*, to divide, to distribute.

DAM; from the Anglo-Saxon Dæm-an, demman, obturare, obstruere. That by which any thing, for example, a current, is stopped.

A DUMB (formerly also written *dum*, or *dome*) person; one whose hearing is stopped. Three words, barren, blind, and dumb, are now applied respectively to the womb, the eyes, and mouth: but they were as the verbs, to bar, to blen, to dam, now are generally applicable: having one common meaning—*obstruction*, and might have changed places.

When Ben Jonson says, " This 'tis to have your ears *damm'd* up to good counsell;" he might have said, " This 'tis to have *dumb* ears, or ears *dumb* to good counsell."

[In Dutch, *dom* is *surdus*, that is, deaf: the Greek τυφλος, is applied not only to eyes, but to ears and soul. *Surdus* is applied to scent by Persius, and to colour by Pliny. Deaf corn, is *barren* corn. A *deaf* nut; the kernel of which has been stopped in its growth.]

Our Winds are named by their distinguishing qualities. Our ancestors knowing the meaning of the words they employed, applied to the four winds the past participles of the four common verbs — *yrs*-ian, wes-an, nyrw-an, and seoth-an: *iras*-ci, marcere, coarctare, coquere.

EAST is yrs-ed, yrsd, yrst (dropping the *r*), yst. Those who cannot pronounce *r*, supply its place by *a ;* and hence *east,* meaning angry, enraged.

[In the early version of the Wiclif Bible, we find " The wind Tiffonyk, that is cleped *north-eest,* or *wind of tempest.*"—*Deeds,* 27, 14.]

WEST, is wes-ed, wes'd, *west,* past participle of *wes*-an, to wet.

Our NORTH (see infra, ch. v.) is the third person singular of the Anglo-Saxon verb, nyrw-an, but the *nord* and norr (as our own sailors pronounce it) of the other European languages is the past participle of the same word, and means narrowed, constrained.

SOUTH is the past tense and past participle of seoth-an, to *seethe.* " Some (fysh) they sold, and some they *soth,* and so they liued."—*Piers Ploughman's Vision.* Hence also the French sud; and our sod, sodden, suds. And the *yesty* waves, are the angry, stormy waves: Anglo-Saxon Ystig, Iestig, procellosus.

GRAVE. *Grove :* the Anglo-Saxon graf, græf, serve for either. They and also *groove* are past tense, and therefore past participles of *Graf*-an, to dig, to excavate, to cut or carve into.

GROVE : cut through a thicket of trees.

GRAFT (sometimes graff) is graf-ed, graf'd, graft.

GROT, from gråft (*a* broad) with *f* suppressed. Italian grotto, grotta.

GREEN, GREY. See BROWN, supra.

HANK, HAUNCH, HINGE, are the same word, with the common interchange of *k, ch,* or *ge,* from Anglo-Saxon Hang-an, to hang.

To have a *hank*, is to have something hank, hankyd, hanged or hung, on any person or thing.

HAUNCH; the part by which the lower limbs are hankyd or hanged to the body. French *hanche*, Italian *anca*.

HINGE; that on which the door is hung, heng, hyng, or hynge; so variously is the word written in our old language. " The body *hankyd* on the cross." " He *hyng* down his head." " He *henge* on the lefte syde of our Lord." " He *hynge* on the ryght syde."

[To HANKER is to *hang* about; loitering as unwilling to quit; desirous to keep or get].

HARLOT is merely horelet, diminutive of hore or whore. So the Latin meretrix, a merendo. *Varlet,** and modern *valet* for *hireling*, are believed to be the same word; the aspirate being changed to *v* and the *r* dropped; as *Lord* is now frequently pronounced, especially at the Bar, *Lod* or *Lud*.

Harlot is in old authors constantly applied to a *hired* servant, a hireling, without any imputation.

HEAL. Past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb Hel-an, tegere; to cover, to conceal. In old English, to hele, and to hil, are very common both literally and metaphorically—to cover, to recover. " Nile ye be bisy with what ye shulen be *hilid*." —*Matt.* vi. 31.

" We women can no thing *hele*."—*Wife of Bath.*

" The child was *heeled* (sanatus est) fro that our."—*Matt.* 8.

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* " Thou hast not been as an *harlot*, in that thou scornest *hire*." —Ezek. xvi. 31.

Ray says, " To heal, to cover. Suss. As to *heal* the fire, to heal a house; to heal a person in bed, that is, to cover them, from the Anglo-Saxon *hel*-an, to hide, cover, or heal. Hence in the west, he that covers a house with slates, is called a healer, or hillier." South and East country words.

[And in his North-country words, A bed-*healing* is a *coverlet;* or absolutely a hylling.]

HELL. Any place, or some place *covered* over; [Who shal go doun to depnesse or *helle* (in abyssum.)—*Rom.* x. 7.]

[HELL has various applications, namely, to

1. An obscure place in any of our prisons.

2. The place under the shopboard into which a tailor throws his shreds.

3. A place under the Exchequer Chamber, where the king's debtors were confined.

Also the place or *hole* to which those who were caught in the game of Barley-Break were brought.]

HEEL; that part of the foot that is *covered* by the leg.

HILL; any heap of earth or stone, &c. by which the plain or level surface of the earth is covered. " Thei shulen bigynne to seie to litil *hillis, hile* ye us."—*Luke* xxiii. 30.*

HALE, that is, healed or whole.

WHOLE; formerly written *hole.* A wound or sore is *healed* or whole, that is *covered* by the skin. [Hence whole-some, or hole-some]. To *re-cover* is our ordinary expression.

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* The learned Swedish etymologist, Ihre, says, " Angl. *hill,* ab hæla, tegere."

HALL; a *covered* building, where persons assemble, or where goods are protected from the weather.

HULL of a nut, &c.; that by which the nut is covered. And see Serenius.

HULL of a ship; that part which is covered in the water.

HOLE: some place *covered* over [a place for concealment or protection].

" You shall seek for *holes* to hide your heads in."

HOLT, holed, hol'd, holt; a rising ground or knoll *covered* with trees. (And see Serenius.)

HOLD of a ship; in which things are *covered,* or the *covered* part of a ship. (Ubi penus navis *conditur.—Skinner.*)

LACE and LATCH: past tense and past participle of Anglo-Saxon Læcc-an, Læcgan, Læccean, prehendere, apprehendere, to hold, to take hold, to catch.

" His hatte hinge at his backe by a *lace.*" (Some ed. *las.*) *C. T.* v. 16042.

The *latch* of a door, or that by which a door is caught, latched or held, is often called a *catch.* [The *latchet* of whose shoes, is in Wiclif, the thwong, that is, thong.] Tooke is persuaded that the Latin *laqueus,* and Italian *laccio,* are from the same Anglo-Saxon verb.

LUCK (good or bad) is (something, any thing) caught. He has had good luck; that is, he has had a good *catch.*

Læcc-an is also written with the common prefix ge; as *ge-læcc-an,* and *ge-latch* (the *g* into *c* combining easily in rapid pronunciation with the

liquid *l*) becomes *clutch*, with the same meaning, to catch, to seize; and so Clutches, that is, clutchers (ge-latchers), as *fangs* and *fingers* from *fang-an*, and *hand* from *hent*-an.

LID and LOT, in Anglo-Saxon *hlid*, and *hlot*, though seemingly of such different significations, have but one meaning—covered, hidden. By change of characteristic letter ī, to ĭ short, and to *o* (as *writ*, wrote), they are the regular past tense and past participle of Anglo-Saxon *hlid-an*, to *cover*. And the English *lid* is that by which any thing (box, vessel, &c.) is *covered.*

LOT is (any thing, something) covered, hidden. Witches were in foretime named lot-tellers, that is, tellers of covered or hidden things.

[From the Greek κληρος,—a fragment of any thing (sc.) cast into the urn or vessel,—(rendered by our translators *Lot*) the *clergy* are called. On choosing an apostle in lieu of Judas, and the choice was between Barnabas and Matthias; "they (the other apostles) gave forth theyr lottes (κληρους), and the lot (ὁ κληρος) fell on Matthias."— *Acts* i. 26.]

Hlid-an (as Læccan) was also written with the prefix *ge*, and the no less common prefix *be ;* both of which easily united in pronunciation with the liquid *l.*

Be-hlod or *be-hlot* (from be-hliden) became our English *blot*, and a *blot* on any thing extends as far as the thing is *covered* and no farther.

Ge-hlyd, ge-hlod, ge-hled (ge-hled-an), is become our *glade ;* applied to a spot *covered* or hidden with trees. In like manner as *lot* and *blot.*

CLOUD: from the same participle (it is supposed), thus : *gehlod,* or *gehloud, gloud, cloud.* So the Latin *nubes,* from *nubere;* " Nubes cœlum obnubit; a nuptu, that is, opertione : a quo nuptiæ nuptusque dictus."— *Varro,* l. 4. [The bride (*nubita,* nubta, *nupta*) was so called, because when led to be married she was *covered* with a veil. " A *married* woman in our law, French, is called a feme-*covert,* fœmina viro co-operta; and is said to be *covert*-baron, or under the *protection* and influence of her husband, her baron, or Lord."— *Black,* i. c. 15.]

LOCK and BLOCK : Anglo-Saxon *loc, be-loc* are the regular past participles of *Lyc-an, be-lyc-an,* to shut up, close up, obstruct. [A block-head; having a head like a *block* (of wood); or whose faculties are *blocked* up.]

LOAF, DOUGH, BREAD. These words are applied to the same material substance in different states.

BREAD has been explained to be *brayed* grain (ante, p. 118).

DOUGH is the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb *deaw*-ian, to moisten, to wet; and means wetted (dewed or bedewed).

LOAF (in Anglo-Saxon hlaf, *a* broad) is the past participle of hlifian, to raise (to lift). Bread *wetted* becomes *dough,* and by the addition of the *leaven* it becomes *loaf.* This leaven is in Anglo-Saxon called *hæf* and *haf-en.* [Anglo-Saxon *hæf,* fermentum, leaven; so called from its quality of heaving or rising.— *Somner.*]

Loaf is in Mæso-Gothic, *hlaibs;* past participle of *hleibyan,* to raise.

LORD, anciently written hlaf-ord, composed of the same *hlaf,* raised; and *ord,* ortus, source, origin, birth; and means therefore *high-born,* or of an exalted origin.

LOFTY and LADY are the same word, and mean merely raised, elevated. The two words are thus traced:

The Anglo-Saxon *hlaf, hlafod, hlafd, hlafdig,* are in English, (omitting the *h,*) *laf, lafed, laf'd, llafd-y* (the Anglo-Saxon termination *ig* softened into *y*). Retaining the *f,* pronunciation requires the *d* to be changed into *t,* and the word becomes *lafty* (*a* broad, that is, *aw*) or *lofty.* Suppress the *f,* the *d* may remain unchanged, and the word becomes *lady.*

LADY, then, in Anglo-Saxon hlafd or hlafd-ig, is merely *lofty,* that is, raised or *exalted;* following the condition of her husband.

LIFT is lifed (Anglo-Saxon hlifod), lif'd, lift; obtained by adding the termination *od* or *ed* to past tense; *Lif,* Anglo-Saxon hlif.

LOFT is lafed (that is, lawfed), laf'd, *loft,* by the same addition to the past tense, *Hlæf, lawf.*

MANY is called a strange word, and its history is certainly singular.

Lowth observes that *many* is used " *chiefly* with the word *great* before it;" and Johnson supposes *few* and *many* to be opposite terms, and so indeed in usage they are. But G. Douglas writes, they were in number " ane *few* menȝe, but quyk and

valʒeant in war." " A *much more* many."—*Spenser*, On Ireland. " How he might find a *moost* meynee."—*Piers Ploughman*, V. 5789.

[In the translation of the Bible by Wiclif and his followers, " His household meynee," is in the Latin, " domestici ejus;" and " his meyneal church," domestica ecclesia; and meyneals, " domestici." And it is perhaps from this limited application of the word to those employed about the house, that our old lawyers have long derived it from intra *mænia*, and this etymology was lately given by a learned Baron in the Court of Exchequer. But in not one of the above instances from P. Ploughman, Douglas, and Spenser, did the *meynee* consist of persons " intra mænia."

The Meynee, or many, of our ancestors consisted of a company of knights, esquires, and gentlemen, who accompanied their king or liege not only on occasions of ceremony, but to the field of battle. These also had their *manye* or *menials;* and so in descending succession, till at length the word *menial* became restricted to the lowest class; to those who performed household services, servile offices.

Cotgrave writes the old French word *mesnie*, and Rochefort gives nearly forty different ways of writing it. The French etymologists derive it from maison, mansio, but it is an old Gothic word common to the Northern languages: and our own lexicographer, Skinner, decided on the German *mengen*, to mix, to mingle, as its true source; in Anglo-Saxon Meng-an.] Of this last, the Anglo-Saxon meng-an, Tooke concludes it (our menye or many)

to be the past participle, and to mean *mixed* or *associated* (for that is the effect of mixing), subaud. company, or any uncertain and unspecified number of things.

" Many a message, many a youth, and many a maid," are corrupt usages. They should be, " a many *of* messages, *of* youths, *of* maids." " Multos sanctorum," Wiclif writes, " Manye *of* seyntes."— *Acts* i. 26. Bishop Gardner ; " A many *of* words." The word was, no doubt, very early applied as Lowth and Johnson explain.

Morrow, Morn, Morning, are traced back to the old English morewe, morewn, and more-wende. In the next stage back, the Anglo-Saxon, the words were written Merien, merg-en, merne, or margen, marne, or morr, morgen, morn : " And I believe them to be the past tense and past participle of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb Meryan, merr-an, mirran, myrran, to dissipate, to disperse, to spread abroad, to scatter."

By the customary change of *i* or *y* to *o, morr* is the regular past tense of myrran; and morr (in order to express the latter *r*) might well be pronounced and written morwe, *morewe.* And it was so written by Wiclif; afterwards morowe and morrow.* By adding the participial termination, *en*, to the past tense *morr* or morew, we have more-wen, morewn, mor'n, according to the accustomed contraction.

Morrow without, and Morn with, the participial

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* Such change, as morwe in morrow, is not uncommon; thus, arwe, arrow ; narwe, narrow ; sorwe, sorrow, &c. &c.

termination *en*, have both the same meaning, namely, dissipated, dispersed, with clouds or darkness understood; whose dispersion (or the time of their dispersion) it expresses.

Anglo-Saxon myrrende is the regular present participle of myrran; in old English, morewende, and so written in Wiclif; where is also found morwe-tid, that is, tide or time of dispersing darkness, which was anciently supposed to be something positive. By the constant change of the Anglo-Saxon participial termination *ende* into *ing*, morewende became morewing, morwing, morning. Such expressions as the following are cited in confirmation of this being the meaning:—

" In the *morning, afore* day, he mette his horse, and rode till it was day."

" You shall rise earely in the *morne*, or the day begin."

" The *morning* dawes or dawns," (lucescit)— " scatters the rear of darkness."

And see infra, MIRTH, quod dissipat (subaud. *mæstitiam*) and murther (quod dissipat), what *mars* (subaud. *vitam*.)

NOTCH, nocke, nook, niche, nick, though so variously written, present at once a common meaning, from the verb *to nick*, incidere.

OPE, by change of characteristic *y* into *o*, is the regular past tense of *ypp-an*, aperire, pandere; and *open*, by adding the termination *en*, is the past participle.

GAP and GAPE are the past tense and past participle of ge-yppan (by change of *y* into *a*).

CHAP and CHAPS differ merely by pronouncing *ch* instead of *g*.

PACK, PATCH, and PAGE.   Patch, in both its applications, namely, to men or to clothes, are affirmed to be the same past participle pac (differently pronounced and written, with *k*, *ch*, or *ge*) of the Anglo-Saxon *Pæc-an, pæcc-ean*, to deceive by false appearances, imitation, resemblance, semblance, or representation; to counterfeit, to delude, to illude, to dissemble, to impose upon.   (A primary meaning is not given; Lye merely says, decipere, mentiri.)

PAGEANT is (by a small change of pronunciation) merely the present participle pæcceande, pacheand, pacheant, pageant.

PISH and PSHAW are the Anglo-Saxon pæc, pæcca, pronounced pesh, pesha (*a* broad), and are equivalent to trumpery, that is, tromperie, from tromper, to deceive.

As PATCH was applied to men, so was *patchery* applied to their conduct; and as servants were contemptuously called harlot, varlet, valet, or knave, so were they also called pack, patch, and page.

Shakespeare writes, " Thou scurvy patch;" "A crew of patches;" " You hear him, *coz*, see him *dissemble*, know his gross *patch*ery."   And Fabian, who wrote earlier, " Noughty *packes, disguised* in Byshoppes Apparel."

They who put *patches* on a little *breach*, to hide it, are careful that the *colour* shall as nearly as possible resemble that upon which they put it.

A PAGE of honour, comparatively with other

pages, was no doubt a post of honour, but in Dives
and Pauper it is written, " The Kyng hath power
and fredom of a *page* to make a *yoman*, of a yoman
a gentylman, of a gentylman a knight;" placing
the *page* at the bottom of all.

Even now, it may be observed, a gentleman's
valet, among servants, is comparatively, as the page
of honour, looked upon as of higher rank than some
others.

POND, POUND.   To *pin* or to *pen* (a common
English word) is the Anglo-Saxon *pyndan*, inclu-
dere, to close in, and the past participle is *pond*,
pound, *pen*, *pin*, *bin* (and the old Latin *benna*, a
close carriage).

A POND, in which water, and in it, fishes are
enclosed.

A POUND, in which beasts, trespassing, are en-
closed or shut in.

A PEN or PIN, in which sheep, fowls, &c. are
shut in; any thing which encloses; a *pin* or web in
the eye, because it closes the eye.   A merry *pin*,
from the custom of drinking in mugs with a *pin*
fixed, as a measure of the exact quantity to be
drunk.   A *pin* is still used for a small barrel, hold-
ing or enclosing so much beer—(four-and-a-half
gallons).

BIN (by change of *p* into *b*), for corn, wine, &c.

RACK is the past tense and past participle of the
Anglo-SaxonRec-an,exhalare,to reek; andwhether
written *rak, wraich, reck, rock* (as in G. Douglas),
or *reeke* (as in Shakespeare), is the same word, with
the same meaning; that which is *reeked, exhaled,*

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evaporated. A *reek* with us (says Mr. Ray) signifies not a smoak, but a *steam,* arising from liquor or moist thing heated (for example, a dunghill). " The winds in the upper regions which move the *clouds* (which we call the *rack*) and are not perceived below, pass without noise."—BACON, *Nat. Hist.* § 115.

" According to Bacon (says Dr. Jamieson), the *rack* denotes the thin *vapours* in the higher region of the air, which may either be moved by the winds, or stand still."

" They must needs conceit that (in death) our substance is in a manner wet, and nothing but a tenuous *reek* remains."—H. MORE, *On the Soul,* b. 3. c. 2.

RACK or REEK denotes vapours in the lower,— in any region. A *reek* or *racke,* from a newly-ploughed field, from a meadow, a pond or river, are common expressions in the Northern counties.

The commentators, I fear, are not yet unanimous that *racke* in the Tempest (IV. 1.) means vapour; yet with such meaning it " is surely the most appropriate term that could be employed by Shakespeare in that passage, to represent to us that the dissolution and annihilation of the globe and all which it inherit, should be so total and complete, that they should so ' melt into *ayre,* into thin *ayre,*' as not to leave behind them even [a tenuous reek], a *vapour,* a steam, an exhalation, to give the slightest notice that such things had ever been."

Some would read *wreck,* which cannot be applicable to any thing " melted into *ayre.*"

RACK, RAKE, RECK, a rack or rick of hay, and a *rake*, the tool or instrument by which the hay is collected, are the past participles Gothic of Ricjan, to draw together.

RICH and RICHES (*k* as usual into *ch*) are the same past participles; the French Riche and rich-esse, and Italian Ricco and richezza (our *tch*, changed in pronunciation to *sh* and *k*). The word applies equally to any thing *collected*, accumulated, heaped, or, as we frequently express it, *raked* together.

ROGUE, ROOK, RAY, &c.

The Anglo-Saxon Wrig-an, to wrine, to wrie (not uncommon in Chaucer), to cover, to cloak, by change, in forming the past tense, of *i* into *o* and also into *a*, has furnished us with a variety of words very differently applied. The verb itself still sur-vives in to *Rig*.

ROGUE means covered, cloaked, applied to one who has cloaked or covered designs; and Tooke says that RAY, used by G. Douglas, is in this sense, but Dr. Jamieson remains in doubt.

ROCK, the part of the machine used by spin-sters *covered* by the wool.

ROCK in the sea, so called because *covered* or hid-den by the water [masses of like substance on the coast, left uncovered by the secession of waters, or of similar substance and appearance on land, have the same name].

ROCKET or ROCHET, the diminutive of *rock;* that with which women or bishops are covered.

[On the past participle *rock* was formed the old English verb to *rock*, rook, rouk, or rack. Chau-

cer writes, " O false murdered, *rucking* in thy den."
" The shepe that *rouketh* in the fold." Covering,
lying close in concealment,—under protection;
and Gower, " But now they *rucken* in her nest,
and resten."

ROKETT in Berner's Froissart, " To run with *ro-
kettes*," " speares, either sharp or *rokettes*," appears to
have been a spear, with its point or head *covered*, to
prevent injury, as the point of a fencing foil now is.

To ROOK is also to *rogue*, to play the *rogue*.

RUG, Anglo-Saxon Rooc (*oo* into *u*), is that with
which a bed, a horse, &c. are *covered*.

RUCK is commonly used when some part of silk,
linen, &c. is folded over or covers some other part,
when the whole should lie smooth or even.

RAY, or, with the common prefix *a*, *array*,
means *covered*, *dressed*, and is applied both to the
dressing of the body of an individual, and to the
dressing of a body of armed men. Surrey, address-
ing Virtue, asks, " Why art thou poorely *raide* ? "
that is, rigged, clothed, dressed.

RAIL, Anglo-Saxon Ræg-el, is the diminutive of
ræg. [Wiclif writes it *wriel*, in the Latin Vulgate,
velamen.] As a woman's night-*rail*, with which
she is *thinly* covered.

RAILS; by which any area, court-yard, or other
place is thinly (that is, not closely, but with small
intervals) *covered*.

RAIL or RALLY; to jest with a *covert* meaning,
and hence *raillery*. To *rail* is now by custom ex-
tended to abuse coarsely and violently.

To RIG a ship, and the *riggen* (now rigging), An-
glo-Saxon *wriggen*. The latter is that with which

a ship or any thing else is rigged or *covered.* [Rig-gish (Shakespeare) is *roguish.* A *rig,* a roguish trick.]

ROOM, RIM, and BRIM, are the past participles of Anglo-Saxon Rym-an, be-rym-an, to extend.

ROOM, Anglo-Saxon Rum, is extended, place, space, extent.

" There was no *room* for them in the Inn."

Luke ii. 7.

In Wiclif's Bible the earlier version has, " there was not *place* to hym in the comyn stable." The Anglo-Saxon is *rum* and Gothic *rumis.*

[Hence our common word *rummage,* formerly written *roomage;* we should now say *stowage.* The old usage is well shown in the following pas-sages from Hackluyt.

" And that the masters of ships do look well to the *romaging*" (*placing* the cargo), "for they might bring away a great deale more than they doe, if they would take paine in the *romaging.*"— *Voyages,* v. i. p. 308.

" Now whilest the mariners were *romaging* the shippes, and mending that which was amisse, the miners, &c." *Id. Ib.* v. 3, p. 88.

" The master must provide a perfect mariner, called *romager,* to *raunge* and bestow the merchaun-dize in *such place* as is convenient."—*Id. Ib.* v. 3, p. 862.

To *rummage* now is to search into any *room* or place, with little regard for arrangement.]

RIM is the utmost *extent* in breadth of any thing.

BRIM (be-rym-an); the *extent* of the capacity of any vessel.

. A large-*brim'd* lake (Drayton) is widely extended in breadth (Anglo-Saxon be-rymmed).

SHEER, SHERD, SHRED, &c.   Sherd and shred have already been explained among the past participles formed by the addition of *ed* to the verb to sheer, Anglo-Saxon Scyran.[*]   The following are past participles of the same verb, by change of characteristic.

SHEER, as we now use it, means *separated;* "Sheer ignorance," that is, *separated* from any the smallest mixture of information.   In Beaumont and Fletcher, " I had my feather shot *shaer* (that is, sheer) away;" so separated by the shot as not to leave the smallest particle behind. [And in Dibdin's memorable song, " Here, a *sheer* hulk, lies poor Tom Bowling."]

SHORE, as the sea-shore or shore of a river, relates merely to the *separation* of land from the sea or river; not a determined spot of any size or shape.

SHORT is shored, shor'd, *short,* cut off; opposed to *long,* which means *extended,* and is the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb *Leng*-ian, to extend or stretch out.

SHIRT and *skirt* (that is, *scired*) is the same participle differently written and applied.

. SHOWER (Anglo-Saxon Scyur and scur) means broken, divided, separated (clouds). [Junius, Skinner and Wachter agree that a *shower* consists of drops of water *broken* from the clouds.]

SCORE, a piece cut off (a talley) containing twice ten notches; and thus a reckoning by *scores* or

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[*] Supra, p. 120,

pieces cut off; a *score* or account kept by cuts or notches in pieces of wood or stick. Such is the etymology of Skinner.

SHARE; any part or portion *separated.*

SHIRE; a *separated* part or portion of this realm.

SCAR, though now applied only to the cicatrix or remaining mark of the *separation,* was formerly applied to any *separated* part. Ray informs us, that the " cliffe of a rocke (that is, the cleaved part of it) is still called a *scarre.*" And in the proverb, " Slander leaves a *score* behind it," *score* is *scar.* Pot-*sherds* or pot-*shards* are likewise called the pot-*scars* or pot-*shreds.*

SHARE-BONE; the bone where the body is *separated* or *divided.* It is written *schere* by G. Douglas.

SHEERS and plough-*share;* contracted from *sheerer,* to avoid the repetition *er.*

The German, Dutch, Swedish, Danish, share this past participle in common with ourselves, and to the Italian *scerre, sciarrare* and schiera, and to the French a l'écart and dechirer, the same Northern origin is ascribed.

SHOT, SHOTTEN. Here we have a very numerous family, all from the Anglo-Saxon *sceat,* past participle of the Anglo-Saxon and English verb Scytan, scit-an, to *shete* or *shut;* variously written with *o* or *a* broad, *ou, oo,* or *u,* or *i* short (jacere, projicere, dejicere, to throw, cast forth, throw out).

A SHOT from a gun, bow, or other machine; something cast or thrown forth.

A SHOT window; a window *thrown* out, projected beyond the rest of the front.

SHOT or SCOT; "A shot of five pence," that is,

five pence cast or thrown down. *Scot* and *shot* are interchangeable.

A SHOTTEN herring; a herring that has cast or thrown forth its spawn.

SHOOT of a tree (Italian schiatta); that which a tree has cast or thrown forth.

SHOUT, a sound *thrown forth* from the mouth. [And see *Tell* in vv. tall, &c.)

SHUT, pronounced by the common people *shet*, and anciently written also with the vowels *i* and *y*. To *shet* the door is merely to *throw* or *cast* the door to. To get *shut* of a thing means, to get a thing *thrown* off or *cast* from us.

SHUTTLE or SHITTLE (shut-del, shit-del) means a small instrument *shot*, that is, *thrown* or *cast*.

A SHUTTLE-cork or SHITTLE-cork is a cork *thrown* or *cast* (*backward* and *forward*).

SHEET, of a bed, of water, of lightning, of paper; thrown or cast or spread. A *sheet* was formerly written *shote* anchor, an anchor *thrown* for security; it is applied metaphorically to our main stay or security.

The Anglo-Saxon *sc*, being pronounced both as *sh* and *sc*, we have thus, *scot* (ante), *scoat, seate*, and *skit*.

A SCOUT; one *sent* out before an army to collect intelligence by any means; at cricket, to return the ball.

[To SCOUT; to cast off, to reject.]

A SKIT; a familiar word in speech for a jibe or jeer *thrown* or *cast* on any one. To the same effect, a *fling*.

SKETCH (Dutch *schets*), thrown off; requiring to be afterwards finished.

SAGITTA (pronounced Sag-hitta), skit, skita, sa-kita, sagita; something cast, thrown, that is, *shot.*

To Italian Scotto, schiatta, schizzo; French es-cot, êcot, esquisse; Dutch schets; the same origin is ascribed.

Our Author enlarges on the fruitless efforts of the Italian and French etymologists to discover the origin of these words, and the following observations well describe the causes to which he attributed their failure.

Our modern etymologists become surrounded with difficulties, because they direct their attention to the East and not to the North. " They seem to forget that the Latin is a mere modern language, compared with the Anglo-Saxon. The Roman beginning (even their fable) is not, comparatively, at a great distance. The beginning of the Roman language we know, and can trace its formation step by step. But the Northern origin is totally out of sight, is entirely and completely lost in its deep antiquity." " The bulk and foundation of the Latin language most assuredly is Greek, but great part of the Latin is the language of our Northern ancestors grafted upon the Greek.* And to our northern language the etymologist must go for that part of the Latin which the Greek will not furnish; and there, without any twisting or turn-

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* We find in the Latin, *as nouns*, many of our past participles, and yet not the verbs to which those participles belong.

ing or ridiculous forcing and torturing of words, he
will easily and clearly find it. We want, there-
fore, the testimony of no historians to conclude,
that the founders of the Roman State and the La-
tin tongues came not from Asia, but from the north
of Europe. For the language cannot lie. And
from the language of every country we may with
certainty collect its origin. In the same manner,
even though no history of the fact had remained,
and though another Virgil and another Dionysius
had again, in verse and prose, brought another
Æneas from another Troy to settle modern Italy,
after the destruction of the Roman Government;
yet, in spite of such false history or silence of his-
tory, we should be able, from the modern lan-
guage of the country (which cannot possibly lie),
to conclude with certainty that our Northern an-
cestors had again made another successful irrup-
tion into Italy, and again grafted their own lan-
guage upon the Latin, as before upon the Greek.
For all the Italian which cannot be easily shown
to be Latin, can be easily shown to be our north-
ern language."*

It would indeed have been in an incalculable
degree useful to the learned world, guiding the
steps and saving the labour of succeeding philolo-
gers, if the author of the Επεα Πτεροεντα, and Mr.
Gilbert Wakefield, had accomplished what they
had agreed to undertake in conjunction, namely, a
division and separation of the Latin tongue into
two parts, placing together in one division all that

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* See Diversions of Purley, v. pp. 140, 270.

could be clearly shown to be Greek, and in the other division all that could be clearly shown to be of northern extraction.

SKILL, SCALE; another long list, with the same changes of characteristic and interchange of *sc* and *sh*, as in *shot, scot,* and seeming to have little in sound and less in meaning common with each other, yet all are the past participles of the Anglo-Saxon verb *Scyl*-an, to divide, to separate, to make a difference, to discern, to skill, and have one common meaning.

The verb to *skill* was in common use down to the reign of Charles the First: " It *skills* not; that is, it makes no difference."

SKILL is *discernment;* the faculty by which things are properly *divided* and separated one from another.

SCALE, shale, shell, shoal or shole, scowl, scull, are different forms of the same word.

We have SCALE, a ladder, and thence *scale,* of a besieged place [by mounting the *separate* steps; and to *scale,* generally to climb, to mount].

A pair of SCALES [for the separation of portions by weight].

A SCALE of degrees.

SCALE of a fish, or of our own diseased skin.

SCALE of a bone.

SCALL and scaled (or scald) head.

SHALE or shell of a nut, &c.

SHOAL, shole, or skul of fishes.

SCULL of the head.

SCOWL of the eyes.

SHOULDER (formerly written *shoulde*) [where arm is *separated* from the body or trunk].

SKILL, shilling, slate.

Fishes come in *shoals, sholes,* or *skuls;* that is, in separate *divisions* or parts *divided* from the main body; and any one of these divisions (these shoals or sculs) may be again *scaled;* that is, *divided* or *separated* by the belching whale.

" And there they flye or dye, like *scaled sculs* before the belching whale."—*Troylus and Cressida.*

In *Measure for Measure,* " The corrupt deputy was *scaled,* by *separating* from him, or stripping off his covering of hypocrisy."

In *Coriolanus,* the tale of Menenius was " *scaled* a little more, by being divided more into particulars and degrees told more circumstantially."

In the same play; " *Scaling* his present bearing with the past," *separating* or looking *separately,* distinguishing the one from the other.

An old sack is always *skailing,* that is, parting, dividing, separating, breaking.

To SHEAL milk; to *separate* the parts, to curdle it.—*Ray.*

To SCALE; to spread as manure, &c. Used in the North.—*Grose.*

To SKALE or SKAIL; to scatter and throw abroad, as mole-hills are when levelled.—*Id.*

SCOWL. Our ancestors said Sceol-eage; we say only *sceol,* that is, *scowl,* subaud. eyes; that is, *separated* eyes, or eyes looking different ways.

SHILLING; one of the (twenty) parts into which a pound is divided or separated.

SLATE, formerly written *sclat,* skalit, sklait, sklate, slate; Scotch schelbzis, Dutch schalien.

" And by the *sclattis* (tegulas) they letten him down."—Wic. *Luke* v. 19.

The Italian Scala, scaglia, scalogna, the French eschelle, escaille, eschalotte, and also their chaloir, nonchalance, and the Italian non cale, with the Latin callidus, are referred to the same origin.

Slack, Slouch; In Anglo-Saxon *Slæc, sleac, slog, slæw, sleaw, slaw*, same past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb *sleac-ian*, sleacg-ian, slac-ian (*a* broad), tardare, remittere, relaxare, pigrescere. " The Greekes caryed the bere with *slake* pace." —Chaucer, *Knightes Tale.*

Slouch, slæc (*ch* for *k*), a slow (pace).

[A *slouch*: " A foul great stooping *slouch*, with heavie eyes and hanging lip."—*H. More.*]

Slough, *slog* (*gh* for *ch*), slow water.

Slug, *slog* (*g* for *k*), slow reptile.

Slow, *slaw* (*w* for *g*). [" Reise ye *slow* hondis and knees unboundeen."—Wic. *Heb.* xii. 12, *remissas* manus.]

Slow-en, slouen, *sloven.*

[" Some sluggish *slovens* that sleepe day and night."—*Skelton.*]

Slow-ed, slow'd, *slut.*

Slut is applied by Gower and Chaucer to males, and it is so by Lord Berners also :—

" Among these other of *sloutes* kinde . . . .
There is yet one, whiche Idelness
Is cleped."—*Gower.*

" Why is thy lorde so *slotelyche*, I the pray?" (Tyrw. sluttish.)—*Chaucer.*

" He showed them all the nature of the Span-

yardes, how they be *sluttish* and lousy, and enuy-
ous of other mannes welthe."—*Berners.*

A SLOW is used by Chaucer as we now use
Sluggard. *Slow* was used as a verb, for example,
" Aqua vitæ moderately given *sloweth* age; it
strengtheneth youth."—*Holinshed.*

The SLOUGH of an animal, the slough of a wound,
that which (skin, scurf) sloweth, slacketh, looseth.

SLOTH is sloweth, slowth, *sloth ;* the third person
indicative of the Anglo-Saxon Slaw-ian, to slow.

SORROW, SORRY, are by change of the charac-
teristic *y* to *o*, the past participle of the Anglo-
Saxon verb *Syrw-an,* syrewan, syrewian, to vex, to
molest, to cause mischief to. This past participle
in Anglo-Saxon was very variously written *sorw,*
sorwe, &c. and in old English *sorwe, sorewe, soor,*
&c.* It was and is the general name for any ma-
lady or disease, or mischief or suffering; any thing
generally by which one is molested, vexed, grieved
or mischieved.

[In the later version of the Wiclif Bible (*Matt.*
iv. 23), the Vulgate Latin, " omnem languorem," is
rendered " every languor;" but in the earlier, " al
sorow or ache," and in v. 25, we have " dyuerse
languores," and " dyuers sorowis" (var. reading,
soores) from " diversis languoribus."]

" Judas was *sorowe* therof, and grutched."—
Dives and Pauper.

[" I am *sorrow* for thee."—*Cymbeline.*
We should now use *sorry;* and as Shakespeare

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* See ante, MORROW, p. 142, note.

writes " I am sorry" only a few lines above, it is very likely that he did so here, *sorrow* in such usage being obsolete.]

Spenser uses *sore* as a verb; to grieve, to lament.

A *sory* maid, in Spenser, a *grieved* maid; a *sory* plight; a *plight* in which he (Malbecco) was grieved, mischieved.

SHREWD, not by change of characteristic, but by adding *ed* to the indicative. It is Anglo-Saxon *syrw-ed, syrew-*ed; and *syrwe,* syrewe, is our modern *shrewe* or shrew (by an easy corruption of *y* into *h,* as also in *syrop, shrub*), the indicative of *shrew-*an, and meaning *one* who *vexes* or *molests. Shrew* was formerly applied to males as well as females. [In Chaucer's translation of Boethius, *pessimi, improbi,* are rendered *shrewde* folke. In Wiclif " prava" is rendered " *schrewed* thingis, schrewed generation."

" Nay then, quod she, I *shrew* us both two."— *Wife of Bath,* v. 6644.

" And yet he was to me the most *shrew.*"—*Id.* v. 6087.]

BE-SHREW *thee;* be thou (Anglo-Saxon) *syrwe, syrewe,* that is, vexed; or mayst thou be vexed, molested, mischieved, or grieved, in some manner. ' [" Now elles, frere, I will *beshrewe* thy face."— *Id.* 6426.

SHREWED or *shrewd;* vexed, troubled, provoked; and consequentially angry, ill-tempered, bitter or biting; and hence further, keen, cunning, sagacious.

A SORRY fellow, a *sorry* tale, case, or condition;

a sorry fellow, tale, case, or condition, so *mischieved* as to appear of little worth; contemptible or pitiable.]

STAGE, STAG. The Anglo-Saxon *Stig-an*, ascendere, by usual change of characteristic vowel and cognate consonants, gives us these following words, so apparently unconnected. The verb, to *stie*, now disused, was common with our best writers, from Piers Ploughman to Spenser. It was variously written *steige*, steye, sty or stie.

1. STAGE; any elevated place, for comedians or other performers to exhibit: to scaffoldings or buildings *raised* for many other purposes.

2. The word is applied to corporeal progress; as at this *stage* of my journey—of the business—of my life. Travelling was called *steigynge*.

3. It is also applied to degrees of mental advancement in or towards any knowledge, talent or excellence.

4. It was also used as we now use *story*. (French estage, étage). "Sleping he fell down fro the thridde *stage*." (Modern Version *loft*.)

STAG; so called from his *raised* and *lofty* head; his "high-palm'd head" being the most striking circumstance at the first sight of him.

STACK; of hay, of wood, of chimneys; chimneys raised (above the roof); hay or wood raised or piled up.

STALK (*a* broad). Spenser describes the progress of seed to green grass, from green grass to the *stalk*, from *stalk* to ear, and thence the grain; and, after mowing or reaping, binding into sheaves, and rearing into *stalks*.

STAY; in Scotch, a *stay* brae is a *high* bank. Rochis full *stay*—very high rocks: *stay,* merely meaning steig, raised, high, lofty.

STAIR; Anglo-Saxon Stæg-er; Dutch steiger; means merely an *Ascender.* Chaucer and Fabian wrote *steyer,* and stey. Fabian writes *steyer* for *stager.*

STORY, stag-ery, stay-ery (*a* broad), stawry or story; a set of stairs.

STY, on the eye; called by Skinner a tumour, from the Anglo-Saxon verb to *stie.*

STY, for hogs; Anglo-Saxon stige, a *raised* pen, to keep hogs in cleanliness.

A STILE; Anglo-Saxon stig-el, a diminutive of *sty.*

STIRRUP (etymologists concur), a mounting rope, a rope by which to mount or *stye;* Anglo-Saxon *stig-rap.*

The low Latin Astraba, and strepa, and Spanish Estribo, are referred to the same origin.

STOCK, STOCKINGS. The Anglo-Saxon Stoc, stak, sticce; English Stok, stok-en, stuk, stak, stik, stich, are the differently spelled, pronounced and applied past tense, and past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb Stic-an; stic-can, to *stick,* figere, pungere. Our modern custom acknowledges *stuck* only as the past tense and past participle; and considers all the others as so many distinct and unconnected substantives.

" Take," says Mr. Trench,* " the word ' stock;'

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* Lect. 6, on the Study of Words.

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in what an almost infinite number of senses it is employed. What point in common can we find between them all? This:—that they are all derived from, and were originally, the past participle of ' to stick,' which, as it now makes ' stuck,' made formerly ' stock,' and they cohere in the idea of *fixedness*, which is common to every one."

STOCK, truncus, stipes, that is, *stuck;* to stand like a *stock*.   See ante, LOCK, POST.

STOCK, metaphorically; a stupid or blockish person.

STOCK, of a tree, itself *stuck* in the ground; from which branches proceed.

STOCK, metaphorically, stirps, family, race; [hence *stock*-dove, the *stock* or stirps of the domestic kinds.]

STOCK ; *fixed* quantity, or store of any thing.

STOCK in trade; *fixed* sum of money, or goods, capital, fund.

STOCK-lock ; a lock *stuck* in.

STOCK, of a gun ; in which the barrel is *fixed* or *stuck*.

STOCK, handle ; in which a tool or instrument is *stuck*.

STOCK, for the neck (or legs, see infra).

STOCKING, for the leg ; corruptly written for *stock-en ;* because it was *stuck* or made with *sticking* pins, now called knitting needles.

STOCK ; in which hands and legs are *stuck*, as a punishment.

STOCKS ; in which ships are stuck or fixed.

STOCKS ; where the money of persons is *fixed;* the public funds.

STUCCO; for houses, &c. a composition *stuck* or fixed upon walls, &c.

STAKE, in a hedge; *stak* or *stuck* there.

["I too have a *stake* (in the country) and a deep *stake*, nor stolen from the public hedge to be sure, for I planted it myself."—*Horne Tooke*, in the House of Commons.]

STAKE; any thing *stuck* or fixed in the ground, to which beasts may be fastened to be baited.

STAKE; a deposit, paid down, or *fixed*, to answer the event. And thus—

STAKE, metaphorically, a risk; any thing *fixed* or engaged to answer the event.

STEAK; a piece or portion of flesh so small as that it may be taken up and carried, *stuck* upon a fork, or any other *sticking* instrument.

STICK (formerly written Stoc); carried in the hand, or otherwise, but sufficiently slender to be *stuck* or thrust into the ground or other soft substances.

STICK; a thrust.

Stitch (*ch* for *k*); a thrust or push with a needle, also that which is performed by such thrust or push.

STITCH; metaphorically, a pain resembling the sensation produced by a *stitch*, or by being *stuck* or pierced by any pointed instrument.

Besides the above, still remaining in common use, there were formerly—

STOCK, for the leg; now Stocking.

"She can knit him a *stocke*."—*Two Gentlemen of Verona*.

STOCK; a sword or rapier, or any weapon that might be thrust or *stuck.* Also

STOCK and STUCK; a thrust or push.

" He gives me the *stucke* in with such a mortal motion, that it is eneuitable."— *Twelfth Night.*

[STOCCADO; a thrust or push. STOCCADE; a fence of sharp stakes.]

STOKER; one who *sticks,*—that which pushes and consequently stirs (the fire), a poker.

STITCH-*fallen* cheek; metaphorically, from a *stitch* of needlework *fallen.*

To the Italian *stocco, stoccada,* and French *estoc,* the same origin are ascribed.

[*Chapman* writes, " And many men at plow he made, and *drave* earth here and there,

" And turn'd up *stitches* orderly."—*Iliad,* 18.

These *stitches* were performed, made, effected, by the driving or pushing of the plough.

" You have gone a good *stitch;* you may well be aweary."—*Bunyan.* That is, a good way at one *stitch* or push.]

STORE, STOUR, as well as *Stern,** are the past participles of the same Anglo-Saxon verb, Stir-an, to steer, to move.

STORE is a collective term for any quantity or number of things *stirred* or moved into some one place together.

STOUR (Anglo-Saxon Stur), formerly in much use, means *moved, stirred,* and was applied equally to dust, to water, and to men; all things easily moved. It is commonly so written in G. Douglas,

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* Ante, p. 122.

is found in Chaucer and Spenser, and so late as Drayton. [Ascham writes *stoorer*, the comparative, more austere or harsh.] *Sturt* in G. Douglas, is *stured*, *stur'd*, *sturt*.

A START, and a STIR, or STUR, need no explanation.

STURDY (*ig* into *y*, and the French *éstourdi*, *étourdi*); stirred, moved, sc. to exertion, endurance, resistance.

STRAIN, STRIDE: *Strain* is past tense and past participle, strined, strind, of the Anglo-Saxon *Stryn-an*, to *get*, gignere, procreare, acquirere. Chaucer and Spenser write *streen* or *strene*. (Tyrwhitt, *stren*.)

" For God it wote, that children ofte been
Unlyke her worthy elders, hem before:
Bounte cometh all of God, and not of the *streen*
Of which they ben engendred and ibore."

Clerkes Tale, v. 8033.

STRIDE (the *n* dropped), called in Lincolnshire, says Skinner, a cock's Strine — Anglo-Saxon *strynd*. G. Douglas writes *get*, that is, begotten, in the same manner. The father of Camilla is said to have ofttimes pressed the milk of mares

" Within the tender lippis of his *get*."

YESTER-DAY is the Anglo-Saxon Gestran-dæg, and gestran is the past tense and past participle of Gestrinan, to *get*, to acquire, to obtain. But a day is not *gotten* or obtained till it is *passed*, therefore *gestran*-dæg, is equivalent to the passed day. *Gestran*, Yestran, yestern (in German, gestern, Dutch gisteren), yester.

Gestran-dæg, is *Hesterna* dies (Lye), and the Latin *hestern*-us is ghestern. [Whatever may be thought of the justice of this etymology, its extreme ingenuity is undeniable.]

Hestern. [The modern Latin etymologists say *hes*, whence hesternus, and hesternus is analogous with Hodiernus. *Hes* they consider to be kindred with χθες; the *old* source of Hesternus.]

TALL, TOLL, are the past participles of the Anglo-Saxon verb, Til-ian, to lift up, to till (toll-ere).

TALL and the French TAILLE, mean raised, lifted up.

[TALL is applied metaphorically to men of high spirit, lofty courage.

" I know your spirit to be *tall;* pray be not vexed."—*Beaumont and Fletcher.*

" Boadicea and her daughter ride about in a chariot *telling* the *tall* champeons as a great encouragement, that with the Britons it was usual for woemen to be their leaders."—MILTON, *History of England,* b. 2.]

TOLL and the French *Taille* (which is taken of goods) differ only in pronunciation and spelling. It is a part *lifted* up; as a tax, *levied,* raised.

TOLL of a bell is the bell *lifted,* and applied to the sound thus caused.

TOOL, is (some, any instrument) *lifted* up, or taken up, to work with.

TOIL (for labour), applied perhaps at first principally to having *tilled* (*lifted* up) the earth, and then to other sorts of labour. Tooke produces two instances from a MS. version of the New Testa-

ment in his possession of the verb to *toil,* written in old English, to *tueill,* and *tuail.* In the Wiclif Bible the word is *trauil.*

TOIL (for a snare) is any thing *lifted* up or *raised* for a snare. A spider's web is a *toil* (something *lifted* up) to catch flies; springes and nets, *toils* for other animals.

[And I know no better etymology for the verb to *tell,* than this Anglo-Saxon *tilian,* or tal-ian, the Dutch *taelen,* numerare, narrare; and I thus explain the word :—

To *lift* or raise, sc. the articles to be counted, or calculated (the calculi), tossed or thrown, on the counter: and hence to count them, to number or enumerate, to reckon them. Also—

To *raise* or lift, sc. the voice, the sound of the voice: and thus to utter, to narrate, &c. &c. What more common expression, when the speaker does not make himself heard, than " Tell it out;" "raise your voice." Hence *tale* and *talk.*]

TOWN, TUN, TEN. Anglo-Saxon Ton, tone, tun, tyne, past tense, and past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb *Tynan,* to enclose, to encompass, to *tyne.* (Somner, *to teen.*)

TOWN; any number of houses *enclosed* together. Formerly the English subaudition was more extensive, and embraced also any *enclosure;* any quantity of land, &c. enclosed. Dr. Beddoes wrote to Tooke that " in the west of Cornwall every cluster of trees is called a *town* of trees;" that is, trees encompassed or within a certain compass. He adds, that " to *tyne* is still a provincialism."

[In the early version of the Wiclif Bible, " oc-
cludens ostium " is rendered " *tyndynge* to the
dore;" in the latter, " closide the dore." And the
Latin Villa, is usually rendered *a toun ;* " villam
emi—I have bougt a *toun.*"—*Luke* xiv. 18.]

A *tun* (Anglo-Saxon Tunne); and its diminutive
tunnel (Anglo-Saxon Tænel); the former applied
to an enclosure of fluids, to the fluid enclosed, to
a certain weight closed or packed together.

[A TUNNEL ; any smaller enclosure, for smoke,
in its passage out; for liquor in its passage into a
tun or other vessel. And some foreign birds are
described by Derham as *tunnelling* their nests; and
suspending them from trees to keep them out of
the reach of rapacious animals.]

TEN (Anglo-Saxon Tyn, tin, ten) is the same
past participle. The names of colours and winds
have been shown to have a meaning, and the names
of numerals have one also. The number of the
fingers is the utmost extent of numeration; and by
them all numeration was performed. The hands
doubled, closed or shut in, include and conclude all
number. In counting more, you begin again, ten
and one; ten and two, &c. to *twain*-tens, &c. on
to *twain*-tens and one, &c.

The Latin *decem,* Greek δεκα, have been de-
rived from δεχεσθαι, comprehendere: and Tooke
approves. See Vossius, and Scheid in Lennep.

WILE, GUILE . . . The Anglo-Saxon Wigl-ian,
ge-wigl-ian, be-wigl-ian, means to conjure, to di-
vine, consequently to practise cheat, imposture,
and enchantment.

WILE (from Wigl-ian), and *guile* (from ge-wigl-ian), are that by which any one is *deceived*.

GUILT, is Ge-wigled, guiled, guil'd, *guilt;* the past participle of *ge-wigl-ian*. To find *guilt* in any one, is to find that he has been *guiled*, or, as we now say, beguiled; " that is," says Mr. Trench, " instigante diabolo—as it is inserted in all indictments for murder, the forms of which come down to us from a time when men were not ashamed of tracing evil to his inspiration." [*]

. WICKED means *witched*, or bewitched; and to pronounce *guilt* is to pronounce *wicked*.

GULL is merely a person Guiled or beguiled. In *gull* there is no allusion to witchcraft. But *guilt*, being a technical law term, keeps its place in our legal proceedings, as the instigation of the devil does; and with the same meaning.

WROTH, WRATH, WREATH, are the past tense and past participles of the Anglo-Saxon Writhan, torquere, *to writhe*, and speak for themselves.

Raddle (supposed to be so pronounced for *wrath-el*, the diminutive of *wrath*); a *raddle hedge*, is a hedge of pleached or plashed, twisted or *wreathed*, twigs or boughs.

So *riddle*, metaphorically; and *wry* so pronounced for *writh*.

I here conclude my selection from the plentiful abundance of this chapter. The whole number of instances produced in it and the preceding chapters to establish the doctrine of past participles used

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[*] On the Study of Words, Lec. 6.

substantively, that is, with a substantive (an *ali-quid*) understood, amounts, as the author himself informs us, to about 1,000 words. But my selection will present to the reader enough (and perhaps more than enough) to stimulate his curiosity to pursue, as far as his means and opportunities will enable him, the study at least of his own language, on the principles which it has been my task and my endeavour to explain and confirm.

Mr. Trench enlarges, with great energy, on the advantages that will result from such pursuit, especially by analysing groups of words with a view to detect their bond of relationship, and the one root out of which they grow; and when one single word is found to be used in various senses, seemingly far removed from each other, of seeking out the bond which there certainly is between these several uses. This can only be done by getting to the seminal meaning of the word, from which, as from a fruitful seed, all the different usages unfold themselves.

" From this," he proceeds, " we may start with, as lifted above all doubt (and the non-recognition of it is *the!* great fault in Johnson's Dictionary,) that a word has *originally* but *one* meaning, and that all the *others*, however widely they may diverge from one another, and seem to recede from this one, may yet be affiliated upon it, may be brought back to the one central meaning, which grasps and knits them altogether."*

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* On the Study of Words. Lec. 6.

He unhesitatingly entertains the doctrine of past participles, as leading to the accomplishment of the purposes above insisted upon as so desirable. " What a multitude," he observes, " of our nouns, substantive and adjective, are, in fact, unsuspected participles, or are otherwise most closely connected with verbs, with which, notwithstanding, until some one points out the fact to us, we probably never think of putting them in any relation. And yet with how lively an interest shall we discover words to be of closest kin, which we had never considered till now but as entire strangers to one another. What a real increase it will be in our acquaintance with, and mastery of, English, to become aware of such relationship."*

But the views of Horne Tooke extended far beyond those which Mr. Trench has described. He concludes this chapter, so full of novelty, with saying—" On this subject of subaudition, I will exercise your patience no further; . . . But I trust these (words) are sufficient to discard that imagined *operation* of the mind, which has been termed *abstraction,* and to prove, that what we call by that name is merely one of the contrivances of language, for the purpose of more speedy communication."

I now proceed to another class of words " most closely connected with verbs," indeed so closely as to form a part of them.

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* And see ante, STOCK.

CHAP. V.

ON ABSTRACTION (*continued*).

[*Abstract terms formed from the third person singular of the indicative*].

A LE; in Anglo-Saxon Alo*th*, that is, quod accendit, inflammat; from *æl-an*, accendere, &c.
" Ale, noble ale;
No liquor more preserves the natural heat."
Howell.

(See YELLOW, supra, ch. iv.)

BIRTH; that which, or which any one bear*eth*. Anglo-Saxon bear-an.

BROTH; that, &c. briw*eth*, breweth; briw-an, coquere.

BREADTH; LENGTH, &c.

In the same manner are formed our words of admeasurement, *length, breadth, width, depth, heigh* (now written *height*), but by Milton, and our old authors, *heigth*; the same change has taken place in many other words. See infra, DROUGHT, HARM, LIGHT, MIGHT, SIGHT. They are respectively the third persons singular Lenȝeth, Brædeth, Wadeth, Dippeth, Heaf-eth of the indicatives of Lenȝian, extendere; Brædan, dilatare; Wadan, procedere; Dippan, submergere.

DEARTH; that which, some or any season, wea-

ther, or other cause, which *dereth*, that is, maketh *dear*, hurteth or doth mischief, " that produceth scarcity or want." Anglo-Saxon *der-ian*, nocere, lædere. The verb to *dere* was formerly in common use. *Dere* and *deriend* mean hurt and hurting; mischief and mischievous. *Dear*, as consequence of being scarce, wanted, " precious, costly, highly prized or valued," &c. &c. Hence the Lat. *Dirus.*

DROUGHT, Anglo-Saxon Drug*oth;* formerly written dry*eth*, dry*th*, and dri*th;* Anglo-Saxon *dryg*-an, excutere, expellere, and therefore siccare, to *dry;* Hence also, DRAIN (Dræn), fluid (or other thing), excussum, expulsum, and the DRONE (*bee*), excussus, expulsus: Anglo-Saxon Dran, drane, dræn.

EARTH; that, &c. ere*th*, or eare*th*, that is, plougheth; Anglo-Saxon *er*-ian, *ar*-are. *Erd,* used by G. Douglas and other old authors, is er-*ed,* er'*d*, past participle, that which is ploughed, and *tell*-us, that which is *till*-ed; Anglo-Saxon *till*-ian; Latin *toll-ere.*

FAITH; Anglo-Saxon fæg*th*, formerly *faieth;* that which one covenanteth or engageth; *fœg*-an, pangere, *pag*-ere, to engage, to covenant, to contract. Faith is, then, a pledge of fidelity; sc. so to live or believe, and consequently that which we do or should believe,—as Christians, Mussulmen, &c. [The German *fug*-en, *fac*-ere, preserves the original meaning expressed by our old English word, to *fag* or *feg;* and *fœgth*, a covenant, is an extension of signification similar to that of *deed*, an act or fact, of covenant or agreement.]

FILTH, that which file*th*, or as we now write, defileth; Anglo-Saxon Fyl-an.

GIRTH, GARTH; that, &c. girde*th*, gird'*th*, gir*th*, and *garth*, used in some Northern counties for a *yard; "* an enclosure about a house, church, barn, &c." from Anglo-Saxon Gyrd-an, cingere, to gird, to surround, to enclose. Hence also, a yard, a garden; any enclosed space.

GROWTH; that, &c. groweth; Anglo-Saxon Grow-an.

HARM; Anglo-Saxon yrm*th* or jerm*th;* that, &c. harm*eth* or hurt*eth;* Anglo-Saxon *Yrm*-an or Jerm-an, lædere. Harm is one of those third persons from which, as a noun, the final *th* has been dropped. See ante, BREADTH.

HEALTH; that which heal*eth* or maketh one to be *hale* or *whole;* (see ante, HELL, &c.) Anglo-Saxon hel-an, *teg*-ere.

KNAVE, (Anglo-Saxon Cnafa,) was probably Naf-*ath*, that is, ne-hæf-*ath*, ge-naf-*ath;* third person singular of Nabban, that is, ne-hab-an. So ge-*næf*, gen*æfd*, næf-ig, nœfga, are, in Anglo-Saxon, mendicus, egens. So Latin Ne-quam is held by Latin etymologists to mean, ne-quicquam; one who has nothing, neither goods nor good qualities. And to this purpose, CHAUCER, *C. T.* 6772:—

" But he that nought hath, or coveiteth to have,
Is riche, although ye hold him but a *knave.*"

MATH; Anglo-Saxon May-*eth;* that which, or which any one, mow-*eth;* as the latter *math;* that is, later or after the former *mow*-ing; Anglo-Saxon *Maw*-an, met-ere, to mow.

MIGHT; Anglo-Saxon Mæg-*eth* or Mæg*the*, that is, what one *may*-eth; Anglo-Saxon *mæg*-an, posse, valere. *Meath;* a word in very common use in Lincolnshire: "I give thee the *meath* of the buying; option, or full *power* of price and purchase." —*Skinner.* See ante, BREADTH.

MIRTH, MURTHER. Mirth, that which dissipateth; namely, care, sorrow, melancholy, &c. Anglo-Saxon *Myrr*-an. (See ante, MORROW.)

The Anglo-Saxon Mor*th*, Mor*the*, is the Latin *Mors*, that is, quod dissipat (subaud. vitam), third person of the same verb *myrr*-an, to mar, &c. and having the same meaning as *mirth*, but a different application and subaudition. Hence, from Mor*the*, *murth-er*, the French *Meurtre* and Latin *Mors.*

MONTH; Anglo-Saxon mon-*ath*. Moon was formerly written *mone*, and mon*th* mon*eth*; the period in which that planet mon*eth* or completeth her orbit.

MOTH; Gothic *Matjan*, Anglo-Saxon *met*-ian; to eat. *Moth*, an insect that eateth (also *Meat*, whatever is eaten). See TOOTH, infra.

MOUTH; Matj*ith*; that which *eateth.*

RUTH; that which any one *rueth*, moaneth, repenteth. Anglo-Saxon *hreow*-an, lugere, pænitere.

SHEATH; that which *sheath*eth, shadeth, covereth. Anglo-Saxon *scead*-an, segregare. Hence also, *Shade, Shed.*

LIGHT; that which light-*eth;* Anglo-Saxon Leoht-*eth*, leoh*th*, and leo*ht*. Anglo-Saxon Leoht-an, illuminare (*th* dropped, as in Harm).

SLOTH; See ante, SLACK, SLOW.

SMITH; one who smit*eth*, sc. with a hammer, &c. " That in his *forge smithed* plow harneis."—*Dan Gerveis.* But the name was given to all who *smote* with the hammer, &c. for example, Carpenter, and much used in composition.

SIGHT; Anglo-Saxon *sith* and *sithe*, that is, that faculty which *seeth;* Anglo-Saxon *se*-on, to see; also applied to that which we *see.* See ante, BREADTH.

STEALTH; applied to the manner by which one *steal*-eth, or doeth any thing silently or secretly.

STRENGTH; that which *stringeth* or maketh one *strong;* Anglo-Saxon *strang*-ian, valere, præ-valere.

TILTH; that which, any manner of operation which *tilleth,* that is, lifteth, or turneth up, or raiseth the earth.   In Gower, the crafte of plough *tillynge,* is the craft of lifting up the earth with a plough. Anglo-Saxon *til*-ian, *toll*-ere.   See ante, p. 166, TALL, and p. 121, TILT.

TOOTH (Gothic taujith); that which *tuggeth;* Gothic *taujan,* Anglo-Saxon *teog*-an, to tug; Swedish tugga, mandere.

TRUTH.   See infra.

WARMTH; that which *warmeth.*

WATH, WADETH, WAD'TH, WATH; that where any one wadeth; in Lincolnshire applied to a *ford.*

WEALTH; Anglo-Saxon *weleg*-ian, locupletare, to enrich;—that which enricheth. [It is in our early writers, generally, that which *weal*-eth; which acts, effects, the weal or welfare.   " Let Kings, if they

had leuer be Christians indeed, than so to be called, giue themselves altogether to the *wealth* of their realms after the ensample of Jesus Christ."—TYN-DALE. *Obedience of a Christian Man.* Works, v. i. p. 212. (By Russel.)

" Let no man seek his own, but every man an-other's *wealth.*"—1 *Cor.* x. 24.]

TRUTH. Though the first word that we are introduced to in this chapter, is that apple of dis-cord—*truth*, I have, on account of its importance, reserved it for the last. We are taught, in the first place, that—

TRUE (or, as formerly written, *trew*) means that which is *trow*ed; and is the past participle of the Gothic verb *trau*-an, Anglo-Saxon *treow*-an, con-fidere, to think, to believe firmly, to be thoroughly persuaded of, to *trow;* and, in the next place, that of this verb, to *trow,*—

TRUTH (formerly written TROWETH, TROWTH, TROUTH, TROTH) is the third person indicative; and that it means (aliquid, any thing, some thing) that which one *trow*eth, thinketh or firmly be-lieveth. And except only in words (that is, when one thing is thought, and another told), there is nothing but *truth* in the world.

" But *truth* supposes mankind, *for whom,* and *by whom* alone the world was formed, and to whom only it is applicable. If NO MAN, NO TRUTH. There is, *therefore,* no such thing as eternal, im-mutable and everlasting truth; unless mankind, *such as they are at present,* be also eternal, immu-table and everlasting." And again, " There can be

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nothing trow*ed* unless there be some one trow-
ing."*

Now these, to my understanding, appear to be
mere truisms.

Truth pertains to mortal and mutable beings;
it can and will endure, as long as they endure, but
no longer: and the eternity and immutability of
that which pertains to a mortal and mutable being,
and to that being alone, *as such,* is denied.

And this denial need give no alarm to those who
uphold that there is *a* truth (which may be distin-
guished, κατ᾽ εξοχην, as *the* truth), or a thought, a
belief, a right-*wise,* or right-*eous* truth, which it
concerns the happiness of all to comprehend within
their minds; which may be, and should be deduced
from the right reading, the right understanding of
the will of God; and this (as Paley justly ob-
serves) " is the whole business of morality."

It appears to me that the Archbishop of Dublin
entertains an erroneous conception of our Author's
meaning. He charges him with a fallacy " founded
on etymology ;" namely, " when a word is used at
one time in its *customary,* and at another in its
etymological sense." And he proceeds to the
employment of a palpable fallacy himself, in charg-
ing Horne Tooke with contending " that it is idle
to speak of eternal or immutable *truth, because* the

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* If the reader has any desire to learn into what verbal intri-
cacies the contrary doctrine has led our philosophers, let him
read that most erudite " Treatise concerning Eternal and Im-
mutable Morality," by Dr. Cudworth. And it is against such
crazy theories as this that Tooke's hostility is directed.

word is derived from to 'trow,' that is, 'believe.'"
I have quoted the words of Tooke: " If no man,
no truth," there is *therefore*, that is, because man,
that is, mankind, and truth, from beginning to end,
co-exist together, are born and die together; so
long as the think*er* lives, so long will think*ing* live;
and as the think*er* is mortal and mutable, think*ing*
cannot be eternal and immutable.

A fallacy, when treating of fallacies, is the error
of the learned and able Logician; he ascribes to
his opponent an insufficient premiss, which his op-
ponent does not employ; and withdraws a premiss
which his opponent does employ, and does so em-
ploy, because he thinks it, *trows*, or believes it,
sufficient to establish the consequence deduced.

It is simply because nothing eternal and immu-
table can be attributed to man, *as he is at present*,
that the word *truth* is employed to express that
which must perish with him—*thought*.

Dr. Whately asserts that by this imputed fallacy,
" Horne Tooke has furnished a whole magazine of
weapons for any sophist who may need them:"*
but if he has done so, it is quite as true, that he
has furnished a destructive armoury from which
the sophist may be reduced to silence.   But Dr.
Whately is, unawares, arguing from the abuse of
etymology against its use.   His antipathy to its
use even he does not conceal.   " It is worth ob-
serving," he writes, " as a striking instance of the
little reliance to be placed on etymology as a guide

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* Logic, b. iii. § 8.

to the *meaning* of a word," (by the *meaning*, I
presume is intended, what Dr. Whately calls ' the
customary sense,') " that Hypo-stasis, sub-stantia,
and under-standing, so widely different in their"
(customary) " sense, correspond in their etymo-
logy."* And it is thus that he writes, after having
resorted to the etymology of *hypo-stasis* to account
for the adoption of that word by the Greek theo-
logians, and after having produced the etymolo-
gical, that is, the intrinsic meaning (on which the
propriety of every customary sense must depend),
as affording a sufficient reason for their otherwise
unaccountable adopted application of it. " It"
(the word *hypostasis*, Dr. Whately informs us)
" seems calculated to express ' that which stands
under (that is) the subject of attributes.'"

Undoubtedly it does, and as undoubtedly jus-
tifies the appropriation of it to the distressing ne-
cessities of those learned men; and I am much
mistaken if this same etymological meaning will
not account as satisfactorily for the " different "
(customary) " senses," that is, the different appli-
cations of the one meaning, in which we use the
other two—substance and understanding.

SUBSTANCE, we apply to " that which stands
under " (that is, the subject of qualities; the
qualities of matter).

UNDERSTANDING, we apply to " that which
stands under;" that is, the subject of thoughts,
ideas; that on which they are impressed.

Dr. Whately here appears to have furnished,

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* Logic, Appendix, i. § 17.

from his own magazine, a weapon that is strong
enough to repel his attack on the use of Etymo-
logy.*

I have endeavoured to convey a just conception
of Tooke's doctrine.on the meaning and usages de-
duced from the meaning of the word *truth*, by the
following method of explanation:

TROTH or TRUTH, TROW, TRUE.

To TROW; to think, to have thoughts, ideas;
(emphatically) to believe firmly, to be thoroughly
persuaded of; to be convinced of.

TRUE; anciently written *trew* (the regular past
tense and participle of *trow*, as *grew* of *grow*, *knew*
of *know*), means, *trowed*, thought, believed firmly;
agreeable to, conformable to or consistent with
truth; with our thoughts or belief;—faithful, vera-
cious, real.

TRUTH means any thing which any one *troweth*;
thinketh, firmly believeth, is thoroughly persuaded
or convinced of;—belief, faith, fidelity, verity, ve-
racity, reality. And further, with more latitude, it
is applied to—fidelity to laws, rules, promises, en-
gagements;—to honour, honesty, integrity, loyalty,
chastity, &c.

TROTH; that which any one *troweth*, plighteth
to be *true* or *trusty*, or faithful; *Truth*, veracity,
faith, fidelity, fealty.

Piers Ploughman uses the (to us) extraordinary

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* Dr. Whately is editor of a little book entitled " A Selection
of English Synonymes," in which it may be presumed all " reliance
on Etymology " is discarded. Mr. Trench, " On the Study of
Words," adopts a different course: and great are the advantages
resulting from so doing. .

expression, " many a *false* truth." " Arrews feathered with fair byheste" (that is, promise), " and many a false *truth* (that is, deceitful thought or meaning)."

" TRUE and FALSE are attributes of speech, not of things; and where speech is not, there is neither *truth* nor *falsehood.*"—*Hobbes.*

" TRUTH consists in the right ordering of names in our affirmations."—*Id.*

" TRUTH is the conformity of words or signs, by which things are expressed, to the things themselves."—*Wollaston.*

" TRUTH and FALSEHOOD belong in propriety of speech only to propositions."—*Locke.*

" Our ideas, being nothing but bare appearances or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be *true* or false, no more than a single name of any thing can be said to be *true* or false."—*Id.*

I have made this long extract from my Dictionary,* as well for the purpose of showing how our present usages of *true* and *truth* may be traced back to the intrinsic meaning of the words, as of showing how vague were the conceptions of philosophers as to that meaning. Their definitions of *truth* apply not to *truth* itself, or what any man *troweth,* but to the communication of it by speech to others. And Locke's position, that our ideas cannot be *true* or false, is as much as to say, that what a man *troweth* or thinketh, cannot be his *truth* or thought. The quotation from Piers Plough-

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* The 8vo. edition.

man is very explicit, that a man may think or *trow*
one thing, and say another.* And from an old
English Poetical Version of the Athanasian Creed,
quoted in Hickes's Thesaurus (Gram. Anglo-Sax.
et Mæso-Goth. p. 223), we find that there is a *right*
truth, as contradistinguished from a *wrong*.

Who so wil be sauf to blis

Before all thinges nede to is

That he hald with all his miht

The heli *trauthe* and leue (believe) it *riht*.

And again:

That he *trowe* it *trewli*—

Then is ever *trault* (trauthe or truth) *right*.—
P. 234.

I would add to the foregoing explanations that a
customary usage of the word TRUE is—that which
is and has been *trowed* by many, by very many, by
the great majority, in successive ages; and which
is therefore accepted as proved and indisputable;—
and that as a customary usage of the word, TRUTH
is that which many, very many, the great majority,
do *trow*, and have *trowed* in successive ages, and
which we in like manner accept as proved and in-
disputable.

But (it is asked) are the corresponding and the
equivalent words in other languages resolvable in
the same manner as TRUE? Does the Latin *verus*
also mean *trowed?*

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* " Who dares think one thing, and another tell,

My heart detests him, as the gates of hell."

> *Achilles'* Speech to *Ulysses:*—who was not famous for
> telling the truth. *Il.* b. 9.

It means nothing else.   *Res*, a thing, gives us *reor*, that is, I am *thing-ed; Ve-reor*, I am strongly *thing*-ed; for *ve*, in Latin composition, means *valde*, that is, *valide;* and *verum*, that is, strongly impressed upon the mind, is the contracted participle of *ve-reor*.   And hence the distinction between *vereri* and *metuere* in Latin: " *Veretur* liber, metuit servus."*   Hence also *revereor*.

" I am *thinged !*" exclaims Tooke's friend; "whoever used such language before?" and Mr. Stewart participates in his distaste.   Quinctilian calls the Latin *reor*, horrid-um (verb-um).   But it is not a matter of *taste* that is under consideration.   In Anglo-Saxon *thinc, thincȝ, thing*, is their various ways of writing our English noun, *thing*.   And *thinc*-an, *thinc*-ean, is *to think: Me thincth, The thincth*, mihi videtur, tibi videtur;—*Me thuhte, The thuhte*, mihi, tibi visum est, are our old and not uncommon expressions.   Me *thinketh* or *thing-eth* (*c* into *g*); it *thingeth* me, or causeth me *to think*.   Me-*thuhte;* it *thought*, or caused me to think.†

Pr. Where shall we sojourne till our coronation ?
Glo. Where it *thinks* best unto your royal self.
        Richard III. p. 186. Act iii. sc. 1.

Thin*g* was written thin*k* by Bishop Hoper, and nothin*k* is a common cockneyism.

Where it *thinks;* where it seems, or it is seen *best*. Ubicunque videtur.

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* Metuebant servi; verebantur liberi (Appium Claudium Cæcum).   Cic. de Senect. § 37.

† See in Lye the same form of expression in v. *Thyrstan*, it thirsteth me, that is, causes me *to thirst*.

[I have felt no hesitation in defining " THING, that which (any thing) we *think*, or causes us to *think;* that which causes *thought*, sensation, or feeling."*

" Such ways of speaking," says Locke, (sc. that fire *is* light and hot,) " truly signify nothing, but those *powers* which *are* in things *to excite certain sensations* or ideas in us."—B. ii. c. 31.

As *thing* is that which causes us to *think*, is the *cause* of sensations or ideas, so *to think* is the effect; that is, *to* receive, *to* have, sensations or ideas.

The learned languages (it has frequently been remarked) are the usual resort for words, and the formation of words, when our own language seems insufficient for the purpose; or where the coinage would appear too base to be allowed to pass current. The Latin *realis* would probably have struck Quinctilian as an adjective still more horrid than the horrid verb *reor:* when the word was *first* invented has not been ascertained. The *Nominales* Philosophi had classic authority for the existence of their appellation, though not for the use to which they applied it; and their antagonists, the *Reales* Philosophi, stole their model from the camp of the enemy. If in our language our own translators had appended a Latin termination to an English noun, and rendered this Latin *realis,* by an English adjective *thingal,* and had attempted to talk of the *thingality* of things, with as much complacency as we have done, and continue to do, of

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* There is no other means of explaining *thing* than by a sub-audition of *itself*—no other more general term which will comprehend it.

their *reality;* the common sense of our Philoso-
phers would have been as offensively affected as the
taste of Mr. Stewart appears to have been by the
before unheard of expression, " I am thinged;"—
with this advantage, that the word, and with the
word much of the mysterious dogmatism to which
its unhappily adopted Latin prototype has been
devoted, would have been refused admittance into
our Schools of Philosophy.   This verb, to THING,
however, is not introduced with a view to its adop-
tion, but for the single purpose of assisting in the
exposition of the philosophy of speech.

The verbs, to *bethink,* and to *mind,* afford ex-
amples of the same tendency.   CHAUCER, *Canter-
bury Tales,* v. 4401, writes—

" At last his Maister hym *bethought:*"
that is, caused himself to *think.*   And this usage
is common.   *Bethink* yourself; I *bethought* myself;
that is, *cause* yourself to *think;* I *caused* myself to
think.   And *Surrey*—" Æneas full *minded* to de-
part;" that is, having it fully *minted* on his mind.

And the Scotch say, " I never *mind* sermons;"
not as we should mean—I never *heed* sermons;
but I never *mint,* or cause myself to *mint* or im-
press them on my *mind;* or sermons never *mint* or
impress themselves on my mind.

To conclude what I *trow* on these words TRUE
and TRUTH.

If a man tells me what he thinks, he tells me
the truth; if I believe him, *his* truth becomes *my*
truth.   If he proclaims it at market crosses, and
the surrounding multitude believes him, *his* truth

becomes *the* truth of the surrounding multitude. If he tells it to the world, and the world believes him, *his* truth becomes the *world's* truth. And thus we reach to a general or universal truth, or a thought, a belief generally or universally received; and it is thus, probably, that, forgetting our nature, we arrive at the conclusion that what is so generally, so universally believed, must be *immutable* truth. And, further, as there are *truths* that have been accepted from generation to generation, through successive ages, from time immemorial, we conclude also that there must be *everlasting, eternal* truth.

A remarkable instance has lately occurred (and in our Courts of Justice remarkable instances are constantly recurring) of the truth of honest men being opposed to the truth of others equally honest, and in which the truth of a jury was to decide by their true verdict, to which of the truthful parties credit was to be given, for *thinking* (or being *thinged*), for *trowing* rightly and speaking accordingly.

The cause was tried at Edinburgh; and the point at issue was—Whether a certain mineral found on certain lands was or was not COAL?

On one side there appeared as witnesses, gentlemen whose scientific knowledge was undoubted, and whose integrity of character was equally so, who deposed their *truth*, their firm persuasion, that this mineral *was not* coal; and that such was their belief, because they could not, by the help of most powerful microscopes, discern the slightest

traces of vegetable tissue in the sections, frag-
ments, or any sensible parts of the mineral.

On the other side appeared as witnesses, gentle-
men, equally credible on all accounts, who de-
posed their truth, their firm persuasion and belief,
that this mineral *was* coal, and that such was their
belief, because they could and did, by the help of
similar microscopes, discern the plainest traces of
vegetable tissue in the same portions of this same
mineral.

And the jury believed those whose evidence was
positive; not those whose evidence was negative.

It is my belief that the witnesses on both sides
saw the same things; and that these things were
recognized by the one party, but were not so re-
cognized by the other, as forming that tissue or
texture of parts, the existence of which in this mine-
ral was to be decided by their testimony, and on
which decision the verdict of " Coal or no Coal,"
entirely depended. All, witnesses and jurymen,
spoke the *truth.*

Boswell tells us, that Johnson distinguished
between physical and moral truth (as many had
done before him) thus: " Physical truth is, when
you tell a thing exactly as it is; moral truth is,
when you tell a thing sincerely and precisely as it
appears to you. I say, such a one walked across
the street: if he really did so, I told a physical
truth. If I thought so, though I should have
been mistaken, I told a moral truth." *

Common sense, and our common law, recognize

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* Boswell, v. iv. p. 338, 8vo. ed.

the distinction intended by Johnson (and which would be now expressed by the terms objective and subjective). To constitute the *crime* of perjury, the *false truth* (to use the words of Piers Ploughman), the false swearing "must be corrupt (that is, committed malo animo), *wilful*, positive, and absolute, not upon surprise, or *the like.*"*

And what are the conditions of the instances stated by Johnson? Simply these—

That in what he calls a Physical Truth—

The Truth is as the fact is—they coincide.

In what he calls a Moral Truth—

The Truth is not as the fact is; they do not coincide.

The application of the word differs, but the meaning is the same: coincidence, or no coincidence, forms no part of it. We cannot divest it of its meaning. We may, as the poet says of Nature, toss it out with a pitch-fork, but incontinently it will return.

And now, I hope I may indulge myself in the satisfaction of believing that I have so represented, so illustrated the doctrine of the "Diversions of Purley" on this grand word, *truth*, as at least, to place the composers of systems, and their disciples, on their guard in their manner of employing it. And I further hope another result may be anticipated; that by an extension of mutual charity, in the intercourse of the world we may be induced to allow that men may tell *their* truth, on occasions when it is quite at variance with our own.

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* Blackstone, iv. 137.

I have, I trust, already disposed of the "Philological Nostrum of past participles" imputed to our Author by Professor Stewart; and I now, as I also trust, have performed the same service to Dr. Whately's "Fallacy Founded on Etymology." And it does not appear to me that I could find a better opportunity than the present, while the preceding etymologies are fresh in the memory of the reader, for noticing another, and that most important error, and consequent misconception, in which these two distinguished writers equally participate.

"Mr. Tooke," says the Professor, "assumes as a principle, that in order to ascertain with precision the philosophical import of any word, it is necessary to trace its progress historically through all the successive meanings, which it has been employed to convey from the moment that it was first introduced into our language; and if the word be of foreign growth, that we should prosecute the research till we ascertain the literal and primitive sense of the root from whence it sprang. It is in this literal and primitive sense alone, that according to him, a philosopher is entitled to employ it even in the present advanced state of science, and whenever he annexes to it a meaning at all different, he imposes equally upon himself and others."*

To the Professor I reply, that Tooke's doctrine is simply this: That from the etymology of the word we should fix the intrinsic meaning; that that meaning should always furnish the cause of

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* Philosophical Essays, pp. 165 and 190, 4to. ed.

the application, and that no application of any word
is justifiable for which that meaning will not supply
a reason; but that the usage of any application so
supported is not only allowable but indispensable.

Indeed, in endeavouring to establish the origin
of a very numerous class of words, he assumed,
and was forced to assume, a diversity of application,
and it was solely for a meaning to justify this di-
versity that he pursued these terms to their source.
And those are not the least curious parts of his
book, in which he shows the same words to be
differently written—a difference introduced and
confirmed merely for the sake of preserving a dis-
tinct difference of application in *usage*. I say
usage, from a conviction that these different modes
of writing might *by usage* have interchanged their
different applications, and it would be a matter of
no great difficulty to produce instances in which
an interchange has actually occurred. The mean-
ing, nevertheless, remains uniform, unvarying, and
invariable; the application and subaudition as un-
limited as the numberless necessities of speech.

Dr. Whately represents that Tooke's principle
is this: " That the meaning and force of a word,
now and for ever, must be that which it or its root
originally bore." And this, he asserts, is absolutely
false.

If Dr. Whately intends that Tooke insists " the
radical intrinsic meaning to be now and for ever
the same," he is right in so doing; and Tooke is
right also.

If Dr. Whately intends that Tooke insists " the

application of the word, that is, our meaning in
applying it, must be in the radical, intrinsic mean-
ing, the literal, primitive sense, and in no other,"
he is wrong in so doing; Tooke insists upon no
such absurdity.

Dr. Whately supplies an instance, which pre-
sents an easy explanation of what it is that Tooke
actually does insist upon; and I hope by its aid to
remove the misapprehension under which he la-
bours, as I hope to have removed that, under which
the eminent Professor had unfortunately laboured
before him.   The two, indeed, are substantially
the same.

" He might as well," exclaims the Doctor, " have
insisted that *sycophant* can never mean any thing
but *fig-shower*."   There is no doubt that Tooke
would so have insisted; and there is as little
doubt that he would have insisted upon no more
than an obvious fact: and one I hope, very briefly,
so to represent as to ensure the conviction of the
Right Reverend Archbishop himself.

It matters little to the purpose, whether the
original application of the compound word, *syco-
phant*, adopted by Dr. Whately, or the common
one * be correct.

A *syco-phant*, or *fig-shower*, might be originally
applied to him, philosopher or not, who showed
his fig—in token of a challenge to a contest; and
thence might its application to any challenger be
deduced, whether showing his token or not, to any
one provoking strife, or litigation, or quarrel; and

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* See Plut. De Curiositate, c. 16.

hence applied to what the English law denominates
a common Barrator: then, 1. to an informer; 2. to
an informer of any thing pleasing, gratifying, flat-
tering to the hearer; to a flatterer, to a parasite.
Or it might be originally applied to him who
showed, gave evidence,—informed that figs were
(contrary to law) carried out of Attica; and thence
the same applications be deduced as above set
forth.

The word *syco-phant* still retains its meaning;
challenger, informer, parasite, flatterer, never enter
into *it,* never become whole or part of it; that
word still *means,* that is, means etymologically,
and ever must so mean, *a fig-shower,* and nothing
else; but in any *application* founded upon this
meaning, and inferred from it, (as in the above ex-
planation, every application is inferred,) the word
may be used to denote the meaning of the speaker,
and is so used with propriety. The meaning or
intention of the speaker in using the word, may be
very different from the meaning of the word itself;
but there must be some inference or deduction in
the mind of the speaker, known to the hearer,
which will warrant the usage. And such is the
clear and decided doctrine of Horne Tooke. The
misconceptions of Professor Stewart, and Dr.
Whately, originate in this: that they have not
distinguished the application or customary usages
from the intrinsic meaning so strongly and repeat-
edly insisted upon in the " Diversions of Purley."

As rationally indeed might it be asserted, that
the thing—*a fig shown,* when intended to signify a

challenge to disputation, changed its nature, and
was no longer a fig shown, as that the word, *syco-
phant*, when intended to signify a challenger, no
longer meant a fig-shower. The thing was a vi-
sible sign of a purpose intended, by one party, and
so understood by another—and the word, an au-
dible sign of equivalent, intent, and import.

Lord Brougham charges our Author with main-
taining that which, without abandoning his own
principles, he could not maintain; namely, that he
would hold the *law* of Libel to be absurd and un-
just, because the word libel means a little book.
We have I think Tooke's own testimony, that he
would hold no such thing; nor can it be maintained
that he ought, as a consequence from his own
principles, to hold such a doctrine. As he well
understood so he would strictly observe, the dis-
tinction between the legal application and the in-
trinsic meaning of the word. He made no com-
plaint, when the opportunity was before him, and
invited him so to do, against the *law* of libel; his
complaint was, that in the information against him
the law was not complied with; that the crime,
for which he was prosecuted, was not described in
that plain language, which, by the law relating to
libel, he had a right to expect.*

I will put together a few general remarks, scat-
tered through the pages of his work, which ought
to remove all misapprehensions of our Author's
principles.

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* Diversions of Purley, v. 1.   Advertisement, Note.

Of great importance it surely is, "that we should have a clear understanding of the words we use in discourse. For as far as we know not our own meaning; as far as our purposes are not endowed with words to make them known—so far ' we gabble like things most brutish.' But the importance rises higher, when we reflect upon the *application* of words to metaphysics; and all general reasoning, all politics, law, morality, and divinity are merely metaphysic."

It is however " a trifling etymology, that barely refers us to some word in another language, either the same or similar;—nor is it sufficient to produce instances of the use of a doubtful word, from which to conjecture its meaning; though instances are fit to be produced in order, by the use of the word, to justify the offered etymology. Interpreters, who thus seek the meaning of a word singly from the passages in which it is found, usually connect with it the meaning of some other word or words in the sentence. A regard to the individual etymology of the word would secure them from this error, and conduct them to the *intrinsic meaning* of the word, and the *cause of its application.*—All etymological pursuit beyond this, is merely for the gratification of a childish curiosity, in which the understanding takes no share, and from which it can derive no advantage. That " word is always sufficiently original in that language where its meaning, which is the cause of its application, can be found.—Nor should it occasion surprise or discouragement, that words so

different *in their present application*, should be
traced to the same origin; for it is the necessary
condition of all languages; it is the lot of man, as
of all other animals, to have few different ideas
(and there is a good physical reason for it), though
we have many words; and yet even of them we
have by no means so many, of different significa-
tions, as we are supposed to have."

CHAP. VI.

*[The three remaining chapters are devoted to
adjectives and participles.]*

OF ADJECTIVES.

THEY and the Participles, it must be remem-
bered, were originally assumed as the pecu-
liar province of this work.   Prepositions, conjunc-
tions and adverbs have been resolved, in the first
volume, into one or the other of the two necessary
parts of speech; into nouns or verbs.   Adjectives
and participles are useful for despatch; and, having
a different manner of signification, are properly in-
cluded in the arrangement of the parts of speech
in our grammars.

But what, it is asked, are these adjectives and
participles by which the doctrine of abstraction
has in the preceding chapters been set aside?

What is an adjective?   Lowth tells us, that it

is not a noun; it is not the name of a thing; and
Harris, that it should not have been ranged with
nouns, as it never denotes *substances;* but with
verbs, as both denote attributes: that is, accidents
and qualities. Some of their ablest predecessors*
differ from Lowth and Harris; and our own coun-
trymen, Wilkins and Wallis, among the number.
Wallis asserts, that the *Adjectivum respectivum* is
nothing else than the very substantive word itself,
adjectivè posita; that is to say, it is a substantive
put in apposition with another substantive. *Gold*
and *brass* are names of things, and denote sub-
stances. If we say a gold-ring, a brass-tube, here
are substantives, *adjectivè posita,* yet names of
things, and denoting substances.

If we say a golden ring, a brazen tube, the ter-
mination couples the two words instead of the
hyphen; and the adjectives golden, brazen, denote
the same things as gold, brass. Nothing is taken
away from, nothing is added to, their signification,
but what is contained in the termination *en.* The
three adjective terminations *en, ed,* and *ig* (our
modern *y*), mean *give, add, join,* and thus designate
this added circumstance, that the substantives, to
which they are added as terminations, are to be
joined to some other substantive: and this single
added circumstance (called by Wilkins that of *per-
taining* to) is the only difference between a sub-
stantive and an adjective; between gold and golden.

Wallis proposes to call our possessive case,

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* Scaliger, Sanctius, Scioppius, Vossius.

formed by the termination *'s* or *es*—*Adjectivum possessivum;* and the common grammatical rule that an adjective cannot stand alone in a sentence, might induce Wallis so to call it, for *man's* cannot stand alone any more than *human*. In both cases we expect another name of a thing. No oblique cases stand alone ; so that this circumstance of not standing alone, is not confined to the adjective.

Grammarians have maintained that adjectives represent only *accidental* qualities; that substantive and accident were the foundation of the difference between the substantive and adjective; yet *human* goodness, and *man's* goodness, have precisely the same meaning; and if the adjective *human* represent an *accidental* quality, so must the oblique case *man's.*

In the expression a *good* man ; *good* represents all the ideas signified by the term *goodness ;* all the difference between the substantive and adjective is, that by the latter part of speech we are by " some small difference in termination, enabled, when we employ the sign of an idea, to communicate at the same time that such sign is then meant to be added to another sign, in such a manner as that the two signs together may answer the purpose of one complex term. This contrivance is merely an abbreviation in the sorts of words to supply the want of an abbreviation in terms," which latter abbreviation we can sometimes effect; as though we have no complex term for good man, we have for *holy man.*

The *hyphen* supplies a deficiency in our lan-

guagé: it is not a word or letter because it is not
the sign of a sound; but it is, what every word
should be, the sign of an idea; with this difference,
that it is conveyed to the eye only, and not to the
ear. In our language we are sometimes obliged to
have recourse to it; thus, sea-weed, shell-fish,
hail-storm, &c. are necessary compounds; as we
have not any complex term to express these collec-
tions of ideas, nor any termination to indicate our
intention of adjecting. Such words as sea, shell,
hail, our old grammarian, Gill, calls by the name of
substantiva sterilia, because they produce no ad-
jective.*

The adjective is therefore well called Noun-ad-
jective; for it is the name of a thing, which may
coalesce with another name of a thing.

Were it true that adjectives were not the names
of things, there could be no attribution by adjec-
tives, for you cannot *attribute nothing.* They must,
as substantives do, denote substances, and substance
is attributed to substance by the *adjective* contri-
vance of language. Substances, essences, accidents,
are equally indifferently denoted, sometimes by
grammatical substantives, and sometimes by *gram-
matical* adjectives.

[It is this doctrine that our Author has so ela-
borately and effectually exerted himself to estab-
lish: and the value of his exertions will be the more

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* For the various offices of the hyphen, see my English Dic-
tionary. Also Mr. Guest's paper in the " Proceedings of the
Philological Society," No. 113.

highly estimated by those who are acquainted with
the monstrous consequences that were introduced
by metaphysical theologians; one most eminently
conspicuous, was no less than this, that in the
sacrament of the Lord's Supper there was a con-
version of the *substance* of the bread and wine
into the *substance* of the body and blood of Christ;
of the bread into the body, and of the wine into
the blood; but that the *accidents* or qualities re-
mained unchanged.   The Romish Church was
driven to this subtlety, in order to evade, what it
could not resist, the evidence of the *senses*.

" *These* ever plainly witness that even after the
supposed change of the bread and wine in the
Supper into the body and blood of Christ, yet
nothing but the appearance, smell, taste, and other
qualities of bread and wine are received.   In op-
position to this a distinction is made between sub-
stance and qualities ('or accidents'), it being main-
tained that the former has undergone a change,
while the latter remain as before; however much
this ran contrary to simple comprehension, which
plainly teaches us that substance and qualities
cannot be separated, since the former is known by
the latter, and the latter are determined by the
former."*]

To return to our adjectives.   We have adjec-
tives ending in *ly, ous, ful, some, les, ish*, &c.; all
of which are *compound* words; the termination
being originally a word added to those other

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* D'Aubigné, History of the Reformation, v. i. p. 147, note.

words, of which it now seems merely the termination, though it still retains its original and distinct signification. These terminations are now more numerous in our language than they were formerly; for our ancestors borrowed and incorporated many adjective terminations which we did not want; so that in some words we have a choice; such as bountiful, bounteous, beautiful, beauteous. And we have not only borrowed terminations, but instead of adjectiving our own substantives, we have borrowed, in immense numbers, adjectived signs from other languages, without always borrowing the unadjectived signs of those same ideas; and neglected to improve our own language by the same contrivance within itself—*Mind* is our own word. *Mental, magnanimous,* &c. are from the Latin, and a list of about two hundred substantives, with their foreign adjectives, is given in the work.

Adjectives, though convenient abbreviations, are not* necessary to language; and are, therefore, not ranked amongst the parts of speech. In the misapprehension of this useful and simple contrivance of language may be discovered one of the foundations of those heaps of false philosophy and obscure (because mistaken) metaphysics, with which we have been bewildered. We *may* learn what to do with all the technical impertinence about *qualities, accidents,* substrata, essence, the adjunct nature of things, &c. &c. And to proceed with our Author

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* An account is given of a tribe of North American Indians, who had no adjectives in their language.

to " a very different sort of logic and critic than
what we have been hitherto acquainted with;"
of which a knowledge of the nature of language
and of the meaning of words is a necessary fore-
runner.   .

CHAP. VII.

OF PARTICIPLES.

W E had formerly but two of these participles;
the present (as it is called) and the past;
but our old translators borrowed from other lan-
guages and incorporated with our own *four* other
participles of equal value. As with the adjectives,
so with the participles, they did not *abbreviate* their
own language in imitation of the others, but took
from other languages their abbreviations ready
made.   The elder Stoics called this word *Modum
verbi casualem;* they would have said better *adjec-
tivum,* as the circumstance of having cases was only
a consequence of adjection.   Instead of *participle,*
then, let this word be called generally a *verb adjec-
tive.*   We have the same occasion to adjective the
verb as to adjective the noun; and, by means of a
distinguishing termination, not only the simple *verb*
itself, but every *mood* and every *tense* of the verb
may be made adjective, as well as the *noun.*   And
accordingly some languages have adjectived more,
and some languages have *adjectived* fewer, of these
moods and tenses, which are themselves merely ab-

breviations; that is, nothing more than the circum-
stances of manner and time added to the verb; in
some languages by distinguishing terminations.
The greatest part of this *modal* and *temporal* abbre-
viation we are forced to perform by *auxiliaries;*
that is, separate words signifying the added circum-
stances. The verb adjective has all that the noun
adjective has (as Perizonius had observed),* and
something more, because the verb has something
more than the noun.

There are now six of these verb adjectives em-
ployed in English, namely, the simple verb itself
adjective; two adjective tenses, and three adjective
moods.

1. The verb adjective.
2. The past tense adjective.
3. The potential mood active adjective.
4. The potential mood passive adjective.
5. The official mood passive adjective.
6. The future tense active adjective.

(1.) The simple verb adjective formerly terminated
in *and;* now in *ing.* As the noun adjective signi-
fies all that the unadjectived noun signifies, and no
more (except the circumstance of adjection), so
must the verb adjective signify all that the unad-
jectived verb signifies, and no more (except the
circumstance of adjection), but neither does *the in-
dicative mood, present tense,* nor the present parti-
ciple, as they are called, contain any adsignification
of manner or of time; its proper name is merely

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* Vide Sanctii Minervam, cap. 15, n. 1.

the *verb*. In this opinion, as to the adsignification
of manner or time, there is nothing new or singu-
lar. Sanctius* both asserted and proved it by nu-
merous instances in the Latin, from which a selec-
tion is made:

" Et *abfui (past) proficiscens* in Græciam."—*Cic.*
Ep.

" Sed postquam amans *accepit (past)* pretium
pollicens."—*Terent.*

" Ultro ad eum *venies (fut.) indicans* te amare."
—*Terent.*

" Turnum *fugientem* hæc terra *videbit.*"—*Virg.*

" *Tum* apri inter se *dimicant* indurantes attritu
arborum costas."—*Plin.*

In the same manner we say, " Truth *is* always
one and the same, from the beginning of the world
to the end of it."

Perizonius is opposed to this: " Animadver-
tendum est," he says, " *præsens* verè *participium*
posse accedere omnibus omnino periodis, in quibus
etiam de *præterita* et *futura* re agitur." And then,
after this admission of the fact, he proceeds to say,
" Quia in præterrita illa re, quum gesta est, *præ-
sens fuit;* et in futura, item præsens erit."†

This is denounced as a mere evasion, since " a
common termination (that is, a coalesced word) like
every other word must always convey the same
distinct meaning, and can only then be properly
used, quando *distinctio* requiritur."

(2.) The past tense adjective does signify the cir-
cumstance of time (or tense), in Latin by distinct

terminations, and in English by termination and auxiliaries. In English we sometimes add the terminations *ed* or *en*, and sometimes use the past tense itself, without any change of termination (though this latter custom has greatly decreased). The Latin makes an adjective of the past tense (as of the noun) by adding its article ος, η, ον, to the third person of the past tense—

 Amavit, amavit*us*, amavtus, amatus.

 Docuit, docuit*us*, docitus, doctus.

 Legit, legit*us*, legtus, lectus.

 Audivit, audivit*us*, audivtus, auditus.

But as we often adject one substantive without any sign of adjection to another substantive, so are we accustomed to use the past time without any sign of adjection; a practice which Lowth seriously condemns as " an abuse long growing upon us and continually making further encroachments," though he produces instances of this barbarism from many of our best writers. It is indeed the idiom of our language, though from greater familiarity with the Greek and Latin languages, we have yielded to their rules and customs. And since we can use our noun itself unaltered and our past tense itself unaltered, for the same purpose and with the same meaning, as the Greek and Latin use their adjective and their participle; it is manifest that their adjective and participle are merely their noun and past tense adjectived.

The difference between the noun and past tense adjectived in our language, will be apparent enough on comparison of such words as the following :—

A golden salver	A gilded or gilt frame
The landed interest	The troops have landed
Fat and *fleshy*	A well fleshed sword
A lovely child	A loved wife
A famous man	A famed exploit
A dreadful storm	A dreaded tyrant
A loathly toad	A loathed toad
Loathful idleness	Loathed idleness
Loathsome life	Loathed life

CHAP. VIII.

PARTICIPLES (*continued*).

(3.) THE potential passive adjective; that is, having manner or mood adjectived.

Under this new name we have our familiar terminations in *able* and *ible;* which Tooke, asserting that whatever the Latin has not from the Greek it has from the Gothic, believes to be originally the Anglo-Saxon or Gothic Ãbal, robur: and in this belief he is supported by Junius, who thinks it plain that we do not owe our own word *able* to the Romans, and refers to a passage in Cædmon, in which this word Ãbal is used, in confirmation of his opinion. As a termination, however, together with the contraction *ile,* we took it from the Latins, and took it very early to free ourselves from the periphrasis by which our oldest translators felt obliged to explain themselves.

[In 2 Cor. ix. 15. the Latin *inerrabilis* is (I find) in one version rendered, " *that may not be teld*," and in another, supposed to be earlier, it is (as in the MS. quoted by Tooke) " *unenarrable*, or that may not be told." And in the very next chap. v. 1. (as I also find), sermo *contemptibilis* is in the one, " the word worthi to be *dispisid;*" and in the other, " the word *contemptible*, or worthi for to be dispysid." In *James* iii. 17, the Latin *suadibilis* is in the one version, "*Able* to be counseiled;" and in the other (as in Tooke's MS.), " *suadible*," that is, " esy for to treete, or to be treetid." And in the fifth ch. v. 17, Elias homo erat similis nobis *passibilis*—is, in the one version, "Elye was a *deedli* man lyk us;" and in the other, " Helye was a man lijk us, *passible*, or *able for to suffre*."] Again, in *Acts* xxvi. 23, si *passibilis* Christus, in the one version is, " If Crist *is* to suffre;" and in the other, " If Crist *passible* or able to suffre."]

The best classic authors used their termination, *bilis, passively;* some few examples to the contrary are produced, and after the corruption and decay of the Latin language they are found in abundance; as they may also be found (and the fact seems remarkable) in the *old* comedian, Plautus. Though it appears that our early translators introduced the *passive* signification when the Vulgate Latin set them the example; yet, as in the instance of *passibilis*, they were occasionally misled. [Other such instances may be found; the Latin, *delectabile aspectu, delectabile oculis,* are rendered *delitable.* The Latin *desiderabile* is rendered both *desiderable* and

desireful.] And a large number of *active* usages
soon followed, which Tooke proceeds to account
for in the following (rather circuitous) manner :
that they were taken from the French, who cor-
rupted them from the Italian, thus,—our Anglo-
Saxon *full,* in German *vol,* became the Italian *vole,*
—a sound pleasing to the Italian ear ; and they add-
ed it to their words without sufficient regard to its
signification, and where, I may add, our termination
full would have been wholly inadmissible.   Hence
their abomine*vole,* amiche*vole,* cape*vole,* and many
others, which the French by slovenly pronunciation,
and not distinguishing between *bile* and *vole,* trans-
formed into abomin*able,* amic*able,* cap*able,* &c. &c.
And thus our own word *full,* passing through the
German, Italian, and French, comes back to us in
the corrupt shape of *ble ;* confounding those termi-
nations whose distinct application and employment
are so important to the different and distinct pur-
poses of speech.

We have various other corrupt terminations in
ble, as double, treble, fable, table, syllable, dis-
semble ; from the Latin duplum, triplum, fabula,
tabula, syllaba, dissimulare, etc. and tumble, grum-
ble, crumble, etc. from the Dutch tumnelen, grom-
melen, kruimelen, etc.

(4.) The potential active adjective (that is, having
manner or mood adjectived).   For this we have
two terminations ; *ive,* borrowed from the Latin,
and corrupted from the substantive *vis,* and *ic,* from
the Greek, corrupted from the substantive ισχυς.
These terminations are thus contrasted by Scaliger
with the Latin *ilis (bilis)* :—

" Duas autem habuere apud Latinos, totidem apud Græcos terminationes; in *ivus*, activam: in *ilis* (*bilis*) passivam: Sic Græci, αισθητικον, id quod sensu præditum est, αισθητον* quod sensu percipi potest."—*De Causis*, L. iii. cap. 98. Thus in English, *sensitive* (that which is), endued with sense, that can or may feel, and *sensible*, that can or may be felt. Yet this word *sensible* we employ in three different meanings, though we have three distinct terminations for the purpose of expressing those meanings. We have sense-*ful*, sensit-*ive*, sens-*ible*, —full of sense; which can feel; which may be felt. And yet we talk of, " A *sensible* man, who is very *sensible* of the cold, and of any *sensible* change in the weather."

I subjoin a few instances of Greek distinction:

Ακουστικος; that can or may hear; *auditive*.

Ακουστος; that can or may be heard; *audible*.

Ορατικος; that can or may be seen; *visive*.

Ορατος; that can or may be seen; *visible*.

Audit*ive* we have not in general use.†

Audi*ble* is common enough, so is *visible;* and vis*ive* is correctly used by Berkeley. All the abbreviations which we have in *ive* are from the Latin, and those in *ic* from the Greek. Tooke asserts that we have not one single word of Anglo-Saxon origin, whose potential mood active is adjectived. He had forgotten—

" The Coxcomb Bird so *talkative* and grave."

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* Words with this termination are called by Greek grammarians verbals in τος.

† It may be found in Cotgrave, in v. Auditif.

The word is common in our best writers and in our current speech.

With the greater number of these abbreviations in *ive* we have not taken the unabbreviated verb: thus ablat*ive,* aperit*ive,* cresc*ive.*

So with the Greek *ic;* analyt*ic,* apologet*ic,* caust*ic.*

The French have immoderately abused these terminations, and we have in some instances followed their example.   Thus *missive* is adopted by Shakespeare and others, and even by Dryden, who uses it for the contraction *missile.*   He might have added by Swift and Pope; the latter writes *missile* and *missive* with the same meaning.

(5.) The official mood passive adjective is a name adopted *from distress.*   It is intended to signify that mood or manner of using the verb by which we might couple the notion of *duty* with it; by which we might at the same time and in conjunction with it, express τα δεοντα, the things which ought, and the things which ought not, to be done. Most ancient grammarians called this the *modum participialem.*   We have made little use of this mood: the words which we have adopted in it being barely these; Legend, reverend, dividend, prebend, memorandum; and several of these are abused in their application.

LEGEND; that which ought to be read.

REVEREND; that which ought to be revered.

DIVIDEND; that which ought to be divided, though the receiver means no such thing.

PREBEND; that which ought to be afforded,

though not uncommonly applied to him who receives it.

Tooke omits our common words, stupend-ous, tremend-ous. These expressions, however, *is to,* or *is to be,* are all that we have *of our own* to supply the place of this adjective, of the potential passive adjective, and also of the future tense adjective.

We use our own home-bred circumlocutory expression *is to be* when translating from the Latin, and anciently *is to;* thus Chaucer renders *spernendus* from Boethius, *is to dispise;* and I find in the Nonnes Prestes Tale (the Cock and Fox), Chaucer writing, " Many a dreme ful sone is for *to drede;*" And Dryden, " Here may you see that visions are *to dread.*"

To the present time too, we say " *is to blame,*" when speaking of a person or action *that ought to be* blamed; *Culpandum.*

(6.) The future tense adjective, in which we have only two words, Future, venture, or adventure. The awkwardness of our substitutions for this future tense adjective will be manifest upon examining the ancient, and even the modern, versions of passages where this *future* abbreviation is to be found.

[This awkwardness, however, was transmitted to us from the Anglo-Saxon. In *Matt.* xi. 3. 14. the Latin *venturus* is in the Anglo-Saxon version rendered to com-*enne,* and in the early version of the Wiclif Bible, to cumm-*ynge:* in the later, He that schal *come. Ventura ira* is also in the early version, Wraththe to com-*ynge;* and in the later, That *schal* come: so also, He is to dem-*ynge;* he

is to tak*ynge :* in the early,—is in the later, He that *schal* deme, He that *schal* take ; from Latin *judicaturus, accepturus.*   And Dæg to com-*enne ;* day to *come.*   The participial termination *ing* seems formed from this Anglo-Saxon infinitive (which Hickes calls *infinitivus derivatus*) *enne,* or ig-*enne.*

It is worthy of remark that the participial termination *end* or *and,* is common in the early version of the Bible, and *ynge* in the later. Substantives in *ung* existed at the same time with this participle in *and ;* it was a common termination in the Northern languages. And hence probably our confusion of substantives in *ing* and participles in *ing.*   See the Grammars of Wallis, Lowth, Crombie, &c.

This future abbreviation ought at once to have been snatched immediately from the Latin, for these abbreviations are of great importance.   A short, close, and compact method of speech answers the purpose of a map upon a reduced scale ; it assists greatly the comprehension of our understanding, and, in general reasoning, frequently enables us at one glance to take in very numerous and distant important relations and conclusions, which would otherwise totally escape us.

" And here," says our Author, " we conclude our discussion for the present.   It is true that my evening is now fully come, and the night fast approaching ; yet if we shall have a tolerably lengthened twilight, we may still perhaps find time enough for a farther conversation on this subject ; and finally (if the times will bear it) to apply this system of language to all the different systems of metaphysical (that is, verbal) imposture."

That this twilight, which has now long sunk in darkness, should be so employed, was most devoutly to be wished; and, as Mr. Tooke declared in 1798, that all he had further to communicate upon the subject of language had then been amongst his loose papers for upwards of thirty years, I, for a long time, thought I might indulge a reasonable hope that we should be permitted to accompany him to the close of his speculations; but that hope has sustained its disappointment.

What is truth? said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an *answer.* What is the verb? exclaims the serious reader of the Επεα Πτεροεντα, and cannot obtain *one.*

WHAT IS THE VERB?

TO this question it is now incumbent upon me to address myself, and I shall in the first place collect some remarks scattered through the work, in order to ascertain, if possible, what something *more* it is, in the *author's* conception, that belongs to the *verb* than belongs to the *noun,* and then to determine what name, in consequence, it will be proper to impose upon that necessary part of speech.*

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* To the definitions of the verb, quoted by Tooke, add the two following:

"Verbum est pars orationis attributum de subjecto affirm*ans.*" —Hickes, *Gram. Franco-Theotisca,* p. 62.

Dalgarno, Ars Signorum, allows only one part of speech, the *noun.*

Cæteras vero vulgatas sic habitas esse inter flexiones casus hujus numerabo.

In the first place, as to the use of the verb, it is necessary to repeat what we were early told, " That the business of the *mind*, as far as it concerns language,* extends no further than to receive impressions, that is, to have sensations or feelings. What are called *its* operations are merely the operations of language.† A consideration of *ideas*, or of the *mind*, or of *things* (relative to the parts of speech), will lead us no farther than to NOUNS, that is, the signs of these impressions or names of ideas. The other part of speech, the *verb*, must be accounted for from the necessary use of it in communication. It is, in fact, the communication itself; [the communication, that is, of those ideas or impressions of which nouns are the signs;] and therefore well denominated Pημα, dictum. For the verb is *quod* loquimur; the noun de *quo*."‡

We are met at the outset with a declaration that the verb does not imply an assertion. How then, it is asked, is the verb *Ibo* to be accounted for? By showing that *Ibo* is not the simple verb, but that, though containing only three letters, it consists of three words; two verbs and a pronoun. In the Greek verb I-εναι (from the ancient Εω, or modern Ειμι); in the Latin, *I*-re, and the English verb, to *hie*, or to *hi*, Anglo-Saxon *Hig*-an, the infinitive termination, εναι, and *re* (and he might have included the Anglo-Saxon *an*), make no more a part of the Greek and Latin (and Anglo-Saxon) verbs,

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* Chap. 3.   † See ante, ch. 2.
‡ Veteres—in verbis vim sermonis, in nominibus materiam (quia alterum est *quod* loquimur, alterum de *quo* loquimur) esse judicaverunt.—QUINT. l. i. c. 4.

than our infinitive prefix *to* makes a part of the
English verb *to hie*. The pure and simple verbs
are *I* (or E*ι*) in the Greek; *I* in the Latin; and
Hie or *Hi* in the English. Inverting our common
order of speech, *Ich wol* (I will) *Hie* or *Hi* to suit
the order of the Greek and Latin, the assertion in
the three languages will stand thus:—

Hi	Wol	Ich		Go
I	Vol	O, that is, Ego	}	will
I	βουλ	Eω, that is, Eγω		I

In the Greek βουλ only is the verb; in the La-
tin *vol;* in the English *wol* (will). *O* in the Latin,
and Eω in the Greek, are the pronouns Eγω, *Ego;*
not far from our own old English pronoun *Ich* or
ig.

A Latin and Italian verb, in the same future
tense, are thus resolved:

Audi-*bo* was the ancient form; then audi-*am.*

Audi-(re)	Vol-o	I *will* to hear
Audi-(re)	Am-o	I *desire* to hear
Udir-(e)	H-o	I *have* to hear.

It is quite clear that our Author's process in the
construction of words is that of *adjection*.

1. We have the simple *noun* (called substan-
tive for the sake of distinction), the name of our
impressions or ideas. Cases and numbers are
formed by adjection of terminations having distinct
meanings of their own.

2. Then we have the noun made adjective by
the addition of a final syllable directing the adjec-
tion of another noun, and from them in like manner
some adverbs are formed.

3. Then comes again the noun, the mere noun, which in English is made a verb by the adjection of *to* placed before it, and in the Greek, Latin, and other languages by their respective terminations, each with its distinct meaning. Our *to* supplanted the Anglo-Saxon *an.*

In To, then, thus adjected or preposed to the noun, we are to find the difference between the mere noun and the noun invested with the verbal character.

We must therefore return to the preposition To, which is so important a word, that nothing said of it can be with propriety omitted. We must bear in mind our Author's derivation;* for "After this derivation, it will not appear in the least mysterious or wonderful that we should, in a peculiar manner in English, prefix this same word To to the infinitive of our verbs. For the verbs, in English, not being distinguished, as in other languages, by a peculiar termination, and it being sometimes impossible to distinguish them by their *place*, when the old termination of the Anglo-Saxon verbs was dropped, this word *to* (that is, *act*) became necessary to be prefixed, in order to distinguish them from *nouns*, and to invest them with the verbal character; for there is no difference between the noun *love* and the verb *to love* but what must be comprised in the prefix To. The infinitive, therefore, appears plainly to be what the Stoics called it, the very verb itself, pure and uncompounded with the various accidents of *mood*, of *number*, of

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* Taui; act, effect, result, consummation.

gender, of *person,* and, in English, of *tense;* which accidents are in some languages joined to the verb by variety of *termination,* and in some by an *additional word* signifying the *added termination.* And if our *English* Grammarians and Philosophers had trusted something less to their reading, and a little more to their own reflection, the very awkwardness and imperfection of our own language in this particular of the infinitive, would have been a great benefit to them in all their difficulties about the *verb,* and would have led them to understand and explain that, which the perfection of more artificial and improved languages contributed to conceal from others. For it is a great advantage, which an *English* Philosopher has over those who are acquainted with such languages only which do this business by *termination.* For though there are good reasons to believe that all these *terminations* may likewise be traced to their respective origin, and that, however *artificial* they may now appear to us, they were not originally the effect of premeditated and deliberate *art,* but separate words, by length of time corrupted and coalescing with the words of which they are now considered as the *terminations;* yet this was less likely to be suspected by others. And if it had been suspected, they would have had much farther to travel to their journey's end, and through a road much more embarrassed; as the corruption in those languages is of much longer standing than in ours, and more complex."*

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* Div. of Purley, vol. i. p. 350, et seq.

The English grammarians " should not have re-
peated the error that the infinitive was a mere
noun; since it was found necessary in English to
add another word (namely) *to*, merely to distinguish
the *infinitive* from the *noun*, after the infinitive had
lost that distinguishing termination, which it had
formerly." " There are certainly other parts of
the English verb, undistinguished from the noun
by termination; but the truth is, that to them also
(and to those parts only which have not a distin-
guishing termination) as well as to the infinitive,
is this distinguishing *sign* equally necessary and
equally *prefixed*. Do (the *auxiliary* verb, as it
has been called) is derived from the same root, and
is indeed the same word as *to*. The difference be-
tween a T and a D is so very small, that an etymolo-
gist knows by the practice of languages, and an
anatomist by the *reason* of that practice, that in the
derivation of words it is scarcely worth regarding.*
And for the same reason that TO is put before the
infinitive, DO used formerly to be put before such
other parts of the verb, which likewise were not
distinguished from the noun by termination. And
as we still say, I DO *love*, instead of I love. And
I DO*ed* or DID *love*, instead of I loved. But it is
worth while to observe, that if a distinguishing
termination is used, then the distinguishing DO or
DID must be omitted, the termination fulfilling its
office. And therefore we never find—I DID loved,
or he DOTH loveth. But I DID love. He DOTH
love.

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* See ante, p. 31.

" It is not indeed an approved practice at present, to use DO before those parts of the *verb,* they being now by custom sufficiently distinguished by their place. And therefore the redundancy is now avoided, and DO is considered, in that case, as unnecessary and expletive.

However it is still used, and is the common practice, and should be used, whenever the distinguishing *place* is disturbed by interrogation, or by the *insertion* of a *negation,* or of some other words between the nominative case and the verb. As—

He *does* not *love* the truth.

Does he love the truth?

He *does* at the same time *love* the truth.

And if we choose to avoid the use of this *verbal sign,* DO, we must supply its place by a distinguishing termination to the verb. As—

He lov*eth* not the truth.

Lov*eth* he the truth?

He at the same time lov*eth* the truth.

Or where the verb has not a distinguishing termination (as in plurals).

They *do* not *love* the truth.

Do they *love* the truth?

They *do* at the same time *love* the truth.

Here if we wish to avoid the *verbal sign,* we must remove the negative, or other intervening word or words, from between the nominative case and the verb; and so restore the distinguishing place. As—

They *love* not the truth.

Love they the truth?

At the same time they *love* the truth: or—

They, at the same time, *love* the truth."*

And thus these methods of using To and Do,
" arise from the peculiar method, which the English
language has taken to arrive at the same necessary
end, which other languages attain by distinguish-
ing *termination.*"

Case, gender, number, are no parts of the noun.
Mood, tense, number, person, are no parts of the
verb.   But these same circumstances, frequently
accompanying the noun and the verb, are then sig-
nified by other words expressive of these circum-
stances: and again, in some languages, these latter
words, by their perpetual recurrence, have coa-
lesced with the noun and verb; their separate sig-
nification has been lost sight of (except in their
proper application), and these words have been
considered as mere artificial terminations of the
noun and verb.   The proper application of these
coalesced words, or terminations, to nouns, has
been called declension; and to verbs, has been
called conjugation.

[From this discussion on the virtue of the pre-
position *to,* it is clear that *place* has some claim to
consideration; since by it the verb may sometimes
be distinguished, and in such cases the prefix *to* or
do may be dispensed with. We have already been
instructed in the effect of *place,* that is of position or
apposition, as it concerned the prepositions, when
those prepositions are nouns, that each of them,
ejusmodi est ut ex eâ et aliâ substantiâ (to which it
is prefixed, postfixed, or in any manner attached)

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* Div. of Purley, v. i. p 355, et seq.

unum intelligi queat.* We have also seen that
the apposition or adjection denoted by the hyphen
has the full force of an adjective termination. It
seems to follow that if *place* could always discrimi-
nate with sufficient clearness and certainty the
usage of a noun, as noun merely, as the " *de quo*,"
or the " materia sermonis," from its usage as the
" *quod loquimur*," or the " vis sermonis," there
would be no necessity for any established prefix or
postfix to accomplish the purpose.]

But as place was not found at all times adequate
to the discrimination required, some additional
word, as a constant prefix or postfix, was resorted
to for the purpose.

In our language when the Anglo-Saxon ter-
mination was dropped, the additional word TO or
DO was employed as a prefix. And TO, so pre-
fixed, *makes the noun* to which it is prefixed a
verb; (such is our Author's homely expression,)†
invests it with a verbal character; constitutes the
infinitive or very verb itself; and thus at the same
time shows that the infinitive is not a mere noun,
as some grammarians have taught.

When we write DO before a noun, we call it an
auxiliary verb; we should call it an auxiliary noun;

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* Diversions of Purley, i. 194, et supra, p. 63.

† Dr. Lowth says, " The preposition TO before the verb makes
the infinitive mood." Now this is manifestly not so, for TO placed
before the verb *loveth*, will not make the infinitive mood. He
would have said more truly that *to*, placed before *some* nouns,
makes verbs. (Diversions of Purley, vol. i. p. 352, note.)
[Lowth's verb is no verb, until *to* is placed before it. Neither
will *to* make all nouns verbs; it will not make LOVER, a verb,
though it will make LOVE one.]

and as, when preposed to a noun, it invests that noun with a verbal character, we thus arrive at the *quod loquimur—Act*, and the sensation consequent; but as every act must have an agent, and every consequence a cause, we necessarily look for the noun, the name of the person or thing, *de quo*, that act is spoken; and, by virtue of the two, complete a sentence, or, as the logicians term it, proposition.

It is the part of this proposition to affirm or deny, and it must, as the logicians also express themselves, consist of the subject (subjectum est *id* de *quo*) and the predicate (prædicatum est *id quod* de *eo*, affirmatur vel negatur).

Neither *to* love or *do* love affirm or deny any thing of any thing; both noun and verb, as grammarians and logicians teach, are necessary for that purpose; or some word, *pro nomine*, as *I* do love.

But though *to* or *do* love affirm nothing, they are in a condition to do so; they *can* or *may* do so, they form one complex term, and are *affirmative;** they are affirmative of act with agent, and being so affirmative of *act*, and of *act* alone, the title of NOUN ACTIVE may with significant propriety be applied to designate the something more, that the verb is than the mere noun, or noun substantive.

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* We must bear in mind the important force of distinct terminations; and of the difference on which our Author consequently insists between adject*ed*, and adject*ive*; between that which *is* *laid* close, and that which *may lie* close. " One word, or one termination," our Author insists, " should be used with one signification, and for one purpose." It is worthy of remark that the names of moods terminate in *ive*.

In like manner, it has before appeared that the circumstance " can or may adject," is the something more that the noun adjective is, than the noun substantive.

But the verb is a noun affirmative; a noun that can or may, by the help of another noun, affirm or complete an affirmation. And thus we arrive at that operation of language, commonly called an operation of the mind; namely, that of affirming, or in one word (as Wallis suggests) of *asserting*; of which I have spoken sufficiently at the beginning of this little book.*

We may now complete our definition of a verb; or description of its functions in the operations of language.

A Verb, or noun active, or affirmative of ACT, is the complex name, affirmative of a mere noun, that is, the substantive noun, or its substitute, a pronoun; (the *de quo*) with itself, the noun active, (the *quod* loquimur); and thus, when the affirmation is made, when the noun and verb are ad-firmed, a proposition is formed affirming WHAT with THAT of which.

And this affirmative power of our preposed TO or DO is denoted in the classical and other languages by a termination or sequent word; observing an order the reverse of our own.

Ought I not, to use the expression of Johnson, ought I not " to tremble at my own temerity," when I say, this is my answer to the long unan-

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* Remarks on the three first chapters.

swered question, "What is the verb? What is that peculiar differential circumstance, which, added to the definition of the noun, constitutes the verb?"

But the matter does not end here. In what manner is the verb to contribute in the application of this system of language, of " this clothing of the whole nature of man,"* to the different systems of metaphysics, which our Author stigmatizes with the name of " Metaphysical (that is), of verbal imposture."

QUID VALEANT HUMERI is a fearful question for an octogenarian to answer; one too who is very sensibly conscious that he is no Entellus to wield the gauntlets of Eryx. Nor would he indeed have been so bold, at a time of life when memory fails, and perception dims, as to attempt the labour of this little volume, if at this hour he had had to encounter the difficulty of providing and preparing the materials for it.†

The mantle of Horne Tooke has long remained unhonoured by a claimant; nor is it my ambition to aspire to that character. My views are less lofty; and my exertions will be discreetly directed to illustrating the virtue (if I may so say) of the VERB, and to nothing more. Yet not without a hope to avail something by this restricted effort.

I will begin with the often quoted words, TO love, or DO love. To or DO, otherwise ACT or CAUSE is placed in apposition, with the name of the consequence or effect, the sensation LOVE: and so in all other cases. In *to* or *do* laugh, burn,

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* See ante, p. 97.   † See ante, Pref. p. 1.

lament, &c. the infinitives or very verbs them‑
selves; act or cause is placed in apposition with
effect or consequence,—the sensation laugh, burn,
lament, &c. and *to* or *do* laugh, burn, lament, mean
respectively—cause sensations, laugh, burn, la‑
ment.

And I DO love, consequently means, I *do* cause
(to myself) the sensation—LOVE: that is, the
sensation of which the mere or substantive noun
LOVE, is the name. And so again in all the other
cases, laugh, burn, lament, &c.

To apply this interpretation to other common
usages of speech:—

The sun *is* hot.   He *is* hot.

The bell *rings*.   He *rings* the bell.

The rose *smells* sweet.   I smell a rose.

That horse *walks* well.   I *walked* my horse home.

That horse *runs* fast.   I *ran* that horse at Ascot.

He *eats* no bread.   The bread *eats* stale.

He *drinks* no beer.   The beer *drinks* sour, &c.

And this exposition of the virtue or peculiar
function of the verb, I shall further practically ex‑
emplify and enforce in the following remarks on
the words

SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT.

TO such of my younger readers (and of such I
hope there will be many) who are not lost
in the metaphysical distinction of THING (*Rei* seu
Ent-is) into Substance and Accident, it may be

useful and sufficient for them to know, that Substance was the ENS PER SE, and Accident the ENTIS ENS (which I cannot undertake to translate into English). Those true, and truly sagacious philosophers, the authors of the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus,* to whom I have before been indebted, will illustrate the many Aristotelean accidents to which substance is exposed, as the Doctors of the Schools were accustomed to expound them, and will at the same time acquaint them with the learned names by which they are honoured in our treatises on Logic.

" Cornelius," they tell us, " was forced to give Martin sensible images. Thus, calling up the coachman, he asked him what he had seen in the Bear-Garden? The man answered, he saw two *men* fight a prize; one was a *fair* man, a Sergeant in the Guards; the other *black*, a butcher; the Sergeant had *red breeches*, the butcher *blue;* they fought upon a *stage*, about *four* o'clock, and the Serjeant *wounded* the butcher in the leg. Mark (quoth Cornelius) how the fellow runs through the PREDICAMENTS, MEN, *substantia;* TWO, *quantities;* FAIR and BLACK, *qualitas;* SERJEANT and BUTCHER, *relatio;* WOUNDED THE OTHER, *actio* et *passio;* FIGHTING, *situs;* STAGE, *ubi;* TWO o'CLOCK, *quando; Blue and red* BREECHES, *habitus.*"

I do not know how these far-famed categories or predicaments of the great Father of logic can be more effectually or agreeably impressed on the

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* Chap. 7.

minds of those for whom I intend them, than by
the above lesson of Cornelius; and for quoting it, I
plead the authority of the most sensible of Roman
poets:—

> Ridentem dicere verum
> Quid vetat?

It is unfortunate that our Author has left no
exposition of any one word ending in *ence* or *ance*,
from the Latin present participle. I will conclude
with an attempt to apply his general principles to
a word in *ance*, that has been, and is likely long to
be, the cause of many a fierce debate—the word
SUBSTANCE.

SUBSTANCE is aliquid *substans*, id quod *substat*;
any thing understanding, or that which stands
under, and thus sustains any thing that stands or
is placed upon it; as the foot sustains the leg; the
leg the thigh; and the thigh the rest of the body.

Everywhere indeed we observe substance;—
above, beneath, around, there is substance support-
ing substance: there is the great globe * itself for
man and beast to rest and move upon; there is the
expanse of waters, on which leviathan may float;
there is the air aloft, on which the winged bird
may sustain its flight. All this was obvious enough,
but it did not satisfy the subtle perspicuity of the
philosopher; and he unfortunately introduced the
distinction between SUBSTANCE and ACCIDENT,
maintaining that accidents are not substances; and
seeing throughout the universe substance support-

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* Itself (the sacred historian tells us), *sup*ported: " The pillars
of the earth are the Lord's, and he hath set the world upon them."
—1 *Sam.* ii. 8.

ing substance, and that such support was a neces-
sary condition, they supposed an equal necessity
for a something, an aliquid *substans* or substratum,
" to sustain, maintain, or hold together, the quali-
ties or accidents of matter and spirit."

This word will strikingly exemplify the assertion
of our Author, that the main subject of Locke's
Essay was the force of terms; and if Locke had
been aware of that, and had judiciously availed
himself at the outset of the aid of etymology, and
kept it faithfully in sight, as he proceeded in his
enquiries, he would have kept clear of the confu-
sion in which he is confessedly involved.

In his chapter on Innate Principles * he intro-
duces us to this word SUBSTANCE; and all that he
there or afterwards has to say concerning it relates
to the meaning, of which it is the sign.   He first
tells us that, " we signify *nothing* by it, but only an
uncertain supposition of we know not what (that
is, of something, whereof we have no particular
distinct positive) idea, which we take to be the *sub-
stratum*, or support, of those ideas we do know."
And, subsequently, when treating of this *uncertain
supposition* of we know not what, as a complex
idea, he says, " *It* is but a supposed I know not
what, to support those ideas we call *accidents*."†
A more perfect description of a nonentity could
scarcely be invented.

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* B. i. c. 4, § 18.

† B. ii. c. 23, § 15.   The whole of this chapter requires to be
carefully perused.   Such *explanations* as the above, of the word
Substance, are frequently repeated.

It is in this same chapter, " of the complex ideas of substances," that he so admirably illustrates his great difficulties in treating of such " creatures of the mind," by a reference to the Indian, who fancied an elephant to be the support of the world; a tortoise to be the support of the elephant, and this same " I know not what" of the tortoise.

He then seems to catch a glimpse of the use of etymology, and to obtain a temporary relief from it. " Those qualities," he says, " we find *existing,* we imagine cannot *subsist,* ' sine re substante,' without something to support them, and we call that support *substantia,* which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, " *standing* under or upholding."* And thus it is that the meaning of the word *substance,* as a general term, comes within the scope of the reasoning which I have applied to the words *difference* and *resemblance.* Wherever these latter are used, and no sensible quality exists, it is not the immediate sign of *an* idea; and whenever the word *substance* is used, and no *res* or aliquid *substans* exists, *it* is not the sign of *an* idea, but both are the complex and general signs or names of a collection of ideas—of things differing, things resembling, things subsisting. And this of necessity, for " Our faculties," says Locke most truly, " carry us no farther towards the knowledge and distinction of substances, than a *collection of those sensible ideas* (' simple ideas co-existent together')†which we observe in them."‡

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* B. ii. c. 23, § 2.   † B. ii. c. 23, § 3.   ‡ B. iii. c. 6, § 9.

In other words, that our ideas of substances are nothing else than a collection of ideas, of sensible qualities or accidents united in one object;—of a variety of colours and forms, for instance, so united in one object,—a tree, a bird,—and each making its simple, single, distinct impression on the mind. And of these collections, as I have before expressed myself, we employ the complex and general term *substance* as the name or sign.

In his letter to the Bishop of Worcester,* I must observe, Locke again makes a reference to etymology ; " I suppose it will be true that *substantia* is derived from *a substando*, and that that shows the original import of the word." And that he was fully aware of the essential importance of knowing the original import of words, that is, of their intrinsic meaning—the impressions or ideas of which they are the sign—in writing concerning the human understanding, he thus plainly, in the same letter, tells us : " I have ever, my Lord, long been of opinion, as may be seen in my book,† that if we knew the original of all the words we meet with, we should thereby be very much helped to know the ideas they were first applied to, and made to stand for." " I doubt not," he says in another place,‡ " but if we could trace them to their sources, we should find, in all languages, the names for *things*, that fall not under our senses, to have had their first rise from sensible ideas. By

* Works, vol. i. p. 471, 4to. edition.
† See, particularly, b. iii. c. 1. " Of Words or Language in general." ‡ Id. ib. § 5.

which we may give some kind of guess, what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds who were the first beginners of language; and how Nature, even in the naming of things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge."* Locke saw the right course, but did not pursue it, and the perplexing consequences to himself are manifest throughout the whole of his great work.

As I am naturally carried on from the opinions of Locke to those of Berkeley, I shall be excused for repeating the trite observation, that the " Essay on the Human Understanding," prepared the way for " The Principles of Human Knowledge;" for so, to *some extent,* it did. †

The remarks I have already made, on the connection of language with the philosophy of the former, have obviously prepared the way for those I have now to make on some tenets maintained by the latter, with a logical subtlety to which it would be difficult to find a rival.

Every acquisition of knowledge gains for us a footing for a further advance; and that for which Locke is so justly famed, as I have before had occasion to observe, is by the reasoning which he employed to prove the truth of a position almost as old as philosophy itself.   Of the same antiquity is the doctrine which Berkeley undertook to confirm

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* See ante, the quotation from " Guesses at Truth."

† This work was published twenty years after the Essay; five after the death of Locke; when Berkeley had just completed his twenty-fifth year.

by reasoning: but he was no sceptic; he had no
doubt of the soundness of his own conclusions as a
philosopher, nor of his own knowledge, and means
of acquiring it, as a man.

Locke had proved that from our senses, and
from them alone, we receive all our ideas; Berke-
ley endeavoured to mark the extent to which our
senses can carry us in the acquisition of ideas, and
in doing so effectually banished a substratum of
material qualities: for this undoubtedly Locke
had prepared the way; he had reduced this sub-
stratum to a *nescio quid;* and maintained that our
senses could not carry us to a knowledge of it.
But Berkeley's object was not only to destroy but
to establish: to destroy what he considered to be the
main pillar and support of scepticism, atheism, fa-
talism, and idolatry.   And this was the doctrine
" vulgarly held by philosophers: That the sensi-
ble qualities *exist** in an inert, extended unper-
ceiving substance,† which they call *matter,* to
which they attribute a natural subsistence,‡ exte-
rior to all thinking beings, or distinct from being
perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal
mind of the Creator, wherein they suppose—only
ideas of the corporeal substances created by him;
if indeed they allow them to be at all created."§

This was the doctrine he meant to destroy; and

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* That is, cause a sensation of existence.

† That is, in re substante.

‡ The reader will find in Locke's Works (vol. i. p. 734) an
amusing dialogue on *subsistence* between the Socia of Plautus, and
a Countryman.   § Principles, § 91.

here he should have rested content with his suc-
cess.   That which he proposed to establish was,
" That the unthinking beings (that is, sensible
qualities) perceived by sense, have no existence
distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore
exist in any other substance, than those unextended,
indivisible substances, or *spirits*, which act, and
think, and perceive them."* He coincides with
Locke, that " all sensible *qualities* have need of a
support, as not being able to subsist by themselves."
And he endeavours to relieve his theory from a
strong prejudice against it, by declaring that " If
there be any thing which makes the generality of
mankind averse from the notions I espouse, it is a
misapprehension† that I deny the reality of sensible
things :"—Sensible *things* and sensible *qualities* are
equivalent terms.

And it is in the distinction between substances
and sensible qualities (inasmuch as the latter re-
quired the support of the former), that we are re-
called to the distinction made by grammarians in
their distribution of language into parts of speech,‡
and in so doing, of considering the noun substan-
tive to be the name of substances, and the noun
adjective to be the name of attributes, accidents,
or qualities, " a word added to the substantive to
express its quality,"§ or which " only implies an
attribute." ‖

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* Principles, § 91.
† Works, vol. i. p. 187.   Third Dialogue.   See also, p. 42.
‡ See ante, chap. 1.   § Lowth.
‖ Harris, chap. 10.   On this supposed difference between sub-

If our Author's doctrine * be true, that the noun adjective is a noun substantive, and something more, we approach the root of the matter. But I must here premise that these observations can only affect those who may be now satisfied that they can safely go so far with our Author, and with all who are not " dark with excess of bright," as to believe, in the first place, that they receive impressions or ideas from sensible objects, that is, from things, the causes of impressions; and in the second, that words are the names or signs of those objects, as perceived by the mind.

We speak, for instance, of a *leaden* bowl; we attribute to the bowl, as accident or quality, the thing, objected before us, *lead;* the sensible object (called substance), with its ideas or impressions of colour and form are here obvious enough. But there are other adjectives which we cannot so easily trace to the *thing,* of which they include within their meaning the name or sign; but if we are convinced that all nouns—substantive and adjective —are signs or names of things, and not of things alone, as causes of our ideas or impressions, but of these latter as the effect of those causes, it follows that all adjectives attribute substances to sub-

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stances " and modes and properties," or accidents, Dr. Watts could perceive that we were led into a mistake " by the grammatical form and use of words." And that " perhaps our logical way of thinking by *substances* and *modes,* as well as our grammatical way of talking by *substantives* and *adjectives,* help to delude us into the supposition." Logic, part i. chap. 2, note. The errors of the Logician and of the Grammarian are alike.

* Infra, chap. 6, on adjectives.

stances, whether under the name of substance, accident, or quality.

Substance, it has been said, is *res substans,* and is used with a subaudition of *res.* Accident, in like manner, is *res accidens,* and is also used with a subaudition of *res.* Quantitas, says Wallis, most truly, non differt a *re* (vel substantia) *quanta;* qualitas, it may be added, non differt a *re* (vel substantia) *quali.* Sensible qualities, or qualities that may be felt, by which the mind may be acted or affected, I conclude are things or substances— *quales.* We cannot abstract or separate the *quales* or the *quanta,* the *accidens* or *substans,* from the thing either in thought or speech. That these sensible qualities, that these things, says Berkeley, which " I see with mine eyes, and touch with my hands, do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. I do not argue against the existence of any *thing* that we can apprehend either by sense or reflection."* He fully admits of *substances* or *things* as combinations of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, &c., of which qualities we can have no idea but as of a thing extended, solid, &c. It is against that *thing*—neither Substans, nor existens, nor accidens, quanta, nor qualis, of which we have no idea; this substratum or substance, under the name of " Matter or material substance," as a support of accidents or qualities without the mind, that the ingenuity of Berkeley is aimed. For instance, I see with my

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* Principles, § 35.

eyes, and press with my hand, a table: I perceive
its colour and figure, its solidity and smoothness,
but with this I am not content: I wish to go
further than my senses will carry me,—transcen-
dentally out of my senses (to use a common and
very appropriate phrase); I require a substance, a
substratum, an aliquid substans, which shall sup-
port these sensible qualities of the table, as the legs
support its surface, and as its surface supports the
pressure of my hand.   And of this substance the
Bishop continues to say, " If the word *substance* be
taken," he further says, " in a *philosophic* sense for
the support of accidents or qualities *without* the
mind ; then, indeed, I acknowledge that we take it
away, if one may be said to take away that which
never had any existence, not even in the imagina-
tion."*

Berkeley, admitting the existence of things, and
external causes, as causes of ideas; of things, as
combinations of sensible qualities, of which the
mind receives impressions or ideas, admits that
there is an occasional impropriety in his usage of
the word *idea;* as the word *idea* is not used in
common discourse to signify the several combina-
tions of sensible qualities called *things,* as it might
be concluded that we eat and drink our ideas, and
are clothed with our ideas, as the qualities that
" constitute the several sorts of victuals and appa-
rel exist only in the mind that perceives them."†
If, from a knowledge of the causes and reasons of
language, he had been aware that the verb, TO

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* Principles, § 37.   † Ibid. § 38.

EXIST, meant, " To cause the sensation, impression, or idea of existence, or of things existing," he would have given a more satisfactory reason than he has done for allowing " that as we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate *objects* of sense, *things* would have been the more proper word ;" although these objects, these *res objectæ*, cannot exist, cannot cause the idea of existence, unperceived or without the mind.   This is no more than to say, that they cannot cause a sensation, or impression, or idea of existence, where there is no percipient or mind to receive it :—And this coincides completely with the dictum of Tooke, " No man, no truth."

And here I must request the reader to bear in mind what has been before said of affirmation and negation, difference and resemblance; right and truth—including thing. Also the few remarks addressed to the objections of the late Professor Stewart, to Dr. Whately and Mr. Smart.

It would have been well for philosophy if philosophers had sometimes amused themselves with experiments in conformity with a rule proposed, but not observed, by Dr. Johnson, for his own direction, that " the explanation and the word explained should always be reciprocal," and if they had in the prosecution of their inquiries sometimes made an interchange of word and explanation, they must soon have found themselves lost in a wilderness of words, pursuing fictiohs or creatures of their own minds; such as existences and substances, or subsistencies, without a thing existent or subsistent; and as attributes, with nothing to attribute.

It is not necessary for me to enter further into the very ingeniously profuse expenditure of words, with which our two illustrious countrymen may both be justly charged, and from which a knowledge of the causes and reasons of philosophical grammar would have preserved them. Yet I feel it due to them, and the Author of " The Diversions of Purley" also, to subjoin a few observations, or rather the materials for the reader to make his own observations, with respect to the advance that, it may be presumed, has been made beyond the Essay of Locke and the Principles of Berkeley. I think it will appear on examination into their works, that little else has been presented to us hitherto by modern doctors of metaphysics than old tenets under new names: that names are still the great subjects of debate, and that such must continue to be the case, until the inseparable connection of thought and speech be investigated and understood, and acknowledged also, as the only safe foundation for further inquiries and further progress.

" In all German systems," says Mr. Carlyle,* " since the time of Kant, it is the first principle to deny the existence of matter;" that is, as Berkeley denies it; and so far, the German philosophers are just where Berkeley led and left them.

The next step seems to have been to the EGO and NON EGO—the subject and object—in other words (to borrow from Sir William Hamilton), " the ideally known, as opposed to the really existent."

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* Miscellanies, vol. ii.

These correlations Sir William Hamilton* has detected in the expressions of Aristotle, the τα ημιν, and the τα φυσει, the things in *us*, and the things in *nature*.

And he also observes, that Berkeley has used the word *objectively* in the manner it is now used: but no instance has been found in him of the use, as its opposite, of *subjectively*.   Bishop Pearson, however, supplies one: " And thus I have proved that the name of God, absolutely taken and placed *subjectively*, is sometimes to be understood of Christ."—*On the Creed*, Art. 2.†

The manner in which these words are now used is thus more fully explained by the very learned editor of Reid :—‡

" The EGO, as the subject of thought and knowledge, is now commonly styled by philosophers simply the *subject;* and the *subjective* is a familiar expression for what pertains to the mind, or thinking principle.   In contrast or correlation to these, the terms *object* and *objective* are in like manner now in general use, to denote the NON EGO, its affections and properties ; and, in general, the really existent, as opposed to the ideally known."

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* I think it is to be much regretted that Sir William Hamilton does not apply the great powers of his mind, and his extraordinary learning, on an original composition, rather than on editing and criticising the works of others.

† It is thus explained by Todd, who introduced it into Johnson's Dictionary, " Relating not to the object but the subject." Dr. Watts in his Logic, Part ii. c. 2, § 8, states the difference between objective and subjective certainty.   The one he concludes to be " in *things*, the other in our minds."

‡ Reid's Works, vol. i. p. 806, n.

Coleridge concludes his reveries on the matter thus:—" Now the sum of all that is merely *objective*, we will henceforth call *Nature*, confining the term to its passive and material sense, as comprising all the *phænomena* by which its existence is made known to us. On the other hand, the sum of all that is *subjective* we may comprehend in the name of *self*, or *intelligence*."

The following passage from Berkeley will show that the only modern novelty is in words, or in adopting new names for old tenets.*

" Besides all that endless variety of ideas, or *objects of knowledge*, there is likewise *something*, which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them. This *perceiving, active being* is what I call mind, spirit, or MYSELF."† And there are other passages running throughout his Principles and Dialogues to precisely the same effect.

The phenomena of Coleridge are the sensible qualities of Locke and Berkeley; and *his self*, or intelligence is *their* sentient or percipient being, and Berkeley's MYSELF.

I will produce two or three more short passages, in addition to the above, and to those I have before had occasion to quote, in which Berkeley's doctrines appear to me to be the germs of those *that*

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* And even these new names, though " ratified and convenient," the Professor pronounces to be *ambiguous*, and proposes that each in turn should be proteron and each hysteron; thus, subject-object, and object-subject, that is, ideal-real, and real-ideal.   † Principles, § 2.

have been maintained by the successors of Kant: perhaps they may prove to be so of those which *they may* hereafter maintain.

" The vulgar are of opinion, that those *things* they immediately perceive are the *real things;* and the philosophers, that the *things* immediately perceived are *ideas, which exist only* in the mind; which two notions put together do in effect constitute the substance of what I advance."*

" If by *ideas* you mean *objects* of the understanding, or *sensible things,* which cannot exist† unperceived or out of the mind, then these *things* are *ideas.*"‡

" I am not for changing *things*§ into *ideas,* but rather *ideas* into *things,* since those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only *appearances* of things, I take to be the *real things* themselves."‖

A few words will not be inappropriate here on the terms *in*ternal and *ex*ternal, with*in* and with*out,* so constantly occurring in the discussions of philosophical speculators, on the existence of an external world. They do not seem to have taken the trouble to answer to themselves the question, What do we mean by this word *external?* They should have considered that it is a name which we

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* Works, vol. i. p. 216, Third Dialogue.
† That is, " cause the sensation of existence."↑
‡ Works, vol. i. p. 203.
§ See in v. TRUTH : Observations on THING.
‖ Works, vol. i. p. 187, Third Dialogue.

give to denote certain sensations different from those to which we give the name of *internal;* that each class of sensations has causes different from the other, to which the different name is given.

A bird in the hand, and a bird in a bush, are different objects, and cause different sensations; and, with relation to the hand, are distinguished by the names of internal and external. So also, a bowler at cricket receives different sensations from the ball in his hand, and the ball delivered against his adversary's wicket. To these sensations, with relation to the hand, are given these names of IN-TERNAL and EXTERNAL, and to all bodies, all objects, in the same relation the same names are given; and they *are* so—*external* and *internal,* as they cause the same different sensations.

Buffon imagines a man, just newly brought into existence, describing the illusion of his first sensations, and pointing out the steps by which he arrived at REALITY; and this was effected by touching an object, which he found to be no part of himself.

He opened his eyes: he imagined (' those accidents') the azure of the sky, the verdure of the earth, the crystal of the waters, to make a part of himself.

He closed his eyes, and was in darkness; he heard the whistling of the wind and the melody of the grove; a light breeze wafted perfumes to his sense of smell, and he was persuaded that all this music, all these odours, were internal,—were within himself.

He opened his eyes again, and saw all restored that in darkness he had lost.*

He moved, and every object appeared in motion.

He touched his person: every part he touched returned the touch—sensation for sensation.

He holds his hand at different distances before his eyes, finds his sight to give uncertain information, and resolves to rely on his sense of touch.

Again he moves; he strikes against a palm-tree; the palm-tree does not return sensation for sensation, as his own person, in every part of it, had done; and he perceives that there is something *external*, and which is not within himself, does not make a part of himself.

This imaginary man had his senses about him, and he had learned much from them in a short time; he had learned that the palm-tree was a THING that he could touch as well as see: that it was a thing sensible by two senses—solid, extended, figured; that he could only see the azure of the sky, the verdure of the earth, the crystal of the waters; that he could only hear the whistling of the wind and the melody of the groves; that he could only smell the perfumes wafted by the breeze. But he had not yet arrived at the subtlety of distinguishing these sensations by the names of primary and secondary qualities.

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* The apparitions that flit before us in dreams and frenzies, afford no confirmation to Berkeley's assertion, "That the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas." § 18. "For the dreams of sleeping men are," says Locke, "made up of waking men's ideas."—B. ii. c. 1, § 17.

He has learned that when he has closed his eyes there is a something wanting that with open eyes he saw; he cannot find that something within himself; a certain impression or idea remains there, but the things themselves are not;—he cannot touch them there, and he learns the distinction between within and without; between things as thoughts of his mind, and things as causes of those thoughts.

Analogous is the distinction before described, of the bird in the hand and the bird in the bush; of the ball in the hand, and the ball in its rapid course to the goal; and to the attendant sensations under the respective circumstances.*

I have said that the ESSAY of Locke may be allowed to have prepared the way for the PRINCIPLES of Berkeley to a certain extent. The difference between the doctrines of Locke and Tooke and those of Bishop Berkeley, was great in various respects. The two former considered things themselves to be *res objectæ* to the senses; and thus the causes of sensations received through those senses, and through them alone, and known only by their effects, and these effects called IDEAS.

Berkeley would change *ideas* into *things*, maintain that they were the real things themselves, and thus assimilate or identify the distinct causes and effects of Locke and Tooke.

He allowed the existence of things, or that things exist; that is, if the words have any meaning, cause the sensations or ideas of their existence, or of their being things existing; but would not allow

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* I must again refer to what I have before said of this word THING.

that they were existences in themselves, not the agents causing the sensations, but simply the agencies, or efficiencies rather, of the Supreme Being, without any intermediate causes, that is, without the interposition of any causes at all.

He agreed with Locke and Tooke as to the origin of ideas;—with Tooke he discarded Locke's doctrine of abstract or general ideas, and contended with Tooke, that words only were general or abstract. Further, he admitted external causes of ideas, that is, causes which act or produce effects on sentient beings, when being or existing within the reach of their action. He maintains the reality of sensible things:—if he had any meaning, language fails him in his attempt to express it; for if these words have any signification, it is that things are things, and nothing more or less. But yet it appears that though things are sensible things, that is, things that may be felt, they are not the causes of what is felt, that is, of our sensations. They are not *substances*.

Agreeing with Locke, " that all sensible qualities have need of a support," he rejects the " I know not what," assumed by his great predecessor in his search for a *general* idea of Substance, and maintains that the only substance or support in which unthinking beings or sensible qualities can exist is SPIRIT, even the Eternal Invisible Mind.*

True indeed it is that to this Eternal Invisible

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* " Since," he says, " we are affected from without, we must allow powers (that is, things having power) to be without in a being distinct from ourselves. I will have it to be spirit; you matter."—*Principles*, Part i. § 2.

Mind we owe our being: " that," to use the ever quoted expressions of the Apostle, " he giveth life to all, and breath, and all things," that " in Him we live and move, and have our being;" that we are created with senses, that we *are* sentient beings; that sensible objects exist, that they *are;* that they cause sensations of their existence in us, different objects, different sensations; that things internal, as the bird in the hand, and things external, as the bird in a bush, are different objects, and cause different sensations.

It is to this Eternal Invisible Mind that we owe our own minds, and all the faculties of our minds; by which we are empowered to will and to do; the faculty of uttering articulate sounds, of making those sounds stand as signs of our ideas; of employing them to communicate those, our ideas, to others; of using them to signify one, or few, or many; of bringing them together as signs of collections, of combining, comparing, permuting these so signified collections; of using them abstractedly without immediate reference to any thing or idea; of constructing them into all those general laws, which regulate the moral and physical world, and by their instrumentality of acquiring all the knowledge we possess; even that which, as beings created with finite faculties, we possess of Him— the Eternal Invisible Mind—the Author of All.

It has not been forgotten, I hope, that according to the theory of language and correspondent philosophy, against which the doctrines of the Diversions of Purley are directed, " There must be as many differences of things as of signs," and as of things, so of ideas.   Hence it followed that finding language to abound with complex, abstract, and general terms, they concluded that there must be so many complex, abstract, and general ideas.   They could not otherwise account for the terms.   Though sufficiently aware that it was language that perplexed them, and though the cry was almost unanimous that *to* language they must look for aid to resolve their perplexities; not one has directed himself to the right source for that purpose—the manner of signification of words.

This task our Author took upon himself to perform, and I have, I trust, laid before the reader proof amply sufficient of his success.   He has accounted for what the old grammarians could not— the origin of those terms, their manner of signification, and shown that they alone are complex, general, and abstract.* And he has thus relieved the philosopher from the composition of ideas and from the supposed existence of abstraction as an operation of the mind.

And yet, it must be confessed, we still find ourselves plunged and lost by modern writers of highest distinction in the wild waste of abstract

* See ante, vol. i. chap. 2; and see vol. ii. ch. 2, for the opinions of Berkeley on abstract ideas and general terms.

and complex ideas; those ideas which, as Berkeley in his time said, " are in an especial manner thought to be the object of those sciences, which go by the name of logic and metaphysics, and of all that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime learning," (such as the transcendentalism of the present day,) " and in all which one shall scarcely find any question handled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is well acquainted with them."*

* Berkeley, Principles. Introd. § 6.

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